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Abstract
This thesis consists of four essays on the determinants, the dynamics and the 
policy implications of simultaneous job creation and destruction in labour mar­
kets. Firstly, it proposes and solves a stochastic search model with endogenous 
job separation and it shows that the amplitude and time variation of job real­
location depend crucially upon the arrival rate of exogenous firing permissions. 
Tighter firing restrictions, albeit not directly relevant for differences in average 
unemployment rates, dramatically reduce the relative volatility of job creation 
and destruction. A parameterization of the model can rationalise cross-country 
differences in the cyclical behaviour of job creation and destruction.
Secondly, it brings together aggregate data on job reallocation and labour 
market policy for nine OECD countries. It shows that long term  unemployment 
and job reallocation are negatively correlated and that job reallocation is lower 
in countries that offer limited benefit for a limited period of time.
Thirdly, it studies the role of time-consuming search in generating the size 
distribution of firms and the dynamics of firm-level turnover. It solves a dynamic 
matching model where the joint distribution of wages and employment results 
from interacting idiosyncratic shocks, firm-level asymmetries in job creation and 
destruction and time-consuming search on the part of workers. Theoretical results 
offer a structural interpretation of existing empirical evidence on firm-size wage 
differentials and point out novel empirical implications.
Finally, it measures the relation between job flows and establishment size 
applying econometric techniques best suited for analysing the dynamics of large 
cross-sections. Using a balanced panel from the Mexican Manufacturing sector 
it finds no evidence of small establishments converging toward the mean, thus no 
evidence of convergence.
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Introduction
Throughout the seventies and the eighties, empirical and theoretical schol­
ars working on the labour market concentrated on the determinants and the 
dynamics of net employment changes, the difference in the aggregate stock of 
employment in a given period. From the early nineties, the availability of large 
data-sets on employment changes at the establishment level has shifted the in­
terest from net to gross employment changes. Gross job creation indicates an 
increase in the demand for labour at some units in the sample (usually establish­
ments but sometimes firms) and gross job destruction a decrease. Changes in the 
aggregate stock of employment, the more conventional concept of labour demand 
in aggregate models, are then obtained from the differences in job creation and 
destruction. Particularly influential have been the data gathered by Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1990; 1992) for the United States, but similar data-sets have soon 
become available in most OECD countries. It is now clear that aggregate net em­
ployment changes are associated with large and simultaneous flows of gross job 
creation and destruction, at any phase of the cycle. Furthermore, the process of 
job destruction is as responsive to economic shocks as the process of job creation 
is.
This thesis aims at contributing to the growing macroeconomic field that 
studies the determinants, the dynamics and the policy implications of simulta­
neous job creation and destruction in labour markets. As new data-set become 
available, new puzzling facts are being discovered and new questions need to be
12
answered. How do firing restrictions affect the dynamics of job creation and 
destruction? Is there any relationship between job reallocation, the sum of job 
creation and destruction, unemployment and its average duration? Do small 
firms play a key role in the job generation process, as a first look at the data 
would indicate? Why is a given worker likely to increase his wage when he moves 
to a larger firm? These are some of the key questions addressed throughout the 
thesis. As a contribution to a fast developing literature, the thesis does not offer 
a complete overview of the new field. Conversely, the thesis selects particular 
issues that appear puzzling and, when possible, tries to rationalise them in a 
theoretically consistent way.
Throughout the thesis I will think about the process of job creation and 
destruction in terms of the matching of job seekers with hiring firms, along the line 
of the most recent development of the search equilibrium literature, also defined 
as the flow approach to employment determination (Mortensen and Pissarides 
1994; Bertola and Caballero 1994; Blanchard and Diamond 1990, 1992). The 
flow approach to employment determination grew out of the theory of search 
equilibrium, following the success of the latter in suggesting simple ways to model 
non-competitive labour markets 1. The concept of the matching function and its 
early empirical success played a key role in the development of this approach. 
The explicit assumption made in the simplest model is that all jobs are alike but 
their matching is costly. The main matching cost is usually modelled as a time 
cost. As a consequence, firms with jobs to fill and unemployed job seekers have to 
spend time to find each other. The matching function is used to derive the speed 
of job formation and, in its simplest form, is modelled as a stable relationship, 
explicitly dependent on the number of unemployed job seekers and the number 
of vacant jobs in hiring firms.
1 Early search models that focused on labour markets are Phelps (1970) and Mortensen 
(1970). More recent contributions are Diamond (1982), Pissarides (1985, 1990) and Blanchard 
and Diamond (1989).
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W ithin the standard matching literature (Pissarides, 1990), employment dy­
namics is entirely driven by job creation (the meeting between a job seeker and 
a vacant job) and by the flow of workers out of unemployment, while job de­
struction (the separation between existing job matches) is exogenously fixed and 
constant at any phase of the cycle. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) have ex­
tended the traditional matching approach by assuming heterogeneity in the firm 
specific productivity. Firms endogenously choose the value of the labour product 
at which labour shedding takes place and job destruction now plays an important 
role in the transmission mechanism of aggregate disturbances to the dynamics of 
employment.
Chapter I, Job Flow Dynamics and Firing Restrictions, focuses on the dy­
namics of job destruction and creation. Davies and Haltiwanger showed that 
in the American manufacturing sector, job creation is pro-cyclical and job de­
struction is counter-cyclical. But in the United States the dramatic rise in job 
destruction during net recessions does not find a symmetric rise in job creation 
during net expansion. As a consequence job reallocation, the sum of job cre­
ation and job destruction, moves counter-cyclically. Empirically, the dynamic 
asymmetry between job creation and destruction is observed only in Canada and 
Britain. Conversely, continental Europe job flows appear much more symmetric 
and job creation is as volatile as job destruction. Chapter I argues that differ­
ences across countries in employment protection legislation, albeit not directly 
relevant to differences in average employment levels, can theoretically account 
for differences in the dynamics of job creation and destruction. Chapter I intro­
duces employment protection legislation and firing restrictions in the Mortensen 
and Pissarides model (1994). Firms face idiosyncratic uncertainty in the value of 
their labour product and endogenously choose the productivity at which existing 
jobs are no longer profitable. However, to actually shed labour, firms need an 
exogenous firing permission. Even though firing restrictions have ambiguous ef-
14
feet on equilibrium unemployment, they dramatically affect the dynamics of job 
creation and job destruction. The tighter the firing restriction, the less volatile 
is job destruction and the higher the correlation between job reallocation and 
net employment changes. The Chapter also shows that the traditional model­
ing of employment protection legislation, in the form of a simple fixed cost to be 
incurred when labour shedding takes place, does not affect job flow dynamics. Fi­
nally, a parameterization of the model helps rationalise cross-country differences 
in the cyclical behaviour of job creation and destruction.
Chapter II, Gross Job Reallocation and Labour Market Policy, is jointly writ­
ten with Jozeph Konings and Christopher Pissarides. The aim of the Chapter is 
to draw together the international data compiled by the OECD (1994a) with a 
view to understanding the relation between unemployment and job reallocation 
and the role of labour market policy in the determination of job reallocations. 
The theoretical literature does not give sufficient reasons for supposing that more 
job reallocation is better than less, or vice versa. Furthermore there is no evi­
dence of a firm relationship between overall unemployment and job reallocation. 
Chapter II presents some evidence that low job reallocation is associated with 
more long-term unemployment. Since the latter is bad, in terms of the loss of skill 
of the unemployed, Chapter II supposes that policies that restrict job realloca­
tion harm the ability of the market to turn over its unemployment stock quickly. 
Gross Job Reallocation and Labour Market Policy looks at three kinds of policies: 
direct restrictions on the firm’s ability to fire employees, “passive” policies, which 
we measure by income support for the unemployed, and “active” policies, which 
we measure by the amount of money spent per unemployed worker on measures 
designed to speed the transition from unemployment to employment. We show 
that, particularly when we restrict the attention to job reallocation by incum­
bent firms (i.e. excluding the role of entry and exit), job reallocation is slower 
in countries that impose restrictions on the dismissal of labour and in countries
15
that offer income support to the unemployed for long periods of time.
Chapter III, Wages and the Size of Firms in a Dynamic Matching Model, is 
jointly written with Giuseppe Bertola. The existence of wage differentials across 
observationally equivalent workers is well known in the literature. In particu­
lar, different data sets in different countries systematically find evidence of an 
“employer size-wage effect” : firms with relatively higher employment levels pay 
higher wages. Chapter III uses the idea, already noted in the literature (Pis­
sarides, 1990 and Burdett and Mortensen, 1989) that slow search and imperfect 
matching can rationalise wage differentials across identical workers. The chapter 
builds on the matching model of job creation and destruction recently proposed 
by Bertola and Caballero (1994), where well defined firms with downward sloping 
labour demand are affected by idiosyncratic shocks. The theoretical approach of 
the chapter is complex enough to treat profits, employment, and wages as jointly 
endogenous interrelated variables and the model is realistic enough to allow a 
quantitative exploration of the employer size-wage effect. Even though wages are 
decreased by higher employment along a given labour demand schedule, firms 
with stronger labour demand pay higher wages at any given level of employment, 
find it optimal to post more vacancies, grow faster, and are larger in size on aver­
age. Thus, the wage-size effect is present in the model-generated data, but it does 
not reflect a positive effect of size on wages, nor does it conflict with the standard 
assumption of decreasing marginal returns to labour. Rather, firm size proxies 
in the model’s wage regressions for unobservable business conditions, which are 
also positively correlated to profits and employment growth. Furthermore, the 
dynamic mechanism we focus on also offers distinctive empirical implications. 
The model implies that wage dispersion is higher among small firms. Finally, 
the model predicts that after controlling for employment levels, wages should be 
higher in faster-growing firms.
While the implementation of the model proposed in Chapter III allows an
16
analytic solution, the specification of the idiosyncratic process remains rather 
artificial. In Chapter III, the asymmetry between positive and negative shocks to 
the unobservable component of individual firm’s labour demand is extreme. Every 
now and then, hiring firms are hit by catastrophic idiosyncratic shocks that cause 
immediate job destruction and dramatic wage cuts. The following chapter, A 
Numerical Approximation of the General Model, relaxes this extreme assumption 
and offers a numerical approximation of the most general specification. The aim 
of the chapter is to show that the results of Chapter III do not depend on the 
particular specification of the idiosyncratic shock and are consistent with, more 
general implementations.
Chapter V, Job Flows and Plant Size Dynamics: Traditional Measures and 
Alternative Econometric Techniques focuses on the relation between job flows 
and firm size. If we define firm size as employment in the base year, job creation 
and job destruction are substantially greater among small firms and net employ­
ment changes are a decreasing function of firm size. Several authors (OECD, 
1994a; Davis et al. 1995) have pointed to the regression fallacy associated with 
the relationship between job flows and net employment changes. Chapter V as­
sesses the traditional measures used to correct the regression bias and argues 
that any definition of firm size that arbitrary forces each unit in the sample into 
a pre-defined size category, will ignore the flows of jobs between size categories. 
Chapter V argues that to estimate properly firm size convergence, avoiding the 
regression fallacy, and to follow accurately employers between size categories, it 
is necessary to apply the methodology recently introduced by Quah (1993a, 1994) 
in the empirics of economic growth. Using a balanced panel for the Mexican 
manufacturing sector I show how conventional results may change when cross- 
sectional firm dynamics is estimated non parametrically. I find no evidence of 
small firms systematically creating more jobs than larger firms and, thus, no evi­
dence of convergence to the mean for the sample as a whole. Finally, I show how
17
cross-sectional dynamics varies across industries and how it is linked to gross and 
net flows in each sector. I observe convergence to the mean in relatively sta­
ble sectors and asymmetric dynamic behaviour between expanding and declining 
industries.
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Chapter 1
Job Flow D ynam ics and Firing  
R estrictions
1.1 Introduction
The measurement of job creation and job destruction for the U.S. manufactur­
ing sector (Davis and Haltiwanger 1990; 1992) threw new evidence on labour 
market dynamics. Following Davis and Haltiwanger’s research, empirical studies 
on employment changes at the establishment level have been performed in most 
OECD countries. (OECD, 1994a)1. North American job destruction features 
wider fluctuations than job creation and causes job reallocation, the sum of job 
creation and destruction, to move counter-cyclically. By contrast, no asymmetry 
between time variation in job creation and destruction is apparent in continental 
European data.
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990) argue that high firing costs 
in Europe and differences in employment protection legislation between countries 
may explain differences in the dynamics of employment even though they do 
not necessarily explain low employment on average. This paper follows this line 
of research and argues that differences in employment protection legislation can
1Examples of country studies are Contini et al. (1992) for Italy, Boeri and Cramer (1993) 
for Germany, Baldwin et al, (1994) for Canada, Konings (1995a) and Blanchflower and Burgess 
(1994) for UK. OECD (1994a) has tried to standardize studies as much as possible.
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theoretically be responsible for observed differences in the cyclical behaviour of 
job creation and destruction. In a stochastic search model with endogenous job 
separation, I show that the amplitude and time variation of job reallocation 
depend crucially upon the arrival rate of exogenous firing permissions. Finally, 
a parameterization of the model helps rationalise cross-country differences in the 
cyclical behaviour of job creation and destruction.
The paper builds on the recent matching framework set forth by Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994; 1993) and Mortensen (1994). Mortensen and Pissarides 
have extended the traditional matching approach (Pissarides 1985; 1990; and 
Mortensen 1991) by assuming an economy populated with a continuum of jobs 
that differ in the value of a firm’s specific productivity. The idiosyncratic risk 
for existing jobs is modeled as a jump process characterized by a Poisson arrival 
frequency and a drawing from a common distribution of productivity. Negative 
shocks induce job destruction but the firm endogenously chooses the value of 
labour product to which correspond instantaneous job destruction. Job creation 
comes from the posting of costly vacancies that are slowly matched to unem­
ployed job seekers. In Mortensen Pissarides (hereafter MP 1994), the asymmetry 
between hiring and firing technologies rationalises the observed asymmetry be­
tween time variation of job creation and job destruction in U.S. manufacturing 
flows (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1990). In its original form, the MP model cannot 
rationalise the cyclical behaviour of job flows in continental Europe.
With respect to the MP (1994) model, the innovation of the paper is the 
modeling of employment protection legislation and job security provisions. Fir­
ing and job destruction are no longer instantaneous but can be costly and lengthy. 
The simplest and widely modeled form of employment protection legislation is a 
fixed firing cost to be incurred by the firm when firing takes place (Bentolila and 
Bertola 1990 and Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1994 in partial equilibrium models 
of labour demand; Burda 1992; Millard 1994 and Millard and Mortensen 1994
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in search-equilibrium models). In this paper I focus on a different form of job 
security provisions and I consider an economy in which firing requires an exoge­
nous firing permission. I show that the traditional fixed firing costs and the more 
complex firing permission have similar steady state effects, in the sense that they 
both reduce the job finding rate and have an ambiguous effect on unemployment. 
Conversely, the dynamic effects of different forms of employment protection legis­
lation vary substantially. A simple fixed firing cost, as in Millard (1994), does not 
reduce the asymmetry between time variation in job creation and destruction. In 
the alternative formalization of this paper, tighter firing restrictions smooth out 
the increase in job destruction during recession and tend to make the dynamics 
of job destruction symmetric to the dynamics of job creation.
Finally, with respect to the MP (1994) model, where wages are the outcome 
of a bilateral bargaining, I assume that wages are set by the firms at the workers 
reservation utility or that the firm continuously extracts all the surplus from 
the match. The rest of the assumptions are introduced in Section (1.3.2), and 
they are totally in line with the recent matching literature. The next section 
briefly looks at the existing empirical evidence on the cyclical behaviour of job 
flows. Section (1.3.1) discusses the modeling of job security provisions and firing 
constraints. Section (1.4) presents and solves the steady state model. In section 
(1.4) the aggregate conditions are fixed while they stochastically jump between 
“good” and “bad” times in sections (1.5) and (1.6). Section (1.7) presents a 
parameterization of the model that helps to rationalise cross-country evidence on 
the cyclical behaviour of job flows.
1.2 A B rief Look at the Evidence
Empirically, job creation (destruction) is defined as the sum of positive (negative) 
employment changes at the establishment level in a given time interval and in 
a specific industry. If the industry is representative of the entire economy, we
21
have a measure of aggregate job creation (destruction). If we divide the num­
ber of jobs created (destroyed) by total employment, we obtain the job creation 
(destruction) rate. The sum of job creation and destruction is called job reallo­
cation and is a measure of employment reshuffle across establishments. Finally, 
the difference between job creation and destruction is the traditional measure of 
net employment changes.
Interest in the dynamic behaviour of aggregate job creation and destruction 
surged when Davis and Haltiwanger compiled establishment data for the U.S. 
manufacturing sector. Davis-Haltiwanger (1990; 1992) showed that substantial 
rates of job creation and destruction coexist at any phase of the cycle, even within 
narrowly defined sectors. Job creation and job destruction are negatively but not 
perfectly correlated, indicating that significant job creation (destruction) persists 
during net recessions (boom). If we take net employment changes as a measure of 
the cycle, job creation is pro-cyclical and job destruction is counter-cyclical. But 
in the United States, the increase in job destruction during recessions appears 
much more pronounced than the increase in job creation during net expansions. 
As a result, job reallocation moves counter-cyclically2.
Following the Davis and Haltiwanger research, measurement of employment 
changes at the establishment level has been carried out in most OECD countries. 
Table (1.1) reports Spearman’s correlations for nine countries. Similar to the 
U.S. experience, job creation is pro-cyclical, job-destruction is counter-cyclical, 
and job creation is negatively correlated with net employment changes.
Remarkable differences exist in the amplitude of fluctuations of job creation 
and destruction. We focus on three simple statistics in Table (1.1) and Table (1.2).
2Since job reallocation {JR)  is the difference between job creation (JC)  and job destruction 
{JD),  it follows that
COV(JR,  NET)  <  0 VAR(JD)  >  VAR(JC) ,  
where N E T  is the difference between J C  and JD.
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The first column of Table (1.2) reports the relative variance of job destruction 
and job creation and shows that the U.S. evidence, where the ratio is greater than 
two is confirmed only in the UK, and to a lesser extent in Canada and Norway. In 
most Continental Europe countries the same ratio is close to one or substantially 
less than one (as in the case of France and Sweden). To differences in the relative 
variances of Table (1.2) correspond differences in the cyclical behaviour of job 
reallocation in Table (1.1). The U.S. evidence, where job reallocation fluctuates 
counter-cyclically, finds similarity in the United Kingdom, where the correlation 
is negative and significant and in Canada, where even if negative, the correlation 
is not significantly different than zero.
The last piece of evidence is reported in Table (1.2), which reports the co­
efficients of variation of job creation and destruction. Two findings are worth 
pointing out. Firstly, both job creation and destruction appear, proportionally 
to their mean, more volatile in Anglo saxon countries than in Continental Europe, 
with the exception of Norway. Secondly, in Continental Europe there is similar 
time variation in job creation and destruction, whereas the opposite seems true 
in North-American countries. Overall, there is a clear dichotomy in the cyclical 
behaviour of job flows. On one side we find the North-American and British 
experience, where job destruction is more volatile than job creation and job re­
allocation moves counter-cyclically. On the other side we find the Continental 
Europe experience, where job reallocation tends to be acyclical and the fluctua­
tions in job creation and destruction are less pronounced.
1.3 Concepts and N otation
1.3.1 Em ploym ent P rotection  Legislation
Employment protection legislation is a form of employment regulation which 
relates to employers’ freedom to dismiss workers. OECD (1994b) argues that
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Table 1.1: Job Flows Over the Cycle
Country Corr.
J C  -  N E T  
(a)
Corr.
J D  -  N E T  
(b)
Corr. 
J C  - J D  
(c)
Corr.
J R  -  N E T
(d)
Time
Period
US 0.90 -0.958 -0.745 -0.519 1973-88
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.003)
Canada 0.82 -0.89 -0.47 -0.252 1973-86
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.38)
UK 0.85 -0.99 -0.78 -0.95 1973-86
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Denmark 0.97 -0.97 -0.88 0.03 1980-91
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.90)
Germany 0.93 -0.95 -0.78 -0.04 1977-90
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.89)
Norway 0.79 -0.84 -0.35 -0.13 1977-86
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.89)
Italy 0.79 -0.81 -0.28 -0.13 1984-93
(0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.88)
France 0.97 -0.85 -0.83 0.74 1984-92
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
Sweden 0.97 -0.95 -0.86 0.49 1984-92
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.25)
(a) Spearman correlation between Job Creation (JC) and Net employment Changes (NET)
(b) Spearman correlation between Job Destruction (JD) and Net employment Changes (NET)
(c) Spearman correlation between Job Creation (JC) and Job Destruction (JD)
(d) Spearman correlation between Job Reallocation (JR) and Net employment Changes (NET) 
Marginal significance in parenthesis
Source: United States, Davis, Haltiwanger ans Shuh (1994);
United Kingdon, Konings (1995a); Canada, Baldwin et al. (1994);
Norway, Salvanes (1995); Germany, Boeri and Cramer (1993);
Italy, R&P (1995); France, Lagarde et al.(1994);
Sweden, OECD (1994a) ;Denmark, Albaek and Sorensen (1995)
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Table 1.2: Variance of Job Flows
Country 4 *
° J C
(a)
'i
a J C
J C
G>)
° 2j d
J D
(c)
US 2.40 0.24 0.33
Germany 1.00 0.10 0.11
Canada 1.55 0.17 0.22
Italy 1.09 0.10 0.12
Denmark 0.98 0.13 0.13
U.K. 17.8 0.52 0.63
Sweden 0.56 0.14 0.11
France 0.39 0.11 0.08
Norway 1.39 0.22 0.29
(a) Variance of Job Destruction over <r2JD over variance of Job Creation a2JC
(b) Coefficient of variation of Job Creation 
(b) Coefficient of variation of Job Destruction 
Source: Table (1.1)
employers’ freedom to dismiss may be restricted by: -(i) a requirement to give 
several months’ notice to the worker before dismissal become effective; and/or to 
provide severance payments upon dismissal; -(ii) a requirement for prior warnings 
or written justification to the person to be dismissed (or to a third party); -(iii)a 
requirement for authorisation from a third party before dismissal can take place, 
or a requirement that rehabilitative measures be attem pted before a worker is 
dismissed; -(iv) provisions for appeal against unfair dismissal.
The multiple dimensions of employment protection are difficult to model in 
an simple way. Most of the work in the area, notably Bentolila and Bertola 
(1990), collapses the multidimensional aspects of employment protection legisla­
tion into a simple fixed firing cost, to be incurred by the firm when separation 
takes place. Firing is always possible, but at an exogenously fixed cost F . This 
simplification has the advantage of being analytically simple and, at least con­
ceptually, empirically observable. In this direction, several quantitative measures
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of employment protection have been proposed in the literature (OECD 1994b; 
Grubb and Wells 1993). Most indices report at one extreme of the scale the 
American experience, where firing can take place any time at no cost. At the 
other extreme we usually find the continental Europe experience, with countries 
like Italy, France and Germany at the very top of the scale. Britain and Canada 
are often cited as mid-way examples.
With respect to the classification above, the fixed cost rule used in the eco­
nomic literature can be a good first approximation for the severance payments 
and the period of notice components of employment protection legislation (-i and 
-ii above). The problem with this simplification is that it fails to capture the 
existence of other types of firing restrictions and more complicated firing proce­
dures. In most European countries, before firing can take place a discussion with 
union representative is often necessary and, in extreme cases, a full agreement 
with government representatives must be reached (Emerson, 1988). In general, 
we can say that these complicated procedures introduce a stochastic component 
in the employment protection legislation. Ex-ante, firms face uncertainty over 
firing costs along two dimensions: the actual costs of firing and the actual time of 
shedding. Firstly, European firms discuss with the worker the amount of sever­
ance payments to be paid to the employees. Secondly, firms do not know exactly 
the moment in which the discussions with the unions will end. Furthermore, as 
in the case of Germany, mass firing requires a given notice period, which can 
be exogenously lengthened by a government intervention. Finally, the existence 
of a “just clause” rule in most European legislation, allow the worker to appeal 
against unfair dismissal and can result in reinstatement of the dismissed worker. 
The traditional indicators of firing costs may capture the uncertainty over total 
firing costs, but they definitely fail to capture the uncertainty over the actual 
timing of labour shedding.
The only indicator that tries to measure the restrictiveness of procedural
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Table 1.3: Importance of Procedural Constraints
Country Strictness Country Strictness
1 United States 0.4 6 Sweden 2.0
2 United Kingdom 0.5 7 France 2.0
3 Canada 0.6 8 Germany 2.5
4 Denmark 1.0 9 Italy 3.0
5 Norway 1.5
Ranking from least restrictive to most restrictive 
ILO classifies regulatory constraint as 
-insignificant (scored 0);
-minor (for termination of regular contracts),
insignificant or minor (for fixed-term contracts) (both scored 1);
-serious (scored 2); -fundamental (scored 3)
Source: OECD (1994b)
obstacles to the implementation of no-fault dismissal is the index compiled by 
ILO, which classified regulatory constraints as insignificant, minor, serious or 
fundamental. The index, originally compiled by ILO for European countries has 
only recently been completed by OECD (1994b) and it is shown in Table (1.3) 
for the same countries for which I have flows data in Tables (1.1) and (1.2).
Comparison of Tables (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3) shows that the countries that ex­
perience asymmetric behaviour in the dynamics of job creation and job destruc­
tion are the countries with insignificant firing constraints. Conversely, continental 
Europe countries, with symmetric behaviour in the dynamics of job creation and 
destruction have serious or fundamental firing constraints. Boeri (1995), using 
data for 8 OECD economies, argues that job reallocation is counter-cyclical only 
in the U.S., but in his data set Britain is missing and data from Canada range 
from 1978 to 1988, whereas the most recent data compiled by Baldwin et al. 
(1994) range from 1973 to 1988.
The easiest way to capture the effects of procedural constraints in an ag­
gregate model is to assume that a firm can accomplish firing only when it is
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granted an exogenous firing permission. In this paper I assume that a firm with 
low productivity is obliged to pay the worker until firing permission arrives. At 
the micro-level these firing permissions may well depend on the firm’s bargain­
ing strength over the workers and government’s representatives. Nevertheless, as 
long as we are only interested in aggregate dynamics, differences in bargaining 
strength across firms should balance-out and we can assume that a firm gets a 
firing permission at an exogenously given rate and it actually fires when produc­
tivity is low and permissions arrive.
More formally, I assume that the arrival rate of firing permissions is a Poisson 
process with average waiting time equal to 1/s. A job in good business conditions 
is an operational job, while a job in bad business conditions without firing per­
mission is an idle job. An economy with no firing restrictions is an economy with 
an average waiting time of firing permissions equal to zero. On the other hand, 
the longer the waiting time (i.e. the lower the arrival rate s), the tighter the firing 
restrictions and the higher are the degrees of job security provisions. As I show 
in Section (1.4), the average value of an idle job is a measure of the expected 
firing costs. As a consequence, the firing restrictions rule can potentially capture 
the traditional effects of simpler fixed firing cost rules. In Section (1.4) and in 
appendix (A) I show that this way of modelling firing restrictions, albeit with no 
immediate empirical counterpart, has very similar steady state properties to the 
simple fixed cost rule. Furthermore, Bertola (1990) points out that economies 
with different degrees of job security provisions tend to have very different dy­
namic behaviour. With respect to job flow dynamics, Section (1.5) shows that 
only the firing permission dramatically affects the dynamic behaviour of the sys­
tem. In this sense, the traditional fixed firing cost is not a good candidate for 
rationalising differences in the cyclical behaviour of job flows.
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1.3.2 T he m odel
I consider an economy populated by a continuum of risk-neutral workers of fixed 
quantity, normalised to one for simplicity. Workers can be either employed or 
unemployed and, if unemployed, are actively searching for jobs. For simplicity, I 
rule out on the job search. Each firm has only one job which can be filled and 
producing or vacant. A filled job can be either fully operational or idle, depending 
on whether the firm is actually waiting for firing permissions. Following the 
empirical literature I define job creation as the moment in which a vacant job 
meets an unemployed worker. Similarly, job destruction takes place when an idle 
job gets a firing permission, separates and leaves the market.
As in MP (1994), each job is characterized by a fixed irreversible technology 
and produces at the productivity level p +  ae. The productivity is made up of an 
aggregate component p, common to every job and a job specific component e3. 
The stochastic process regulating the idiosyncratic component of the productivity 
(e) is Poisson with arrival rate equal to A. In the event of a change in e, the new 
value of the job specific productivity is a drawing from a fixed distribution F(e), 
with finite upper support eu, lower support e/ and no point mass, other than at 
the upper support eu. This way of modeling implies a memoryless but persistent 
idiosyncratic productivity. The persistence of any given productivity e is 1/A.
I follow the earlier literature by assuming that new firms have the option to 
select the best productivity in the market, and create jobs at the upper support 
p + aeu. Following an idiosyncratic shock, however, the firm has no choice over 
its productivity. Filled job are said to be fully operative if the idiosyncratic 
productivity is above some critical value while they are said to be idle if the 
job specific productivity is below Operational jobs turn  idle at rate XF(ed) 
while idle jobs get firing permissions and leave the market at rate s . Finally, idle
3In the paper a  is simply a normalising parameter useful for the simulations of section (1.7); 
it is common to every job and it will not play any specific role.
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jobs are subject to idiosyncratic uncertainty and can return fully operational at 
rate A(1 — F(cd))-
Vacant firms and unemployed workers meet at rate m(u, u), where m is a first- 
degree homogeneous matching function and u and v are the number of vacancies 
and the number of unemployed normalised by the labour force. Vacancies are 
filled at the rate
# )  =  Ia M .  =  ” , <  0,
V U 0(7
where 0 is a measure of market tightness from the firm’s point of view. Similarly, 
workers find job at rate
> 0.
U 0(7
Apart from the firing constraints, we depart from the standard MP (1994) 
framework in the wage-setting behaviour. To simplify the analysis of the effects 
of employment protection legislation on job flow dynamics, I assume that employ­
ers capture all the rents associated with a job-worker match by paying workers 
the common alternative value of their time, 6. As Diamond (1971) has shown, 
this outcome is an equilibrium in a wage setting game played among employers 
when workers have only the power to accept or reject offers and workers search 
sequentially at some positive costs. Given this outcome, workers have no incen­
tive to search on the job and their parameters, other than b, do not affect the 
equilibrium. Alternatively, if I allowed a continuously renegotiated Nash bargain 
between the firm and the worker, the wage would certainly be higher than the 
worker reservation utility in operational jobs, where the surplus from the match 
is positive. But the presence of firing restrictions would force the firm to pay 
the worker even when the job is idle and the worker’s participation constraint 
is binding. This would force idle firms to offer the worker his reservation utility 
6, exactly as in the present model. Thus, a continuously renegotiated bargain 
would only affect the wage of operational jobs, leaving unchanged the behaviour
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of idle jobs, the distinctive feature of this model. To keep track of such bargains 
would be analytically tedious and would not change the qualitative results of the 
paper.
1.4 Steady State
The asset valuation of a filled job, conditional on an idiosyncratic productivity e 
is
rj(e)  =  p +  ae — 6 +  A ^  J(x)dF(x)  — J(e) +  s [max(0, J(e)) — J (e )] , (1.1)
where </(.) is the value of a job, r  is the exogenous interest rate, p -f crc — b 
are operational profits at idiosyncratic productivity e. Apart from the flow-term 
p+ae — b, (1.1) involves two capital gain terms. At rate A the firm loses its current 
asset value J(e) and draws a new e from the productivity distribution. At rate 
s firing permissions arrive and the firm gets an option to destroy the job. Since 
a destroyed job has zero value, the max operator in (1.1) captures the idea that 
a firm will keep running a job as long as its value is positive. It follows that an 
operational job is a positively valued job that ignores firing permissions while an 
idle job is a negatively valued job that destroys the job when permissions arrive. 
Differentiating (1.1) with respect to e it shows that J(.)  is a piece-wise increasing 
function of e and its derivative reads
Jt(e) = - Z - r  Ve : J(e) >  0, (1.2)
r  -f- A
and
If we define the reservation productivity q  as
J(ed) =  0,
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making use of (1.2) and (1.3), after an integration by parts, the expected value 
of a job in (1.1) reads
/ ' “ J(x)dF(x)  =  / ' “(l -  F(z))dz -  £  r  F{z)dz.  (1.4)
Jti r +  A Jed r +  A +  6 J^ i
The last term  of (1.4) is the (negative) value of an idle job and is a measure of 
expected firing costs. As the average waiting time goes to zero (s oo), the 
second term  on the right hand side of (1.4) vanishes, firing is always possible and 
it is accomplished as soon as the value of the job is negative. To obtain the cut 
off value €d, below which the firm will accept firing permission, we make use of
(1.4) and we evaluate (1.1) at «/(.) =  0. The reservation productivity solves
p + a i d - b = £  (1 -  F(z)) dz +  £  F(z)dz.  (1.5)
Equation (1.5) is one of the key equations of the model and uniquely determines 
the reservation productivity as a function of the parameters r,A,p,s,b,a and the 
productivity distribution F(e). The left hand side of (1.5) is the profit from the 
marginal operational job. In an economy with no firing constraints (s —» oo), the 
second term on the right hand side vanishes, the marginal profit is negative and 
there is voluntary labour hoarding in equilibrium. When firing is instantaneous 
(s —y oo) but hiring is costly, the firm will hoard labour up to the level in which 
current losses compensate savings of hiring costs if conditions improve. The 
presence of firing delays increases, through the last term in (1.5), the value of 
the marginal profits. As the average waiting time for firing permissions increase, 
a job will be kept running in bad times for a longer period of time because 
of exogenous constraints and there will be institutional labour hoarding. Since 
the firm anticipates firing restrictions when conditions are bad, in (1.5) the firm 
reduces the extent of voluntary labour hoarding. As s falls it is possible that 
firing restrictions become so high that the firm will accept firing permissions at 
a positive profit per period.
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Differentiating (1.5) with respect to s, 
ded X a ded Xa ded X a
*37 = 7Ta(1 " 37 + 7 n T 7 F(Q) 37 " (TTaTT? i, F{z)dz
( 1.6)
and rearranging, yields
^ S(r  +  A F M ) +  r ( r  +  A) =  A ru
ds (r +  A)(r +  A +  5) (r +  A +  s)2 Jc,
Thus 4^ <  0: an increase in the average waiting time of permission (fall in 3) 
increases the productivity at which the firm accepts firing permissions. This is 
consistent with the firm anticipating long waiting time when conditions worsen.
The reservation productivity falls with p, the common productivity. Differ­
entiating (1.5) with respect to (p — b) yields
1 , X(T n  r?f w ded , c v  \  ded /1 o \
3 ( p - 6 )  r  +  A d ( p - b )  r  +  A +  s ^ 3 ( p - 6 )   ^ ^
and rearranging, yields
ded (r +  X)r -f s(r +  XF(ed))
a- = - 1 .  (1.9)
d(p - b )  (r +  A)(r +  A + s)
Thus 4^ < 0: as the productivity increases the firm will find it profitable to keep a 
job operational for a higher range of productivities. The effect of other parameters 
on the reservation productivity is ambiguous. Higher discount rate r reduces the 
flow of income from the job and makes labour hoarding less profitable. This 
would reduce ed. But simultaneously, the higher discount rate reduces expected 
firing costs and makes autonomous labour hoarding profitable. Similar arguments 
hold for changes in the arrival rate of idiosyncratic shocks. Higher A corresponds 
to an increase in the arrival rate of productivity shocks. On the one hand the 
reservation productivity tends to decrease since the firm expects the duration of 
adverse conditions to be shorter. At the same time the probability of facing a 
firing procedure is higher and the net effect depends mainly on the distribution 
F(.).
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Job creation comes through the posting of vacancies. When creating a job we 
assume the existing technology is fully flexible and the productivity distribution 
is common knowledge. Job creation takes place at the upper support of the 
distribution (eu). A posted vacancy yields an asset return of — c per period, c 
being the constant cost of hiring, and a probability q(6) of being filled with a job 
created at the upper support of the distribution. The vacancy asset valuation is
rV = - c + q(0)[ j (eu) - V } '  (i.iQ)
W ith free entry into the job market there are, in equilibrium, zero expected profits 
(V  =  0) (Pissarides 1990) and the value of a job equals the expected searching 
costs:
= W ) '  ^■11^
where the value of a job at the upper support of the distribution is obtained 
subtracting (1.5) to (1.1) and reads
J[tu)  =  (1.12) 
r  +  A
(1.11) is the job creation condition and uniquely determines the vacancy unem­
ployment ratio 9 as a function of the parameters r,A,c, the matching function 
g(.), the upper support of the distribution eu and the reservation productivity
Q4-
Differentiating (1.11) with respect to common productivity p, yields
ded 1 <l\6)c d®
dp r + A <z(#)2 dp1 (1.13)
and, making use of the facts that ^  < 0 and q'(.) < 0, | |  > 0. Higher common 
productivity, increasing the flow of future profits, increases job creation at given 
unemployment. Conversely, higher job security provisions reduce the expected
4It can easily be checked that if c =  0, J(cu) =  0 from (1.11) and q  =  cu.
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value of a job and reduce the profitability of new jobs. Job creation at given 
unemployment falls. Differentiating (1.11) with respect to s,
ded 1 cq\e) 89
d s ( r  + X) q(9)2 8 s ’ { V
making use of < 0 (1.14) implies that >  0.
To close the model we need to introduce unemployment. W ith a fixed labour 
force, a worker can be either unemployed or employed. If employed, a worker can 
be attached to a fully operational (e > td) or to an idle job e < cd. Normalizing 
variables in terms of a constant labour force, the relationship among different 
labour force status is
u +  rij +  rii =  1, (1-15)
where u is the unemployment rate, n,- is the employed idle capacity and rij is the 
employed operational rate. Let us consider unemployment. In an interval dt , the 
outflow rate corresponds to the number of matches per unemployed times the 
number of unemployed; while the inflow rate corresponds to the fraction of work­
ers in the idle state that obtained firing permission. Unemployment dynamics 
reads
u = srii(t) — 9q(9)u(t), (1-16)
where 9q{9) is the job finding rate. If job creation (job destruction) is defined 
as the sum of all positive (negative) employment changes, as in the empirical 
literature, (1.16) defines unemployment variation as the difference between job 
destruction and job creation. Simultaneously there are a number of fully opera­
tional jobs that are hit by a shock below the reservation productivity and enter 
the idle state. The outflow from the idle state corresponds to the idle jobs that 
have obtained firing permissions plus those idle jobs that, hit by a positive pro­
ductivity shock, return to be fully operational. The inflow into the idle state is 
given by the operational jobs hit by a shock below the reservation productivity.
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The change in the idle rate is
hi =  AF(ed)rij(t) — [s +  A(1 -  F(cd)] (1-17)
In steady state equilibrium, the unemployment rate and the employment 
composition between idle and operational jobs is constant. From (1.16) and 
(1.17) it follows that unemployment and the idle rate are constant if the inflow 
rate is equal to the outflow rate. Steady state idle rate is
n . = (1.18)
Making use of (1.18), equilibrium unemployment is
A F{tj)
A F(ed) + ^ 0 q ( 0 )
The steady state system is recursive and it reduces down to four equations.
(1.5) uniquely determines the reservation productivity td while (1.11), given e^ , 
uniquely determines the vacancy unemployment ratio 9. Given 0 and (1.18) 
and (1.19) simultaneously determine unemployment and the idle rate. Finally, 
given the unemployment rate, 9 determines vacancies5.
If firing is unrestricted (3 —b 00), the idle rate in (1.18) tends to zero and 
equilibrium unemployment in (1.19) coincides with equilibrium unemployment 
in more standard matching models (MP 1994; Pissarides 1990). As the aver­
age waiting time increases, firing restrictions affect both job creation and job 
destruction decision (i.e. td and 9) and they have an ambiguous impact on unem­
ployment. Differentiating (1.19) with respect to 3, it is obvious that the overall
5The system (1.18) and (1.19) is fully stable and the convergence to the steady state equi­
librium is monotonic. From the characteristic equation of the homogeneous system (1.18) and 
(1.19),
r2 +  v(s +  A -b 9q[9)) -b 9q(9)(s +  A) -b sXF^td) =  0, (1.20)
it follows that both roots have negative real parts and the system is stable. Furthermore the 
convergence is monotonic since in (1.20)
A =  (s — A — 9q{9))2 +  4sA(l -  F(ed)) >  0. (1.21)
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results depends on the particular values of the parameters and on the form of the 
productivity distribution.
Lower firing restrictions increase the job finding rate, 6q(9), through their 
positive effect on market tightness (|^  > 0). Steady state job reallocation is 
2sn* = 29q(6)u* and it depends on firing costs in a direct and indirect way. 
Stricter job security provisions lower the job hiring rate and negatively affect job 
reallocation. Simultaneously, higher firing costs indirectly affect job reallocation 
through their ambiguous effect on unemployment and the overall results depend 
upon parameters of the model. On the other hand higher common productivity 
reduces both unemployment and the idle rate6.
The distinctive prediction of the model is that higher firing delays (lower 5) 
reduce the job finding rate; the effect on job reallocation is likely to be negative, 
but overall ambiguous. In appendix (A) I show that, as long as we look across 
steady-state equilibria, the comparative static of modeling firing delays are qual­
itatively similar to the comparative static of traditional fixed firing cost rules, 
as in Millard and Mortensen (1994); the only difference being that stricter firing 
restrictions have ambiguous effect on the job reallocation rate while the latter in 
the Mortensen Millard (1994) paper is unambiguously reduced by higher firing 
tax. Even though the prediction that higher firing costs reduce both job creation 
and destruction is common to many search models, empirical evidence is contro­
versial (Bertola and Rogerson, 1996) 7. In Chapter (2) there is some evidence of 
a negative relationship between job reallocation and long-term unemployment. 
Countries with high long-term unemployment tend to have lower job reallocation 
and, as long as we exclude the role of firms’ entry and exit, higher job security
6This prediction should not be expected to hold empirically, especially when considering 
long-run growth. In the spirit of the model and in the rest of the paper p  is a cyclical variable. 
Section (1.7) shows that when we let p be a cyclical variable its fluctuations results in counter­
cyclical movements of unemployment.
7Bertola and Rogerson (1996) argue that the fact that countries with different degrees of job 
security provisions have similar rates of job reallocation should not be surprising once we realize 
that countries with high job security provisions have also centralized wage-setting institutions.
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provisions. Nevertheless, the main interest of this paper concerns the effect of 
firing restrictions on the cyclical behaviour of job creation and destruction. From 
the next section I turn explicitly to dynamics.
1.5 Job Flows and Cyclical Shocks
1.5.1 T he G eneral M odel
To study the cyclical behaviour of the model proposed in Section 2 I need an 
explicit driving force. In this paper I assume that job dynamics is driven by 
a single aggregate disturbance and I let the state of the economy be described 
by a realization of a first order Markov process. Aggregate conditions move 
stochastically between n states, indexed by net common productivity X{ = (p —b)i 
with Xi > X{+1. Aggregate shocks are described by the elements 7rtj of a nxn 
stochastic m atrix that contains the probabilities that the aggregate productivity 
jumps from state i to state j .  From the analysis in the previous section it is 
clear that for each aggregate productivity the system is characterized by the 
pair {edi,0i}. In this section I describe the methodology for solving for pairs 
{tdi, 0*}5 * =  1 • • • n. The techniques applied in this section were first introduced 
by Mortensen (1994), but they have to be slightly modified to solve the model of 
this paper. In what follows, the two steps procedure for obtaining the reservation 
productivities is very similar to Mortensen (1994), apart for the presence of firing 
restrictions s, while the methodology for obtaining the market tightness is specific 
to the model of this paper.
The comparative static results of the previous section let us infer that, in 
general, since Xi > x*+i, e&- < £&•+1 and 0t+i > 0,-. Since we assume that cyclical 
shocks are anticipated, we need to set out an aggregate state contingent value 
function for each job e. The value of a job, conditional on aggregate state pro­
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ductivity X{ and idiosyncratic productivity c now reads
rJi(e)  =  Xi +  a t  +  A [  /  Ji(z)dF(z)  -  J ; ( e )  +  ^  i r [ J j { t )  -  J ; ( e ) ]
+  s [max(Jz(e),0) -  J z(e)] i , j  =  1 , .. .  ,n , (1.22)
where at rate A a job specific shock arrives, at rate 7rtj an aggregate state switch 
occurs, while at rate s the firm gets firing permission. (1.22) can easily be written 
as
(r +  A +  ^ 2  +  s) M e) =  Xi +  cre +  A f  Ji(z)dF(z)  -f ivij J j ( e )
i#* Cl
+  s [max(</i(c),0)] i , j  = l , . . . , n .  (1.23)
After dividing both terms by ( r+  A +  £ # j  +  5)? tHe right hand side of (1.23) is
a mapping that satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction. The 
system in (1.23) has to be solved for the vector of reservation productivities. 
Each £*■, if it exists, is defined as J(e^) =  0, and I let Rd be a column vector 
containing the n reservation productivities. Differentiation of (1.23) with respect 
to e shows that each value function J t (e) is a piece-wise linear increasing function 
in e, with n kinks at values corresponding to elements of the vector Rd. The n 
consecutive kink points at tdi < Qi+i, together with e/0 < and en < eu , divide 
the productivity distribution into n +  1 interval of the form [tk — e*+i) , with 
e0 = eio and en+i = tu. In the first stage of the solution the derivative of each 
Ji (e)  for values of e in the interval [ck — e*:+i), is obtained as a solution to the 
linear system
(r +  ^ +  ] C 7ro +  = <7 + J 2 7rij~^r =  ek <  e < c/b+1, (1.24)
06 0e
where $  is an indicator function taking the value 1 if Cdi > e^+i and zero otherwise. 
Let D be an (n, rc+l) matrix whose general element dik gives the partial derivative
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of Ji(e) in the interval [e*, £*+1). The elements of Rd are then obtained in the 
second stage as a solution to the following non linear system in the n reservation 
productivities:
-}- <J€di =  • . • , Cn)] ^ ] 7TijJj^di) 2 — 1, . . . , 72. (1.25)
j±i
In (1.25) E(J{) is obtained integrating by parts (1.23) for each J; using the partial 
derivatives dij obtained in the first stage. E(J{) is defined as
n /*£p+1 rcp+1
E{Ji) = X )^ ‘.p+1 /  C1 ~  E{x))dx -  ^ 2 d iiP+i /  F(x)dx  (1.26)
p = i  J c P  p = 0  J cp
Job creation takes place at the upper support of the productivity distribution. 
Depending upon the state of the system X{, vacancies will be created so as to 
eliminate all possible rents. For each state i of the economy, an expression similar 
to (1.11) of Section 1.4 holds:
M eu) = -r r7  * =  (1.27)
W )
To obtain the market tightness 0{ from (1.27) it is necessary to obtain an ex­
pression for the value of the job at the upper support of the distribution Ji(cu) . 
Each Ji(tu), using the vector Rd obtained from (1.25) is one of the solutions to 
the following linear system:
(r* d" A -(- ^ ] T^tfe)«/t(^ tt) == 0"(^ u ^di) d“ ^  ^TTt'fc (Jfc( t^t) </fc(C(it)) (1.28)
kjki k^i
and
(  r  +  ^  ^kj)Jj{^u) -  ( r  +  A +  ^ 2  *kj +  <j>2s ) J j ( t d i )  =  ^ ( e u  “  C* ' )
k^j kjzj
T ^  ^ ft kj (Jkfeii) «7/j(Cj£j)) d" 7T for J  7^  2. (1.29)
k^j,i
In (1.29) <t>2 is an indicator function taking the value of 1 if e# > e^. The 
system (1.29) and (1.28) has to be solved recursively for each 2, starting from
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i — n. In (1.28) and (1.29) the unknowns are Ji(eu), (Jk(eu) — Jk{tdi)) for k < i 
and Jk(€<ii) for k > i, while Jfc(eu), for k > i, enters the system as a parameter. 
Each Ji(eu) can then be substituted into (1.27) to obtain the corresponding 0*-. 
Since > X{+i it will, in general, be true that Ji(eu) > J;+i(eu) and, from (1.27),
6i > $i+1-
1.5.2 T he D ynam ics o f Job D estruction  in a Special Case
With respect to the MP (1994) model, the introduction of firing restrictions has 
important effects on the dynamics of job destruction and on the cyclical behaviour 
of job reallocation. Conversely, the dynamics of job creation is completely in line 
with the MP (1994) model: as conditions improve new vacancies have to be 
matched to unemployed job seekers and the resulting rise in job creation is time 
consuming due to the presence of the matching function. In this section, to 
illustrate analytically how the dynamics of job destruction is affected by firing 
restrictions, I let the aggregate productivity parameter p take only a high value 
p* when the economy is booming and a low value p when the economy is in 
recession, and I shall indicate with /i the instantaneous transition rate from one 
aggregate state to the other. Since job destruction is completely driven by the 
reservation productivity, I start describing the equations of the marginal jobs.
Applying the methodology of the previous section to this simpler case and 
indicating with (e<*) and (ej) the marginal productivity in bad and good times, 
the reservation productivity in recession solves
p +<rcd — b = —\ E [ J ] —fjLj*(ed), (1.30)
where
j*(r \ _  P* +  a€d ~  h +  ^ E lJ *] n  o, x
J  M ' (L31)
Conversely, the reservation productivity in a boom solves
p* +  at", -  b =  (1.32)
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where
=  P + * $ - b + X E [ J )
r + X + p + s
Equations (1.32) and (1.30) form a system of two equations in eg and e*d.
To understand properly the separate effect of cyclical shocks (through the 
switching parameter /z), and firing restriction (through the arrival rate s), I con­
sider each of them separately.
Firstly, let the average waiting time for firing restriction be zero. In equa­
tion (1.32) the second term in the right hand side vanishes. Qualitatively, the 
introduction of cyclical shocks in an environment without firing restriction does 
not affect the equation of the marginal job during a boom8. When (s —> oo) 
in (1-32), as the economy switches from boom to recession the marginal job will 
immediately be destroyed. Conversely, with s —> oo in (1.30), the probability 
that common productivity jumps from p to p* increases the option value of the 
marginal job in recession. This effect is reflected in the second term  of the right 
hand side in (1.30).
Now let s take a positive and finite value, permission arrive at random and 
firing restrictions apply. The reservation productivity in recession in (1.30) is not 
directly affected by the firing restrictions s. Obviously, if the state of the economy 
switches to boom the marginal firm will get a positive asset value and will ignore 
firing permissions if they arrive. Conversely, the introduction of s directly affects 
the reservation productivity during a boom in (1.32). If the economy switches 
from boom to recession the last term in (1.32) is positive as long as the marginal 
job must wait for a firing restriction and can not destroy a negatively valued asset. 
This last effect is crucial and it is what makes the dynamics of job destruction 
in the model different from the dynamic implied by a simple fixed firing cost 
to be incurred when job destruction takes place. In appendix (B) I show that 
with a simple fixed firing cost, in the spirit of Millard (1994), a marginal job in
^Equation (1.32) when s —>• oo is qualitatively analogous to equation (1.5) of section (1.4).
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a boom will immediately be destroyed when the economy switches from boom to 
recession. Thus, in an institutional world with a simple fixed firing cost, all jobs 
whose marginal productivity lie between the two reservation productivities will 
be destroyed when the economy switches from boom to recession, exactly as in 
the world with no firing delays considered by MP (1994).
Solving for the market tightness in recession and in boom, from a system 
analogous to (1.28) and (1.29), the model is determined by the couple (q , $) in a 
recession and (e^, 0*) in a boom. To see how the model works consider first what 
happens when the aggregate productivity switches from p to p*. Since 6* > 0, 
firms open up more vacancies and since (ej < £<*), firms keep operational more 
existing jobs. On impact neither job destruction nor job creation jumps, since 
new vacancies take time to be matched to unemployed workers. As new matching 
starts to take place, the fall in unemployment induces a fall in job creation and 
an increase in job destruction until there is convergence to a new steady-state, 
or until there is a new cyclical shock. When aggregate productivity falls from 
p* to p, the dynamics of job creation follows an opposite pattern to that after 
an increase in p: vacancies fall on impact, but job creation takes time to fall. 
As for job destruction, the same reasoning applied to the marginal job in (1.32) 
holds for all jobs whose productivity lie between e*d and e .^ On impact there is 
an increase in idle jobs that wait for firing permission. As the matching of new 
vacancies and unemployment take time when there is a rise in p, so the shedding 
of new idle jobs is time consuming when there is a fall in p. In a world with firing 
restrictions, job destruction not only is costly, but also time consuming and, as 
will be clear from the simulations in section (1.7), depending on the value of s, 
its dynamic behaviour may well be symmetric to the dynamic behaviour of job 
creation. In structural terms, the hiring and firing technologies are governed by 
the parameters s, c, p — b and by the matching function q. On the one hand 
the flow cost c in the hiring technology plays a role similar to the operational
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profits p +  e — b (generally negative) in the firing technology. As new vacancies 
have to pay the flow cost c, so an idle job must suffer operational losses when it 
waits for the firing permission. On the other hand, the average waiting time 1/s 
plays a similar role to the matching function q, in the sense that they both act 
as a stochastic filter and introduce a time lag between the moment in which the 
firms takes a decision (to post a vacancy or to accept firing permissions) and the 
moment in which a job-worker pair matches or separates.
The analysis so far has concentrated only on the direct effect of s on the 
marginal productivity (1.31) and (1.33). In general, the presence of firing re­
strictions affect the marginal productivity in (1.31) and (1.33) also through its 
indirect effect on the average value of the jobs. For completeness of exposition, 
the expected value of a job in recession is
M i , .  a . ! . )
Similarly, the expected value of a job during a boom reads
E iJ ’] =  — - r  / ' “ ( l  -  F(x))dx  +  -------r + A Jed (r +  A -f 2p)(r  +  A) +  s(r
F ^ dx -  r + x + i  C  F (x)dx■ (1-35)
In (1.34) s reduces the average value of a job during recession through the 
second and third term of (1.34). When s —> oo the second and the third term
vanishes, a job in recession is never idle and it is operative only in the interval
between (eu — e^).
Similarly, with no firing restrictions, the third term  in (1.35) vanishes and 
the expected value of a job in the boom becomes
The indirect effects of firing restrictions on the expected value of the jobs are 
similar to the steady-state effects of firing restrictions described in section (1.4) 
and have no distinctive dynamic effects.
1.6 Job Flow D eterm ination
Both €{ and 0* are forward-looking jumping variables, independent of history. In 
general, as the aggregate state switches from Xi to Xj , both ez- and 0; will jump, on 
the impact, to their new values t j  and 6j. On the contrary, employment is a sticky 
variable and to implement the model we need to specify its dynamic behaviour 
at discrete time t =  1, . . . ,  n. For this purpose it is necessary to keep track of the 
entire distribution of employment at each reservation productivity . If Nt is a 
measure of employment at time 2, then Nt =  ’/* +  O*, where I t indicates the idle 
jobs waiting for firing permission and 0 t are the operational jobs that will ignore 
the arrival of firing permission. Following Mortensen (1994), we assume that the 
aggregate shock is completely revealed at the beginning of each period. In the 
time interval between t and t +1, £d(xt) and 0t(xt) are state variables determined 
at the beginning of time t and constant throughout. If 0 t(e) is a measure of 
operational jobs at idiosyncratic productivity e its law of motion is
Ch+i(e) =  (1 — A)0t  +  AF\ e) ( I t +  0 t), €d(xt) < c < (1.36)
while the law of motion of idle jobs It(e) is
I t+i{e) = (1 -  A)/< +  \F' (e)(I t +  0 t) -  s/*(e), ei(xt) < e < ed{xt) (1.37)
where the difference between (1.36) and (1.37) is that an idle job is destroyed 
if firing permission arrives. From the laws of motion (1.36) and (1.37) I can 
calculate job flows between t and t +  1. The empirical definition of job creation 
is the sum of all positive employment changes in a given period. Since, in the 
model, only the unemployed people are actively searching, job creation between
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t and t +  1 is
JCt = q(0t)9t{l -  Nt). (1.38)
If the matching function is log-linear with matching elasticity of unemployment 
a, q(9t)0t from the job creation condition (1.27) is
q(e)$t = kJt(eu) ^ ,  (1.39)
where A; is a scale parameter and </t(eu) is the time t value of the job at the upper 
support of the distribution obtained from (1.29). Similarly, the empirical defini­
tion of job destruction is the sum (in absolute value) of all negative employment 
changes. Endogenously, negative employment change comes from those idle jobs 
that get firing permission. If we then assume that there is an exogenous turnover 
rate of 5, the job destruction is
J  Dt — sit  +  SNU (1.40)
where s l t is job destruction via the firing permission and 5Nt is job destruction 
by natural turnover 9.
To evaluate (1.40) we have to keep track over time of the switch in the
composition of employment between operational and idle jobs. If we define Iinf t
as the inflow into the idle state at time f, it follows that:
red(xt)
Iinft =  ^F(td{Xt)){Nt — It) +  4>3 I  Ot{z)dz , (1-41)
l)
where $3 is an indicator function taking value 1 if Cd(xt) > td(xt- 1). Jobs flow
into the idle state for two reasons: either an idiosyncratic shock below the current
reservation productivity hits the job or the aggregate state worsens and makes
idle all jobs whose productivity lies between the two values. Vice-versa, if we
9In the asset equations describing the value of a match (1.1) and (1.23), the presence of 
the natural turnover works exactly as the interest rate r and, for simplicity, it has been so far 
neglected.
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define Iout as the outflow from the idle state between t and t +  1:
font =  (^(l — ^ (Q ^ t) ) )  +  <s)/* +  $4 f  It(z)dz , (1-42)
Jcd(art - i )
where $ 4 is an indicator function that takes value 1 if Cd(xt) < td(xt-1). Jobs 
leave the idle state for three reasons: a positive idiosyncratic shock makes jobs 
fully operational, firing permission arrives or a positive aggregate shock makes 
all jobs between the two reservation productivities fully operational. Given the 
flows (1.38)-(1.42), obviously:
N t+i =  J C t -  J D t 4- N u  (1.43)
and
If+l =  l in f t  liout 4~ It- (1.44)
Let us consider a positive aggregate shock that switches the system from X{ 
to Xj and assume that Oj > $i and €{. The intuition goes as follows. In (1.38) 
job creation increases as new vacancies are matched to unemployed through the 
matching function q. On impact, from / out, the outflow from the idle state jumps 
since all idle jobs whose productivity lay between the two reservation produc­
tivities are now fully operational. The number of idle workers jumps downward 
and, for a given arrival rate s, job destruction next period will fall. The process 
continues as long as a new steady state with job creation equal to job destruction 
is reached or a new aggregate shock arrives. Let us now repeat the experiment for 
a negative aggregate shock from Xj to a;*, and assume that Ok < Oj and tk  >  i j .  
Job creation falls as the number of vacancies opened falls, while impact, the num­
ber of idle jobs jumps upward, since all operational jobs whose productivity lies 
between the two reservation productivities are now idle. For a given s in (1.40), 
job destruction next period will increase. Intuitively, in a boom (recession) job 
creation rises (falls) and job destruction falls (rises). Furthermore, the response 
of the two flows following a state switch should be symmetric. As new vacancies
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have to be matched to unemployed workers as conditions improve, so new idle 
workers need firing permission to destroy the job. The next section simulates the 
solution of the general model for different values of firing permission s.
1.7 M odel Simulation
To implement the general stochastic model of the previous sections it is necessary 
to specify the process for {x t}. The Markov chain is determined by the state space 
of x*, x-> and the transition probability matrix II. In this section, as in Christiano 
(1990), we adopt the following three state model:
n =
and
0 7 1 - 0 - 7
$ 1 — 2$ $
0 - 7 7 0
/  \
— X
X =  < 0 ►.
XV J
The Wold representation corresponding to this Markov chain is
x* =  px*_ i +  et, (1.45)
where et is mean 0 with variance and is uncorrelated with x t- \.  Furthermore,
p =  20 +  7 — 1; k =  1 T .57/ ^ ,  (1*46)
where k, is kurtosis, and
x2
' (1.47)var(xt) = — ; cre — var(xt)( 1 — p2).
To determine this model, values must be assigned to four parameters, 0 ,7 ,$  
and x. The simulations in this section follow the lines of a recent paper by 
Millard and Mortensen (1994), who calibrate the MP model for the U.S. and 
U.K. economies under the assumption that the only difference between the two 
countries lies in the policy parameters and in the workers’ bargaining strength.
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Thus, the baseline parameters values should be taken as representative of every 
country, independent of its labour market policies. In this direction the United 
States turns out to be the country with insignificant firing restrictions and I use 
parameter values very similar to MP (1993), where they solve the MP (1994) 
model without explicitly considering wage bargaining. As to the Markov chain 
parameters, I set <f> =  0.933, 7 =  0.067 and ^  =  0.017. As to the aggregate 
shock I let x be 0.008. These parameters imply a value of p = 0.933 - slightly 
less than what is generally used in the real business cycle literature - and a value 
of k =  2.97, so as to approximate the kurtosis of the normal distribution. The 
productivity distribution is uniform over the interval [-1,1], the arrival rate of the 
idiosyncratic shock A is set to 0.081, while <7, the dispersion of the productivity 
distribution is set to 0.037. The matching function, as in (1.39) is log linear with 
matching elasticity of unemployment a  equal to 0.25 and coefficient k  equal to 1. 
The real interest is set to 0.02. These parameter values are very similar to those 
chosen by MP (1993) and they are summarised in Table 1.4.
The most problematic parameter to set is s. From the Beveridge curve for 
the steady state model (1.19) it is clear that, given a value of A equal to 0.08, a 
value of s of the order of 1 should not affect too much equilibrium unemployment 
directly. Numerical solutions show that a value of s of 1.2 implies an average 
equilibrium unemployment of 5.8% 10. The corresponding correlation between 
job reallocation and net employment changes is, on average, —.5, the relative 
variance of job destruction and creation is 4 while the coefficients of variation are 
respectively 0.7 for job destruction and 0.4 for job creation. These values are in 
line with the statistics of job flows in United States, Canada and Britain reported 
in Tables (1.1) and (1.2) and I take them to be representative of an economy with 
insignificant firing restrictions.
10All the simulations of this paper have been obtained with a Gauss programme written by 
the author. The programme is available under request.
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Table 1.4: Baseline Parameter Values
Variables Notation Value
Matching Elasticity a 0.250
friction parameter k 5
net common price Xi 0.008
net common price X2 0.0
net common price *3 -0.008
interest rate r 0.020
natural turnover 5 0.020
idiosyncratic shock rate A 0.081
price dispersion a 0.037
price distribution H- ) uniform
upper support 1
lower support Zlo -1
Markov chain probability <f> 0.933
Markov chain probability 7 0.017
Markov chain probability V 0.067
firing restrictions (max) s 1.20
firing restrictions (min) s 0.05
Source: Christiano (1990), Mortensen (1994), Mortensen Pissarides ( 1993) 
and author calculations.
Summary statistics for time series simulations are summarised in Table (1.5). 
For different values of firing restrictions I simulated 150 time series of 64 peri­
ods each. Job creation is pro-cyclical (correlation Jc-Net) and job destruction is 
counter cyclical (corr. Jd-Net) for different values of s ranging from 1.2 to 0.2. As 
firing restrictions increase, both job creation and destruction fall, and, from the 
range of values of s chosen in Table (1.5), equilibrium unemployment is approxi­
mately constant. This result is similar to Mortensen and Millard (1994), who find 
that firing costs are responsible for less than 1 percent of the UK unemployment. 
The effect of linear firing costs on labour demand in a partial equilibrium model 
have recently been analysed by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994). They argue 
that labour demand is likely to increase only if firing restrictions are sufficiently
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Table 1.5: Simulation Statistics
5  =  1.20 5 =  1.00 5 =  0.80 s =  0.60 5 =  0.40 s =  0.20
corr. JC-NET 0.617 0.607 0.592 0.598 0.644 0.776
corr. JD-NET -0.814 -0.735 -0.704 -0.607 -0.592 -0.374
corr. JC-JD -0.157 -0.018 0.078 0.200 0.190 0.242
corr. JR-NET -0.502 -0.367 -0.267 -0.120 -0.007 0.368
° 2inl<r2in 4.051 2.422 1.676 1.030 0.594 0.204
v j c / J C 0.377 0.344 0.328 0.315 0.281 0.276
<7j d / J D 0.750 0.588 0.489 0.395 0.301 0.202
J C  rate 2.776 2.728 2.720 2.634 2.598 2.287
Unem. 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.059 0.053
Dur. Unem. 2.035 2.046 2.063 2.091 2.218 2.321
Idle 0.022 0.026 0.033 0.042 0.063 0.109
pers. unem. 0.610 0.731 0.793 0.881 0.905 0.940
high. In this respect the results in Table (1.5) seem to confirm the Bentolila and
Saint-Paul finding, even though their model is a partial equilibrium model.
The most important result in Table (1.5), in line with the spirit of Bertola
(1990) is that firing restrictions, albeit not responsible for lower employment
levels, dramatically affect labour market dynamics, through their effect on the
relative volatility of job creation and job destruction. The relative variance of job
2
destruction to job creation - p  falls dramatically as firing restrictions increase.
° J C
To falls in the relative variance correspond differences in the cyclical where be­
haviour of job reallocation, which rises from negative to positive values. Overall, 
as the average waiting time for firing restrictions increases, the statistics in Ta­
ble (1.5) replicate the dynamics of economies with serious or fundamental firing 
restrictions, as indicated in Table (1.1) and (1.2).
A controversial result of Table (1.5) is the correlation between job creation
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and job destruction, which is not as negative as the one found in Table (1.1) 
and (1.2). This result is due to a too strong responsiveness of job creation to 
unemployment. Similar correlation is found in MP (1993). Mortensen (1994) in­
troduces voluntary quits and obtains a negative correlation between job creation 
and job destruction. Other statistics of Table (1.5) show that as firing restrictions 
increase the average duration of unemployment increases. Firing restrictions ob­
viously have a strong effect on average idle capacity, the average fraction of jobs 
waiting for firing permission. Finally Table (1.5) agrees with the econometric ev­
idence on the effect of firing costs on the persistence of employment (Alogoskoufis 
and Manning, 1988). Employment adjusts more slowly with relatively high firing 
costs.
1.8 Conclusions
This paper has taken seriously the recent empirical studies on job creation and 
destruction collected by the OECD (1994a). Focusing on the cyclical properties 
of these flows, job creation is pro-cyclical while job destruction is counter cyclical. 
Huge differences exist in the relative volatility of the two flows. This paper has 
offered a model that for different values of firing restrictions, implies both facts.
When firing permissions are continuously available, job destruction is in­
stantaneous while job creation takes time and job reallocation moves counter 
cyclically. As firing is restricted to be costly and time consuming, the asymme­
try between job flows disappears and job reallocation is uncorrelated with net 
employment changes. This paper has argued that this mechanism is behind the 
cross-country variation in the cyclical behaviour of job flows.
Another implication of the model is that reasonable firing restrictions do 
not imply higher equilibrium unemployment, but they reduce both job creation 
and job destruction. Since these flows are equal in equilibrium, the effect on 
unemployment is ambiguous. It has already been recognized (Bertola 1990; Ben-
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tolila and Bertola 1990) that higher firing costs do not bias downward average 
employment, but they significantly affect labour market dynamics. In this pa­
per, we have shown a way in which firing restrictions affect the volatility of job 
destruction and creation, an aspect of employment dynamics.
Several directions should be taken from this paper. Firstly, following Burda 
and Wyplosz (1994) for Europe and Mortensen (1994) for the U.S., it is necessary 
to investigate the effect of firing restrictions on worker flows. Secondly, Hopen- 
hayn and Rogerson (1993) simulate a general equilibrium model with simultane­
ous job creation and destruction and they find that a tax on job destruction has 
a sizable negative impact on total employment. W ith respect to the approach 
of this paper, Hopenhayn and Rogerson explicitly consider the effects of firing 
restrictions on labour supply decisions, completely neglected in this paper. Fu­
ture research should try to model labour supply in a dynamic matching models. 
The last direction of research would address the question of the optimal level 
of job reallocation and the relationship between job reallocation and economic 
performance.
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A Appendix: Firing Tax in Steady State
In this section I model the behaviour of the firm under the assumption that 
firing costs take the form of a simple fixed firing tax of — F  to be incurred when 
separation takes place. The model is in the spirit of Mortensen and Millard 
(1994). In this case, the forward looking asset equation for a job at productivity 
e reads
rJ(e) = p + e r e - b  + \ ( E ( J )  -  J ( e ) ) . (I)
A firm hit by a negative idiosyncratic shock will keep running a job as long as 
its marginal value is greater than the fixed firing cost —F.  Under this rule the 
marginal productivity solves
J ( 4 )  =  - F ,  (II)
where e j is the marginal productivity under the fixed firing rule. The average 
value of the job is
E[J] = [** —FdF(x)  +  r  J (x )dF(x ), (III)
Ja JcF
where
£  J(x)dF(x)  = J(eu) -  J { $ ) F { u )  ~  £  F ^ ) dx - (IV)
Making use of (II), the value of a job at the upper support of the distribution 
reads
J(eu) = —F  +  j q - y  dx, 
and substituting this expression into (IV), the average value of a job reads
E[J) =  ^  / ' ” (1 -  F (x ) ) dx ~  F■ (V)
From (V) it is clear that, given the reservation productivity, firing costs reduce 
the average value of the job.
Making use of (II) and (V), the reservation productivity solves
The right hand side of (VI) is negative and there is labour hoarding in the firm’s 
optimal policy. Differentiating (VI) with respect to F  yields
<V I I >
Thus higher firing costs reduce the reservation productivity and induce the firm 
to hold on to less profitable jobs.
Firms post vacancies and, conditional upon finding an unemployed worker, 
they create a job at the upper support of the distribution J(eu). Free entry in 
equilibrium implies that
(VIII)
In order to solve (VIII) for 6 we need an expression for J(eu), the value of a job 
at the upper support of the distribution. If we evaluate (I) at eu and subtract it 
from (VI), J(eu) reads
J M  = - F- (IX)r  +  X
Differentiating (VIII) with respect to F , making use of (IX) and (VII), yields
-A F { 4 )  cq>(9) de
r  +  AF(«£)) q { 6 f d F ' 1 ’
Since qt{6) < 0, job creation falls with the increase in the firing tax. Thus higher 
firing taxes reduce the job finding rate 9q(6).
Job creation is 0q($)u, and job destruction is XF(ed)(l — u ) and unemploy­
ment is obtained as a solution to
u = X F ( ^ ) ( l - u ) - $ q ( 0 ) u .  (XI)
Unemployment is constant when job creation equals job destruction and reads
A F (ef)
A F (ef)+  * ,(* )' ( }
Since higher firing costs affect both the job creation and job destruction decision, 
they have an ambiguous impact on equilibrium unemployment. Differentiating
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(XII) with respect to F , it is clear that the overall effect depends on the pa­
rameters of the model and the distribution of productivity F (eJ). Total job 
reallocation is 2AF(e^)(l — u) and the derivative with respect to F  depends on 
the ambiguous effect of firing costs on unemployment. Nevertheless, if we define 
job reallocation as the sum, in absolute value, of employment changes, over total 
employment, it follows that
J R  =  A F(ef).  (XIII)
Differentiating (XIII) with respect to F,  and making use of (VII), higher firing 
costs unambiguously reduce the job reallocation rate.
B Appendix: Job D estruction, Firing Tax and 
Cyclical Shocks
In this section I extend the model of the previous section to allow the aggregate 
productivity p to fluctuate stochastically between an high value p* and a low 
value p, and I indicate with p the switching probability between the two values. 
The model is in the spirit of Millard (1994). If we indicate with e j and ej*, the
reservation productivity in bad and good times, the value of a job in recession,
J(e), for e > e% solves
(r +  A +  p)J(e) =  p +  ere -  b + AE(J)  +  (XIV)
Similarly, a value of a job during a boom, J*(e), for e > solves
(r +  A +  p) J*(e) = p* + <Te-b + \E(J*)  +  pJ{e).  (XV)
Finally, for ej* < t < the value of a job during a boom solves
(r +  A + p)r(c) = p* +  at  -  b +  AE(J*)  -  pF.  (XVI)
Proceeding in the same way as in section (1.5), the expected value of a job during 
recession is
E{J)  =  ~  j f  “(1 -  F(x))dx -  F, (XVII)
d
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and the expected value of a job during the boom is
E( J ' )  = / ' “(I -  F(x))dx +  ^  P  (1 -  F(x))dx -  rF. (XVIII)r a  r  H- A +  fi J e y
Using (XVII) into (XIV) and evaluating (XIV) at J(td) = —F,  yields
p + <red -  b =  / ' “(1 -  F(x))dx -  ^  ~  rF. (XIX)
r +  A J  r  +  A +  f i
Proceeding similarly for J(ef*) =  — F  yields
p’, + a c ^ - b = - ^ j j ^ ( l - F ( x ) ) d x - - ^ ^ — j ^ { l - F { x ) ) d x - r F .  (XX)
Proceeding as in section (1.5) it is possible to obtain market tightness in boom 6* 
and in recession 6. Consider first what happens when the aggregate productivity 
switches from p to p*. On the one hand, firms open up more vacancies, on 
the other hand firms hold on to more existing jobs (eJ* < ef). On impact 
neither job destruction nor job creation jumps, since new vacancies take time 
to be matched to unemployed workers. As matching takes place, the fall in 
unemployment induces a fall in job creation and an increase in job creation until 
there is convergence to a new steady-state, or until there is a new cyclical shock. 
When aggregate productivity falls from p* to p the dynamics of job creation 
follows an opposite pattern to the one after an increase in p: vacancies fall on 
impact, but job creation takes time to fall. Conversely, since all jobs whose 
productivity lies between ef* and ef will immediately be destroyed, there will 
be an immediate spike in job destruction. This increase in job destruction has 
no counterpart in the behaviour of job destruction when p increases, or in the 
behaviour of job creation during net expansion. Thus, with a fixed firing cost 
rule, the variance in job destruction is bound to be higher than the variance in 
job creation, exactly as in the MP (1994) model.
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C hapter 2
Job R eallocation and Labour 
M arket Policy
2.1 Introduction
The popularity of the notion of “labour market flexibility” in the policy debate 
in Europe and the interest in sectoral reallocations as a source of the business 
cycle in the U.S., have led to the accumulation of statistical information on job 
reallocations in several OECD countries. The manufacturing data gathered by 
Davis and Haltiwanger in the United States have been particularly influential. 
They found that a large number of jobs close down each quarter and an equally 
large number open up, apparently for specific reasons unrelated to sector or 
economy-wide performance. When the OECD (1994a) compiled comparable data 
for several of its members it found that the U.S. experience was by no means 
exceptional, though it also found that job reallocations elsewhere were on average 
not as frequent.
Concurrently with the collection of data for the OECD, a number of authors 
have developed theoretical models to explain the processes of job creation and 
job destruction. A natural way to think about job creation is in terms of the 
matching of job seekers with hiring firms, along the lines of the equilibrium search 
literature. The search literature, however, had only a rudimentary discussion of
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job destruction and several suggestions have been put forward about the factors 
underlying the destruction process. In the analysis of Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1994) jobs differ according to productivity and job destruction takes place when 
the productivity of a job, following a shock, drops below a reservation value. 
Thus job destruction in their model follows the same principles as job creation 
in more conventional matching models with match productivity differentials. In 
both cases jobs are independent “islands” that are subjected to both idiosyncratic 
and common shocks and the key variable that determines whether they are active 
or not is a unique reservation productivity.
Our interest in this paper is to draw together the international data compiled 
by the OECD (1994a) with a view to understanding the role of labour market 
policy in the determination of job reallocations. Of course, we have no strong 
theoretical reasons for supposing that more job reallocation is better than less, 
or vice versa. We also do not have evidence yet of a firm relationship between 
overall unemployment and job reallocation. But we present evidence that low job 
reallocation is associated with more long-term unemployment. Since the latter is 
bad, in terms of the loss of skill of the unemployed and the disenfranchisement of 
those who suffer it, the supposition is that policies that restrict job reallocation 
are not good for the ability of the market to turn over its unemployment stock 
quickly.
In section (2.2) we give some definitions and briefly describe the job real­
location data. In section (2.3) we discuss the relation between unemployment 
and job reallocation in the context of the flow approach to labour markets. Fi­
nally, in section (2.4), we look at the relation between labour market policy and 
job reallocations, with the help of simple figures for ten OECD countries with 
comparable data.
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2.2 Prelim inaries
Gross job reallocation is normally defined as the sum of the absolute value of 
the change in employment in each unit in the sample (normally an establishment 
but sometimes a company) expressed as a proportion of total employment. More 
specifically, the job creation (J C ) rate is defined as the sum of all increases in 
employment expressed as a proportion of total employment, and job destruction 
as the sum of all decreases in employment, again expressed as a proportion of 
total employment.
Note that because in each case we are dividing by total employment, not 
just employment in either expanding or contracting establishments, the figure 
obtained for J C  is not the average expansion rate of expanding establishments 
and the one for J D  is not the average contraction rate of contracting establish­
ments. If, say, exactly half of establishments expanded, then to find the average 
expansion rate, J C  has to be doubled.
The difference between JC and JD, gives the rate of net employment change. 
Their sum gives the gross job reallocation rate. Because of our definitions, the 
gross reallocation rate is the average change (positive or negative) experienced 
by the typical establishment in the sample, expressed as a proportion of mean 
employment for each establishment. To express it as a proportion of beginning-of- 
period employment, one can use the transformation 2( J C  +  JD) / (2  — J C  — JD ), 
so if, say, gross reallocation on our definition was 0.2, using beginning-of-period 
employment would make it 0.22.
Our analysis in this paper compares average job reallocation rates for the 
OECD countries that have comparable data in order to say something about the 
role of labour market policy. Since job reallocation rates are highly sensitive to 
the phase of the cycle that the economy is in, for the comparison to be meaningful 
the economies have to be either in about the same phase of the cycle over the
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Table 2.1: Job Reallocation in OECD Countries
Country Notation Total Job 
Reallocation
Continuining
Establishments
Entry and 
Exit
Belgium B 14.4 8.9 5.5
Canada C 26.3 20 6.3
Denmark DK 29.8 18.7 11.1
Finland FL 22.4 15.1 7.3
France F 27.1 12.9 14.2
Germany G 16.5 12.1 4.4
Italy I 23.4 15.7 7.7
Sweden S 29.1 17.6 11.5
U.K. UK 15.3 8.7 6.6
U.S.A. US 24.6 18.9 5.7
Source: OECD (1994a) and Appendix.
sample period or the period has to be long enough to average across cycles. Our 
sample period is for 1982-89 when the economies covered were coming out of 
recession and productivity growth was positive. The only exception amongst the 
OECD countries with comparable data was New Zealand, which experienced a 
deep recession with large negative productivity growth during this period. We 
decided to drop New Zealand from the sample. We also decided to make no 
effort to bring Japan into the sample (the only major OECD economy left out) 
because its peculiar job tenure arrangements make it difficult to compare its job 
reallocation rate with that of other OECD countries.
Table (2.1) gives the job reallocation rates for the ten countries in our sample. 
It also splits job reallocation according to whether the reallocation of jobs was due 
to contraction or expansion of existing establishments (continuing establishments) 
or to new entry or exit. The reason for the split is that much of what we shall 
have to say about policy relates more to large established units rather than to 
small new ones. Another reason that one might want to split the sample is 
that the theory of job creation and job destruction as it applies to continuing
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establishments is often different from the one that applies to entry and exit.
The Table shows that gross job reallocation rates across the ten OECD coun­
tries range from low of about 14 percent for Belgium to a high of 29 per cent 
for Sweden. When entry and exit are removed the range drops to about 9 per­
cent for the UK and Belgium to 20 percent for Canada. The new entry and exit 
figures show some peculiarities, with France having approximately twice as high 
a figure as the rest of the sample, with the exception of Sweden. In contrast, 
when only continuing establishment are considered, France and Germany have 
broadly a similar figure for the low reallocation countries of Europe (UK and Bel­
gium) and high reallocation countries of North America. The North American 
countries do emerge as countries with more reallocation, as conventional wisdom 
would lead us to believe, but not by much when compared, for example to Swe­
den (which might have a high reallocation rate because of its limited-duration 
job subsidization programmes).
If there are large net changes in employment in the sample, the conventional 
definition of gross job reallocation can give rise to some peculiarities. For ex­
ample, imagine a situation where no establishment in the sample expands but 
all establishments contract by 5 per cent. Then, the gross job reallocation rate 
will be 5 per cent, though there has been no job reallocation within the sample. 
Contrast this with a situation where 3 per cent of workers leave from half the 
establishments and get jobs with the other half. In the latter case the gross job 
reallocation rate will be 3 per cent, lower than in the former case, though in the 
latter there has been a genuine reallocation of 3 per cent of the jobs.
For this reason, a more satisfactory definition of job reallocation is what is 
often called the “excess” job reallocation, defined as the average of gross realloca­
tion minus net employment change for each year in the sample (or, alternatively, 
as twice the average of either J C  or J D  whichever is the smaller). Unfortunately 
we do not have enough data for the countries in our sample to compute the net
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Table 2.2: Gross and Excess Job Reallocation
Country Source JR Excess
Germany Boeri and Cramer (1993) 15.94 14.23
U.K. Konings (1995a) 7.18 2.81
U.S. Davis and Haltiwanger(1992) 20.43 15.62
Canada Baldwin et al. (1994) 20.52 17.77
Italy Contini et al. (1992) 23.06 21.96
reallocation rate. For the five countries that we have data, the relation between 
gross and excess reallocation turns out to be linear with positive intercept and 
slope less than one, and correlation coefficient 0.97. Table (2.2) gives the gross 
and excess reallocation rates for the five countries.
2.3 U nem ploym ent and Job R eallocation
A number of different and often contradictory views about the relation between 
job reallocation and unemployment have been expressed. The current interest 
in job reallocation has been partly stimulated by the interest in the “sectoral 
shifts hypothesis” , especially in the United States. This is the view, first put 
forward by Lillien (1982), that the business cycle in the United States is largely 
driven by reallocation shocks; that is, shocks that shift real demand from some 
sectors of the economy to other sectors of the economy and which on aggregate 
might be neutral. A faster pace of reallocation, according to this view, requires 
more intersectoral labour mobility: if there are inertia to mobility, unemployment 
results in the contracting sectors that might last sufficiently long to mirror the 
cyclical persistence of unemployment in the real economy
Although intense testing of this view has rejected it as the dominant ex­
planation of the business cycle, even in the United States where unemployment 
persistence is a lot less than it is in Europe, if there is any tru th  in this hypoth-
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esis we should expect to observe a positive association between unemployment 
and gross job reallocation. For it the pace of allocative shocks is faster, gross 
job reallocation rates should be higher at the same time that unemployment is 
higher.
Contrary to this view, it is often stated that large rates of job reallocation 
indicate a “flexible” labour market that is better able to adapt to new conditions. 
By implication, the allocation of resources in a labour market that has more job 
reallocation should be better and so unemployment should be less.
Unfortunately, neither economic theory nor empirical work is yet in a posi­
tion to shed light on the relation between gross job reallocation and the allocation 
of resources in the labour market. For example one question we do not have an 
answer is whether individuals participating in a market with more job realloca­
tion should expect to find a better quality match during their job search. Future 
work will undoubtedly shed light on this and other related questions. But in the 
absence of a theoretical framework that could shed light on the welfare implica­
tions of more or less job reallocation, it is difficult to evaluate the welfare effects 
of policy measures that influence job reallocation
For this reason we follow here a different route. We outline first a way of 
thinking about unemployment, derived from the flow approach to the labour 
market, that shows that there should not necessarily be a relation between gross 
reallocation and unemployment, though it is unlikely that there should be no 
relation between gross job reallocation on the one hand and either unemployment 
or its duration on the other. We then look at our cross-section of OECD countries 
and discover that there is a relation between the duration of unemployment and 
gross job reallocation. We draw some tentative conclusions about the process of 
job search in the labour market and the contribution of job reallocation to it, 
before we proceed to evaluate the effects of policy measures on job reallocation.
Looking at employment flows first, we follow the empirical literature and
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define the rate of job creation (JC)  and the rate of job destruction (JD)  during 
a year by
Number of Jobs created
J C  = Total Employment 
and
Number of Jobs destroyed
J D  = Total Employment
If there is an exogenous rate of labour force growth of n, employment flows in 
the steady state have to satisfy,
J C  — J D  = n.
Gross job reallocation is conventionally defined as
J R  = J C  + JD.
Let us now look at unemployment flows. In the steady state, the mean 
duration of unemployment is defined as
Total unemployment 
Outflow from unemployment
If the rate of unemployment is to remain constant during periods of population 
growth, the number of unemployed workers has to grow at rate n. Writing total 
unemployment as I/, we therefore have,
Unemployment Inflow — Unemployment Outflow =  nU.
The unemployment inflow is made up of workers who lost their jobs because 
of job destruction and of some other workers, mainly those quitting their jobs to 
enter unemployment and new labour force entrants. We can therefore write the 
above formula for unemployment in equilibrium in the form,
Job Destruction +  Other inflow — Outflow =  nU.
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Straight forward manipulation of this formula gives,
other inflow u nu
employment (1 — u)D 1 — u
where u is the rate of unemployment. Since from the definition of job reallocation 
we know J D  = (J R  — n ) / 2, we can write the above formula in the form,
2 u'J R  =  - jy  +  other terms,
where uf is the ratio of unemployment to employment and the other terms depend 
on the rate of labour-force growth and the other inflow into unemployment as a 
proportion of employment.
This formula shows that there is an equilibrium relation between the rate of 
unemployment, the gross job reallocation rate and the mean duration of unem­
ployment but this relation depends also on other factors. As an example of what 
might cause the difference in job reallocation rates across countries, suppose that 
the two countries have the same unemployment rate, say 8 percent, but one has 
population growth rate of 2.5 per cent and the other 1.5 per cent. Then, the 
formula above says that job reallocation in the country with the faster growth 
should be 2.35 percentage points higher than in the country with the lower growth 
rate. Country differences in the flow into unemployment other than those caused 
by job destruction can also produce differences in job reallocation rates at given 
rate and duration of unemployment. Since (in the absence of reliable data) such 
differences are likely to be larger than differences in population growth rates, we 
would expect this factor to be a more important cause of distortion in the relation 
between unemployment, its duration and the job reallocation rate.
Having noted that, however, it would be surprising if there were no relation 
between the three variables in what is essentially a formula between five variables, 
one of which (the labour force growth) is not likely to differ much across the 
OECD. In an international cross-section, we might well find that all three are
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Figure 2.1: Job Reallocation and Unemployment
related, or that the two are related and the third is following its own path. 
But complete independence between unemployment, its duration and the job 
reallocation rate is unlikely.
In Figures (2.1) and (2.2) we plotted the gross job reallocation rates against 
an OECD-adjusted definition of unemployment for the ten countries in our sam­
ple. There is a small negative correlation, derived from the negative association 
between gross job reallocation in continuing establishments and unemployment.
There is, however, a stronger correlation between gross job reallocation and 
the duration of unemployment. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show that countries with 
less job reallocation have more long-term unemployment. The relation is again 
stronger for the job reallocation that is due to continuing establishments than for
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Figure 2.3: Job Reallocation and Long Term Unemployment
the whole economy. As in the case of total unemployment, there is virtually no 
relation between entry and exit and gross job reallocation.
Thus, in our decomposition shown in the formula above, the correlation ap­
pears to be mainly between the gross reallocation rate and the duration of un­
employment, with very little correlation between the gross reallocation rate and 
unemployment. Of course, the formula above does not suggest any explanation for 
the observed relations. A possible explanation for the correlation between gross 
job reallocation and long-term unemployment runs along the following lines.
We think of the process that allocate worker to jobs as taking place in a 
large hiring hall. Workers search for jobs with given intensity, they are prepared 
to accept jobs on the basis of a variety of reservation wages and firms choose
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which workers to hire on the basis of the expected productivity of the match and 
the wage rate. If the job reallocation rate is small, not many new jobs and also 
not many previously employed workers enter the hiring hall. The unemployed 
workers have fewer jobs to search but there is also less competition for them, 
because of the smaller inflow of workers into the hall. Our finding suggest that 
unemployed are less likely to find a job when the inflow of both job vacancies 
and job seekers is down. In the absence of the active job matching induced by 
large job reallocation rates, the unemployed are more likely to enter long-term 
unemployment.
If this way of looking at the matching process is correct, doubts can be cast 
on the “insider-outsider” explanation of the persistence of unemployment and on 
the view that the unemployed cannot compete for jobs with employed for newly- 
unemployed job seekers. Insider-outsider theory in this context would imply that 
the already unemployed are not active participants in a matching round generated 
by entry of new jobs and new workers. This does not appear to be the case. The 
competition theory (Burgess, 1993) claims that the outflow from unemployment 
is virtually independent of the number of job vacancies in the market, which is 
also inconsistent with the view expressed above.
The process described is, however, consistent with a purely random matching 
game when the number of job vacancies is less than the number of job seekers (or 
when there are increasing returns to scale in matching) and even more so with the 
matching ideas recently put forward by Coles (1992). In his model pre-existing 
unemployed benefit more from newly created job vacancies than from ones that 
already existed, because they searched some or all of the already existing ones in 
the past without success.
Since long term unemployment is wasteful in terms of the loss of skill and 
the disenfranchisement of those who suffer it, the lower long-term associated with 
higher turnover is one beneficial effect we can identify at this level of analysis.
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Another way of looking at the theoretical relations behind the correlations 
found between unemployment, its duration and job reallocations is to think of 
the job reallocation rate as largely determined by a vector of variable X , the 
unemployment rate as largely determined by another vector Y y and the duration 
of unemployment determined by both X  and Y.  Such a formulation justifies the 
observed correlation between the job reallocation rate and long-term unemploy­
ment reported here, the correlation between the rate of unemployment and the 
long-term unemployment previously found by several studies and also the absence 
of a close correlation between unemployment and gross job reallocation.
The analysis in the next section identifies policy variables that belong to 
the set AT, that is, variables that might explain the co-movement between job 
reallocation and long-term unemployment for given rate of unemployment.
2.4 Job R eallocation and Labour M arket P ol­
icy
We look at three kinds of labour market policy and, rather briefly, at what might 
be described as industrial policy. The labour market policies that we look at are 
direct restrictions on the firm’s ability to fire employees, “passive” policy, which 
we measure by income support to the unemployed, and active “policy”, which 
we measure by the amount of money spent per unemployed worker on measures 
designed to speed the transition from unemployment to employment. Industrial 
policy refers to subsidization of industrial production or employment.
2.4.1 E m ploym ent P rotection  L egislation
We refer to restrictions on the firm’s ability to dismiss employees as “employment 
protection legislation”. Our measure of such legislation derives from the OECD, 
where an index is constructed showing the sum of weeks’ notice and weeks’ com­
pensation that has to be given to dismissed employees. In our sample and for the
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period of our analysis this index ranged from virtually zero for the United States 
to 7 for Belgium and Italy.
The obvious link between employment protection legislation and the gross job 
reallocation rate is that restrictions on dismissals impose a shadow price on the 
firm, leading to a drop on dismissal. Because the entry into unemployment is as 
a consequence reduced, there is less exit, that is, less job creation. Alternatively, 
looking at it from the firm’s point of view, a shadow price on dismissal should lead 
to higher labour costs and so lower demand for labour. Either way, employment 
protection legislation should lead to less job reallocation. This link, which has 
featured in the labour demand literature several times (see for example the survey 
by Nickell, 1986), was also explored more recently in models with explicit job 
creation and job destruction by Millard and Mortensen (1994) and in chapter 
( ! ) •
The negative correlation between employment protection legislation and job 
reallocation is clearly visible in our sample, especially when entry and exit of firms 
is excluded from the sample (Figure (2.6)). Since restrictions on dismissals apply 
mainly to large firms, the fact that there is no relation whatsoever between entry 
and exit on the one hand and employment protection legislation on the other (not 
shown in the Figures) is not surprising. The simple correlation coefficient between 
the gross job reallocation rate of continuing establishments and the OECD index 
of employment protection legislation is —0.57.
2.4.2 Passive Policy M easure
Next we consider the relation between unemployment compensation, the main de­
terminant of the generosity of passive policy measures, and gross job reallocation. 
In the model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) more generous unemployment 
compensation reduces the cost of unemployment and raises the wages of labour. 
The implication on impact is that there is less job creation and more job destruc-
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Figure 2.7: Job Reallocation and Unemployment Insurance, General Index
tion, i.e. the Beveridge curve shifts out. But the economy eventually settles down 
to a higher- unemployment equilibrium, where job creation and job destruction 
are equal to each other. Whether they equalise at higher rates or lower ones, when 
compared with the previous steady state is not possible to say without knowledge 
of parameter values (although it should be noted that in simpler versions of the 
model, when the wage rate is independent of the rate of unemployment, higher 
unemployment benefit always leads to higher job destruction in the steady state 
and so to more reallocation). So, although the generosity of the unemployment 
insurance system unambiguously raises unemployment, it can either reduce or 
lower gross job reallocation.
In Figures (2.7) and (2.8) we plot gross job reallocation against the summary
76
e-3
DK
US
UK
B
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 V
Un.employm.ent .  I n s u r a n c e .  G e n e r a l  I n d e x
s
Figure 2.8: Job Reallocation by Continuing Firms and Unem. Ins., Overall
Index
77
CVJ
JJS
CO
1 o s o20 30 60 70O 60 90 1 o o
R e p l a c e m e n t  Rat io
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index for the generosity of the unemployment insurance system in the OECD 
constructed by Michael Burda (1988). There is a clear negative relation, with 
the simple correlation coefficient a strong 0.6. Interestingly, even new entry 
and exit are negatively related to the generosity index, though with a smaller 
correlation coefficient of 0.39. On closer examination of the relation between 
gross job reallocation and the two main components of the generosity index, 
the level of unemployment benefit and the duration of benefit entitlement, an 
interesting contrast emerges. The relation between the level of benefit and job 
reallocation is positive, but that between job reallocation and the duration of 
benefit is strongly negative. Figures (2.9) and (2.10) shows the two relations for 
continuing establishments.
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Our models of job creation and job destruction are not yet in a position 
to tell us why there is this contrast between the level of benefits on the one 
hand and their duration on the other. Simulations with the level of benefits 
in the Mortensen-Pissarides model shows that the economy settles at slightly 
higher job turnover rate when the level of benefits is increased indefinitely. The 
analysis of limited duration benefits is a lot more complicated because we lose the 
stationarity of the optimal strategies. In partial models of search, the prospect 
of benefit exhaustion leads to a decline in the reservation wage during search and 
therefore to an increased probability that the worker will be willing to accept a 
job quickly. Since the jobs that are likely to be accepted in this rather desperate 
state are not likely to be good long-term jobs, we would expect job destruction to 
be more frequent. Put differently, in countries where workers know that the state 
will support them indefinitely they spend more time looking for regular stable 
jobs; if support is expected to run out they would be prepared to take irregular 
jobs on a short term basis. When employers realise that attitude they are more 
likely to bring on to the market the irregular short-term jobs in the latter case 
than in the former.
2.4.3 A ctive P olicy M easures
Much has been written recently on the advantages of active labour market policies 
versus passive (OECD 1993; 1994a). Active measures include the subsidization 
of employment, the subsidization of training, the running of a state employment 
service and the provision of help to unemployed job seekers, in the forms, for 
example, of guidance how to fill in job application forms. Thus, spending on 
active measures either make the unemployed more employable or they help the 
job seeking activities. Passive measure simply provide income support.
There is some evidence that active measures reduce overall unemployment 
but the evidence with regard to job reallocations is mixed. One of the difficulties
80
CO
C\2
JJS
esj
co
20 30 4.0
A ct iv e  L a b o u r  M a r k e t  P o l i c y
io 50 60o
Figure 2.11: Job Reallocation and Active Labour Market Policy
in making international comparisons of the effects of active labour market policies 
is how to deal with Sweden. Because Sweden spends far more on active labour 
market policies than other OECD countries do, any international comparison 
involving a small number of countries is bound to be distorted by Sweden. If 
we are not careful in drawing inferences from the comparison we might end up 
building an argument entirely on the comparison of two points, one for Sweden 
and one for the rest of the OECD.
This problem shows up in our comparison too. In Figures (2.11) and (2.12) 
we plot average job reallocation rates against two measures of active policies, the 
average spending per unemployed worker as a proportion of output per head and 
the ratio of active to passive spending. Because Sweden is way above all other
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countries on both measures and because it has a high job reallocation rate, the 
correlation coefficients between each of our measures and the job reallocation rate 
are both positive and 0.25. But if Sweden is excluded from the comparison it is 
clear from the Figures that the relation between active policy and job reallocations 
is, if anything, negative, though weak.
In view of this, we cannot infer anything about the relation between job 
reallocation and active measures from our small sample. Indeed, one is likely 
to learn more about the contribution of active policy to job reallocation from 
detailed study of Swedish labour markets than from an international comparison. 
For example, job reallocation rates are likely to be positively affected by active 
measures if the jobs that are subsidize to hire unemployed are not regular long­
term jobs, or if workers are dismissed when the subsidy ends. But they might 
reduce job reallocations if the subsidization stops firms from closing down jobs 
that are hit by negative shocks.
2.4.4 Industrial Policy
Finally, we examine the role of subsidies to industry. Our source for the data 
is the statistical office of the European Union, so we have data only for the 
member countries in our sample and for the United States. It has recently been 
argued by Leonard and van Audenrode (1993) that subsidies to industry slow 
down the process of job renewal by supporting ailing plants. This should imply 
strong negative correlation between job reallocation and industrial subsidies, at 
least for continuing plants. There is some evidence for this in our sample for 
continuing plants, with a correlation coefficient between the two for the seven 
countries -0.25 (Figures (2.13) and (2.14)). But the relation is lost when we 
consider total reallocation (since only established ailing plants are likely to be 
subsidized, the relevant comparison is with continuing establishments). Also, it 
should be noted that in such a small sample, the relation is driven by the two
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countries in the Leonard-van Andenrode study, Belgium and the United States, 
the former with a lot of subsidies and very low job reallocation and the later with 
virtually no subsidies and high job reallocation. Thus, although there are strong 
theoretical argument that providing subsidies to ailing establishments leads to 
less job destruction, and so to less job reallocation, there is no evidence in our 
sample that the industrial subsidies in the European Union have been directed 
at such establishments.
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2.5 Conclusions
The international data on job creation and job destruction show large variations 
across countries. We have used this variation for a sample of ten OECD countries 
to make some inferences about the connection between gross job reallocation on 
the one hand and aggregate economic performance and labour market policy on 
the other.
The connection between job reallocation and unemployment in the interna­
tional domain is rather loose but there is a strong connection between reallocation 
and long-term unemployment. Countries with less job reallocation experience 
longer durations of unemployment, presumably because in those countries the 
employed do not easily relinquish their jobs to enter unemployment and give the 
unemployed a chance to replace them. Since long-term unemployment is not 
good for the skills and the morale of those who suffer it, policy measures that 
restrict job reallocation will have negative impact on the functioning of labour 
markets in this connection.
When we examined the relation between gross reallocation and policy we 
found two strong correlations and some other looser ones. Employment protec­
tion legislation, in the form of restrictions on the dismissal of employees, slows 
down both job creation and job destruction, and so leads to longer durations of 
unemployment. The indefinite availability of unemployment compensation also 
slows down the reallocation of jobs. The mechanism is probably the elimina­
tion of low productivity unstable jobs that the long-term availability of income 
support is likely to bring about.
In contrast, the level of unemployment benefit seems to exert a mild positive 
influence on job reallocation, though not a very important one. Spending on 
active labour market policies, perhaps surprisingly, does not appear to exert a 
significant influence on job turnover, though it should be pointed out that when
86
it comes to using OECD data to say something about active policy conclusions 
are always dependent on how one treats Sweden. As it turns out, Sweden has 
a high job reallocation rate but our summary data cannot identify active policy 
spending as the reason.
Finally, industrial subsidies appear to slow down job reallocation, though a 
warning should be sounded here too. We have data for this comparison for only 
seven of our countries and the comparison is dominated by the experience of two 
countries, the United States with no subsidies and high turnover and Belgium 
with a lot of subsidies and low turnover.
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2.A Some Further Evidence
Throughout the discussion in the chapter we concentrate on job reallocation by 
continuing establishments arguing that the theory of job creation and destruction 
as it applies to continuing establishments is often different from the one that 
applies to entry and exit. While this is true, there is also a more pressing empirical 
justification for concentrating on continuing establishments only. OECD (1994a) 
points out that the definitions of birth and death vary widely across countries. 
For example, births can appear for any of the three reasons: (i) the creation 
of a new business from scratch, (ii) the take-over of an existing business by an 
entrepreneur and (iii) the reallocation of an existing business into another area or 
industry. Presumably we would like to concentrate on (i), but different countries 
have different definitions. Similar problems affect the definition of deaths.
All the results in the text are based upon bivariate correlations between re­
allocation rates and alternative policy measures. In the empirics of economic 
growth Levine and Renelt (1992) have shown that many results from cross­
country regressions of growth are not robust to changes in the conditioning set 
of variables in the regression.
To test the robustness of the result I performed a set of simple regressions 
in the spirit of Bell (1994). Firstly I estimated bivariate regressions on the re­
lationship studied in the chapter and record the significance of the correlation. 
I then ran regressions in which I include a single conditioning variable and test 
whether the coefficient on the policy variable remains significant (and of the same 
sign). So, for example, to test the robustness of the employment protection leg­
islation (EPL) effect I ran regressions that include EPL and total unemployment 
as independent regressor, EPL and the replacement ratio, etc. I only include one 
conditioning variable because we begin with only 8 degrees of freedom. There 
are eight independent variables, so I estimated a total of 64 regressions. Bivari-
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Table 2.A.1: Bivariate Regressions for Job Reallocation
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 10% sig. 5%sig.
Unemployment -0.54 1.043 No No
Long Term. Unemp. -.12 2.88 Yes Yes
Active Policy .03 0.35 No No
Unempl. Insurance -1.11 1.75 Yes No
Firing Costs -.99 1.85 Yes No
Benefit Durat. -1.97 3.69 Yes Yes
Industr. Subs. -1.101 0.58 No No
Replacement Ratio 0.04 0.73 No No
Source: OECD (1994a) and Appendix.
ate results are in Table (2.A.1) and multivariate results in Table (2.A.2). The 
t-statistics in Table (2.A.1) at 10% significance are all consistent with those re­
ported in the text, but the effect of employment protection legislation and overall 
unemployment insurance is no longer significant at 5%. Table (2. A.2) checks the 
robustness of results in Table (2.A.1) and confirms that the relation between long 
term unemployment and job reallocation is a robust one, as well as the relation 
between job reallocation and the benefit duration. Conversely, the effect of em­
ployment protection legislation and unemployment insurance does not pass the 
test of Table (2.A.2).
2.B D efinitions and Sources
2.B.1 Cross Country Com parisons
Job Reallocation. Data come from OECD (1994a) Employment Outlook, chapter
3. They are drawn from national, primarily administrative sources that differ in 
their methods of collection, in their employment coverage and sectoral classifi­
cation. The information refers to establishments except for Canada, Italy and 
the U.K., where data refer to firms. An attem pt was made by the OECD to
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Table 2.A.2: Multivariate Regressions for Job Reallocation
Variable Num. of times 
coeff same as 
Table(2.A.l)
Num. of times 
coeff. is 
10% sig.
Num. of times 
coeff.is 
5% sig.
Highest
t.
Unemployment 7 of 7 0 of 7 0 of 7 1.24
Long Term. Unemp. 7 of 7 7 of 7 6 of 7 3.22
Active Policy 4 of 7 0 of 7 0 of 7 0.8
Unempl. Insurance 5 of 7 1 of 7 1 of 7 3.84
Firing Costs 6 of 7 4 of 7 1 of 7 2.45
Benefit Durat. 7 of 7 7 of 7 7 of 7 6.37
Industr. Subs. 3 of 7 0 of 7 0 of 7 0.45
Replacement Ratio 6 of 7 2 of 7 2 of 7 3.9
Source: OECD (1994a) and Appendix.
standardize as much as possible. For the U.S. we used the manufacturing rates 
computed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990) adjusted to make them comparable 
to rates for the entire economy. The transformation was based on a comparison 
between Canadian job flows for the overall economy (OECD, 1994) with Cana­
dian flows for the manufacturing sector only (Baldwin et al. 1994). This led to 
multiplying the job flow rate for manufacturing by 1.2. We did not use the U.S. 
figures in OECD (1994a) because they are based on a much smaller data set with 
two-year frequency. The two- year frequency biased the picture in favour of entry 
and exit.
Other variables. Unemployment. OECD (1992) standardized series in Layard 
et al. (1991). Active labour market policies. OECD (1992) Table 2.B.I. and own 
calculation. Percentage of GDP spent on active labour market policies divided by 
the unemployment rate. Data refer to annual averages between 1980 and 1990. 
Employment protection legislation. Sum of required severance payments and 
maximum period of notice to be given to dismissed employees. OECD (1993). 
Long-term unemployment. Unemployment of more than one year duration over 
total unemployment. Data refer to annual averages between 1980 and 1990. 
OECD (1993). Subsidies: Subsidies to firms as a percentage of value added
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(Leonard and Van Audenrode, 1993) Duration of unemployment benefits. Layard 
et al. (1991). Replacement ratio. Layard et al. (1991).
2.B .2 T im e Series
Table 2 is based on a time series for each country. The sources are: United 
Kingdom: Konings (1995a). Sample of 993 firms for U.K. manufacturing sector 
between 1973 and 1986. United States: Davis and Haltiwanger (1990). Sample 
of 70 per cent of U.S. establishments in the manufacturing sector. Data collected 
by the Bureau of Census between 1973 and 1986. Italy: Contini, Revelli, Gavosto 
and Sestito (1992). Sample of 80 per cent of Italian firms between 1980 and 1988. 
Data collected by the Italian social security system INPS. Canada: Baldwin, 
Dunne and Haltiwanger (1994). Annual census of the Canadian manufacturing 
sector from 1972 to 1986.
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C hapter 3 
W ages and th e Size o f Firm s in a 
D ynam ic M atching M odel
3.1 Introduction
Wage differentials across observationally equivalent workers are both sizable and 
persistent in reality, and empirical work has given stylized-fact status to sev­
eral relationships between them and employer characteristics. Our work in this 
chapter is motivated by what is perhaps the strongest such stylized fact, namely, 
the employer size-wage effect: Brown and Medoff (1989), Krueger and Summers 
(1988), and many other contributions find, in a variety of data sets, that firms 
(or plants) with higher employment levels pay higher wages.
Different compensation for apparently identical workers is inconsistent with 
textbook models of labour market equilibrium, where wage differentials should be 
arbitraged away by employment changes. A positive association between wages 
and employment is perhaps even more puzzling from the point of view of such 
models: if anything, higher wages should be associated to lower employment in a 
static model of downward-sloping labour demand. Since wage and employment 
observations are simultaneously determined in equilibrium, however, the empir­
ical evidence can potentially be rationalized in terms of labour-demand move­
ments along upward-sloping labour supply relationships at the firm (or plant)
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level. If labour mobility is costly and/or time consuming, firms offering higher 
wages are able to attract more numerous (homogeneous) workers in steady state; 
hence, higher employment levels should indeed be associated to high wages in 
cross-section. Bertola and Ichino (1995) offer a very simple illustration of the 
basic idea that positive business-condition shocks should lead to increased em­
ployment, higher profitability, and higher wages if higher pay is needed to finance 
costly worker mobility.
In reality, a large part of worker mobility costs reflects matching difficul­
ties and search unemployment. The idea that imperfect matching or “search” 
can rationalize wage differentials across identical workers has already noted in 
the literature. Burdett and Mortensen (1989) propose a model where random 
matching only slowly draws workers from low-pay to high-pay jobs and, in equi­
librium, ex-ante symmetric constant-return-to-scale “firms” earn similar profits 
through different combinations of wage and employment levels. The association 
of high wages to a specific firm’s circumstances, however, is lost in a constant- 
return environment, where jobs paying the same wage could just as well be spread 
in the economy at large instead of being lumped together in a specific “firm.” 
Most search models (e.g. Pissarides 1990, 1994; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) 
similarly focus on matching and wage determination issues at the level of individ­
ual jobs in constant-return environments where “firms” can hardly be defined or 
identified while, of course, observable characteristics of real-life firms do appear 
empirically relevant: Dickens and Katz (1987), Katz and Summers (1989), and 
other references in Blanchflower et al. (1996) find that persistently high wages are 
associated to larger profits, or more generally to indicators of employers’ “ability 
to pay.”
This paper proposes a model of matching frictions and wage-setting insti­
tutions aimed at offering a structural interpretation of the accumulated body of 
empirical evidence: our theoretical viewpoint is complex enough to treat profits,
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employment, and wages as jointly endogenous and interrelated variables. We 
build upon the earlier work of Bertola and Caballero (1994), who propose a 
model of search where individual jobs’ productivity is determined by standard 
downward-sloping labour demand functions within firms affected by idiosyncratic 
labour-demand shocks.
Section 3.2 lays out the basic structure of the Bertola and Caballero model, 
correcting a minor algebraic error in the original derivations. While employment 
reduction can be instantaneous in the model, hiring is costly and time-consuming 
in an environment where unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies are only 
slowly matched to each other. If higher employment decreases labour’s produc­
tivity and wages are continuously renegotiated so as to split in fixed proportions 
the surplus afforded by existing employment relationships in a search environ­
ment, the hiring process results in a pattern of declining wage rates at larger 
(and growing) establishments. Once extended to allow for a more flexible and 
realistic patterns of exogenous dynamic events, however, the model is capable of 
reproducing the wage-size effect.
The model is qualitatively realistic enough to allow a quantitative exploration 
of the empirical phenomena which motivate our work. In Section 3.3 we show 
that establishment size has a positive coefficient in wage regressions run on data 
generated by the model. Even though wages are decreased by higher employment 
along a given labour-demand schedule, firms with stronger labour demand pay 
higher wages at any given level of employment, find it optimal to post more va­
cancies, grow faster, and have larger size on average. Thus, the wage-size effect 
is present in model-generated data, but it does not reflect a positive effect of size 
per se on wages, nor does it conflict with the standard assumption of decreasing 
marginal returns to labour. Rather, firm size proxies in the model’s wage regres­
sions for (unobservable) business conditions, which are also positively correlated 
to profits and employment growth. In fact, including the latter variables in wage
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regression also yields significant coefficients which, however, are similarly hard to 
interpret in structural terms.
Section 3.4 reviews in some detail existing work on firm- or plant-level wage 
regression. Profit and size effects are well established in the literature, and we 
argue that both are qualitatively consistent with our theoretical perspective. Our 
dynamic approach to wage-determination issues, however, suggests that profits 
and size should both be included in wage regressions, and that neither vari­
able’s coefficient should be given structural interpretations. Further, our mod­
eling perspective implies that employment growth should also be significant in 
wage regressions, and in the concluding Section 3.5 we briefly discuss how fu­
ture empirical work might try and use real data to assess the relevance of the 
theoretical mechanisms we focus on.
3.2 Firm -level D ynam ics in a M atching M odel
We start with a brief outline of the technology and market structure which our 
model shares with other matching models and, particularly, with that proposed 
by Bertola and Caballero (1994). The object of interest is a stationary labour 
market, inhabited by a continuum of firms of fixed total mass and by an also fixed 
and continuously divisible amount of inelastically supplied labour. Normalizing 
the total measure of both sets to unity, we index firms by /  6 [0, 1]; since labour 
is assumed homogeneous in quality, it will not be necessary in what follows to 
explicitly index individual workers.
The marginal revenue product of labour at an individual firm is a function 
7r(/, 77) of its current employment level and of 77, a shifter of its labour demand. 
While a larger I decreases 7r ( . , .), larger values of 77 are associated to higher labour 
demand, and 77 follows exogenous idiosyncratic stochastic processes taking a finite 
number of values across the continuum of firms. As long as the idiosyncratic 
process {77} is Markov in levels, the shadow value of firm / ’s employment is
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a function A(-) of the same state variables I and 77. By its definition as the 
present discounted value of labour’s marginal contribution to profits, this function 
satisfies a standard asset-pricing relationship in the form
rA(-) =  *(•) -  «,(■) -  ^ - l  + + Ej  [AA(.)]; (3.1)
to simplify notation, we let (•) stand for the (Z, 77) pair of relevant state variables, 
and we let firm and time indexes be implicit on the individual firm’s current 
employment level I and on its time derivative I.
In equation (3.1), r  > 0 denotes the rate of return on the firm’s operation, 
and w(-) denotes the wage paid to its employees: the latter is allowed to depend 
on 77 and I and, to the extent that wages do endogenously depend on employment 
in equilibrium, the marginal cost of employing an additional worker is appropri­
ately written as the derivative of its wage bill with respect to employment. The 
last two terms in equation (3.1) conveniently decompose the sources of “capi­
tal gains” along the firm’s dynamic path. When the firm does not experience 
a state transition, the shadow value of its labour evolves only as a consequence 
of employment dynamics, hence the term A(-) = (dA(')/dl)L  The final term, 
Ej  [AA(*)], represents the state-dependent expectation of the “capital gain” (or 
loss) resulting from possible positive (or negative) shocks to 77 and from possible 
employment jumps associated to such events.
The endogenous dynamics of individual-firm employment levels indexed by I 
interact with each other in the aggregate labour market. An individual firm can 
increase its employment level by posting a number (or measure) vj  of vacancies. 
The rate at which each vacancy is matched with an unemployed worker depends 
on the overall tightness of the labour market, or on the ratio of aggregate vacancies
V =  f 1 v j d fJo
to aggregate unemployment
U n d e r th e  c o n v e n ie n t a n d  fa ir ly  re a l is t ic  a s s u m p tio n  t h a t  th e  m a tc h in g  te c h ­
no logy  h a s  c o n s ta n t  r e tu rn s  to  sca le  a n d  a  C o b b -D o u g la s  fu n c tio n a l  fo rm , th e  
p ro b a b il i ty  in te n s i ty  p e r  u n it  t im e  t h a t  a n y  o p e n  v a c a n c y  is m a tc h e d  to  a n  u n ­
em p lo y ed  w o rk e r is £ ( V f U) v =  ■$, fo r so m e —1 <  v < 0 a n d  £ >  0 , a n d  is 
c o n s ta n t in  th e  s te a d y - s ta te  e q u il ib r iu m  o f in te re s t .  A cco rd in g ly , w h e n  f irm  /  
p o s ts  vj  > 0 v acan c ies , i ts  e m p lo y m e n t lev e l evo lves a c c o rd in g  to
if  =  19vf . (3.2)
W ith  p ro b a b il i ty  in te n s i ty  t?, e a c h  o p e n  v ac an cy  is filled  a n d  b e c o m e s  a  m a rg in a l  
jo b  o f v a lu e  A (-). I f  a  firm  fin d s  i t  o p t im a l  to  p o s t  v ac an c ie s , th e n  ea c h  o n e ’s 
m a rg in a l p ay o ff tM (-)  in  te rm s  o f  a d d it io n s  to  th e  f i rm ’s e m p lo y m e n t s to c k  m u s t  
b e  eq u a l to  i ts  m a rg in a l  co st w h ich , as  in  B e r to la -C a b a lle ro , w e p a r a m e te r iz e  as 
cvf , w ith  c > 0 in d e x in g  th e  r a te  a t  w h ich  m a rg in a l  s e a rc h  c o s ts  in c re a se  a s  an  
in d iv id u a l f irm  p o s ts  la rg e r  a n d  la rg e r  n u m b e rs  o f  v a c a n c ie s .1 T h u s , w e h a v e
M-) = f
fo r all /  su c h  th a t  vj  > 0. T h is  a n d  (3.2) m a k e  i t  p o ss ib le  to  w r ite  (3.1) in  th e  
fo rm
rA (-)  =  * (• )  -  w (-) -  +  E f  (A A (- ) ] , V /  s . t .  A (-) >  0 .
(3.3)
T h e  v a lu e  o f a d d it io n a l  e m p lo y m e n t,  o f  co u rse , n e e d  n o t  b e  s t r ic t ly  p o s it iv e  
fo r all lev e ls  o f 77 a n d  I. W h e n  A ( - , - )  <  0 , i t  is o b v io u s ly  n o t  o p t im a l  to  p o s t 
co s tly  v acan c ies : e m p lo y m e n t, a c co rd in g ly , is e i th e r  c o n s ta n t  o r  d ec lin e s  th ro u g h  
v o lu n ta ry  q u its  (w h ich  w e n e g le c t fo r s im p lic ity )  o r f ir in g  d ec is io n s . W h ile  h ir in g  
is m o d e le d  as  a  tim e -c o n su m in g  p ro c e ss  (a n d  e m p lo y m e n t n e v e r  ju m p s  u p w a rd s ) ,  
firm s a re  a llo w ed  to  sh e d  la b o u r  in s ta n ta n e o u s ly :  i f  t h e  {77} p ro c ess  h a s  d is c re te
1 Quadratic vacancy-posting costs ensure that it is never optimal to post infinitely many 
vacancies, and that employment levels never jump upwards.
97
downward increments, employment may fall by a finite amount A I if a state 
transition is such as to make it profitable for the firm to fire. In the aftermath of 
such an event, the firm must be indifferent between retaining and firing employees 
at the margin if it does employ / > 0. Accordingly, the shadow value of a filled 
job at a firm which posts no vacancies and has positive employment must be 
equal to the cost — F  < 0 of shedding one additional unit of labour:
A(-) = - F ; (3.4)
in this case, equation (3.1) reads
- r F  =  O - t 0 ( - ) - ^ s p *  +  E/[Aj4(-)], V /s . t .  v/  =  0, A(-) = —F,l  > 0.
(3.5)
As long as F > 0, however, the firm may find it optimal not to react to a 
state transition. If
—F < A(-) < 0,
the shadow value of labour is negative (making it pointless to post costly va­
cancies) at the same time sis it is larger than the marginal cost of employment
reduction (making labour shedding suboptimal as well); the firm then finds it 
optimal to choose inaction, a situation familiar from, e.g., Bentolila and Bertola 
(1990). In this case, equation (3.1) features no “capital gains” terms other than 
those reflecting state-transition expectations: hence,
rA(-) = *(•) -»(■)- +  E ,  [AA(.)],
V f  s.t. vj = 0, —F  < A(-) <  0,/ > 0. (3.6)
Turning next to wage determination, let all workers be risk neutral, exert
constant search effort, and enjoy an income-equivalent flow z  from leisure and 
unemployment benefits when not working. For workers living in the steady- 
state economy under consideration, the present discounted value of future labour
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income depends on whether they are unemployed or matched to a firm. Unem­
ployed workers’ human capital takes a fixed value J u in steady state and, since 
each unemployed worker is matched to a random open vacancy with probability 
intensity d V /U , we have
r J u = z  + <& E U[J] -  J “) (3.7)
if EU[J] is the average value of jobs for which vacancies are posted.
The wages and human capital of employed workers will be functions w{-) 
and «/(•) of the employing firm’s circumstances—namely, of its business conditions 
index rj and of its employment level I—and satisfy the asset-valuation relationship
rJ{-) = w{-) + j {-)  + E f [AJ].  (3.8)
Here, as in equation (3.1), the capital-gain component of total return consists 
of a continuously evolving term, reflecting employment growth for unchanged 
business conditions, and of the expectation of discontinuous jumps in the event 
of a state transition.
Since forming matches is costly, existing job/worker relationships may afford 
a surplus, which we take to be split according to a continuously renegotiated Nash 
bargain. At firms where the marginal value of employment is zero or negative, 
there is no surplus to be split, and the workers (if any) which the employer finds 
it optimal not to fire are just indifferent to the outside option:
J U = J{-) V /s . t .  A(-) < 0, / > 0. (3.9)
As to firms which are posting vacancies, the option of opening a new one is 
always open to the employer, and has zero value; for workers, the outside option 
(never taken in equilibrium) is a voluntary quit into unemployment. Denoting 
with (3 the employees’ bargaining share, at firms where the marginal value of 
employment is positive we have
/3A(•) =  (1 — — J u) for all firms where A(-) >  0. (3.10)
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Accordingly, workers’ human capital functions may be expressed in terms of firms’ 
shadow-value functions:
■/(•) =  +  JU>
( ) J 1 )
This completes the model’s basic structure. To proceed, one may insert the ex­
pressions in (3.11) in the worker’s asset-valuation relationship (3.8), and consider 
the shadow-value dynamics implied by employers’ optimal hiring, firing and in­
action policies: first, however, more needs to be said on the dynamic structure of 
the business-conditions process {77}.
3.2.1 Specialization  and Solution M ethod
Like Bertola and Caballero’s (1994) model (and unlike other matching models, 
where each job is managed in isolation), the framework outlined above features 
well-defined firm “sizes.” Hence, it is well suited to a study of wage-size relation­
ships and, in particular, to the role of trade frictions (or “matching”) in their 
rationalization.
We follow that earlier model in taking labour’s marginal revenue product be 
a linear function of employment,
7r(/, 77) =  77 — crl. (3.12)
Bertola and Caballero worked under the assumption that 77 would take only two 
values, but the model’s wage-size implications deserve to be explored under a 
richer and more empirically realistic structure of exogenous shocks. Let 77 take 
n possible values 77;, with 771 >  772 > . . .  > r]n; denoting with 5{ the probability 
intensity of a transition out of state i among these, let the row vector pk =  \pkj) 
collect the probabilities of reaching each of the other states upon a transition out 
of state k (with Pkj =  1, and pkk =  0).
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Under these parametric assumptions, the marginal shadow value of an addi­
tional worker for a hiring firm, from equation (3.1), reads
r A ( .) =  (?_ <T/_ U,( .) _ _ Z + A ( . ) _ r _
-I- SiPi (max [ -F , A(l, ff)] -  A (-)). (3.13)
The A( l , ff) functions on the right hand side represent vectors of shadow values, 
and the max. operator selects, for each productivity value, the maximum between 
the shadow value of employment and the marginal cost of firing. This appropri­
ately accounts for the fact that the firm will fire if the marginal value of labour 
at the current employment level I is lower than the marginal firing cost —F.
The wage paid by such a firm, in turn, must satisfy the asset-valuation rela­
tionship obtained by inserting expressions from (3.13) into (3.8), and recognizing 
that the firm’s optimal hiring behavior straightforwardly determines its shadow- 
value dynamics in the absence of a state transition:
rA(-) = -  r r )  +
(3.14)
r (+  OiPi- -  -  I max
The wage-size relationship can be characterized rather sharply when the 
marginal cost of firing is zero and inaction is never optimal. W ith A(r},l) = 
—F  =  0 for all matches where the workers’ participation constraint is binding 
at J u, subtracting (3.14) from (3.13) yields a simple differential equation for the 
w(l,r)) wage function at hiring firms:
m -  a/ -  Ito(-) -  =  0, (3.15)
solved by
»(•) =  h  +  (i -  p y r  -  + c h - w , (3.i6)
for C l a constant of integration.
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The linear solution which obtains from (3.16) when C% = 0 highlights the 
key insight to be gained from our model’s framework of analysis. As in Bertola 
and Caballero, the wage paid by a hiring firm is declining in its size: this is in­
tuitive, since labour’s marginal productivity is inversely related to employment, 
but appears to be at odds with the stylized empirical evidence summarized in 
the Introduction above. Firm-level wages, however, are also increasing in the 
idiosyncratic shifter rjii at any given employment level, firms with higher pro­
ductivity pay higher wages. This effect, which could not be captured as clearly 
by a model with only two productivity levels, follows immediately from the fact 
that highly productive firms share their good fortune with their employees (in 
Nash-bargaining fashion) as long as the latter are scarce, which in turn depends 
on the costly and time-consuming nature of the matching process.
3.2.2 Em ploym ent D ynam ics in a Special Case
Clearly, the model’s implications are consistent with empirical evidence if, as is 
intuitively obvious, firms with higher productivity and higher wages also tend to 
have larger employment levels. As in the job-level matching model of Cabrales 
and Hopenhayn (1995), it would be desirable to allow for proper persistence in the 
Markov process followed by the r] indicators. Unfortunately, however, the model 
does not admit an analytic solution for labour’s shadow values and employment 
dynamics under general and realistic configurations of the idiosyncratic shock 
process. Inserting the linear form of (3.16) in (3.13) with F = 0, one obtains a 
differential equation for the marginal shadow value of labour at a hiring firm:
rA(-) = (Vi- c l ) - ( h i + 2kil) + A(-)d A V;ni)-
Ol c
+  Sipi (max[0, A(l,fj)] -  A (-)), (3.17)
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where
hi = f in  +  (1 -  P)rJu, ki = (3.18)
This nonlinear and nonhomogeneous differential equation features the prod­
uct of the solution function’s level and derivative: like the similar equation en­
countered by Sutherland (1992) and his references in a different context, its non­
linear solutions can only be studied numerically. In this direction, chapter (4) 
solves a numerical approximation of the nonlinear solution of equation (3.17).
The equation has a linear and economically meaningful solution, however, 
for a specification of transition probabilities which, while still rather restrictive, 
is considerably more general than the one considered by Bertola and Caballero. 
Specifically, let all negative rj transitions bring the firm to the lowest-productivity 
state, and let the other states be reachable only from the latter so that, in our 
notation, ptn =  0: the pk probability vectors attach unit weight to j  = n (with r)n 
the lowest possible value of rj) for k > n, while pn may feature non-zero transition 
probabilities to all the higher productivity states.
In this special case, higher-productivity (hiring) firms enjoy different levels 
of productivity, but their employment level is irrelevant to its outlook upon state 
transitions: whenever 77 changes, all such firms fire some of their workers and turn 
into (firing) firms with poor productivity and a marginal value of labour equal 
to 0. This simplifies considerably the capital-loss component of equation (3.17) 
and validates its linear solution in the form
A(-) — cti 4 - 6t7 ,
t -  u n _ c(r  +  5i) 1
bi = WO--^ 5 ----2^
rji -  h i
c2(r +  Sj)2 4c(l - P ) a  
tf4 ti2( l + P )  7
m = a(rn,Si) = ——  p —. (3.19)
r +  dt -  —bi
We can take advantage of this simple characterization of a hiring firm’s wage 
function when considering the relationship between the wage and employment
103
level of a firm which is not hiring—i.e., in the case under consideration, of a firm 
which has productivity indicator rjn and marginal employment value A(lmtn, rjn). 
Evaluating expression (3.5) under our parametric assumptions and indicating 
with lmin employment of a firm that is not hiring, we obtain
r,n -  crlmin -  w(-) -  +  SnPnA(lm'n, ff) =  0, (3.20)
where, consistently with previously introduced notation, the column vector A(lmtn, rf) 
collects the marginal shadow values of this firm’s employment stock upon transi­
tions to other (hiring) states, which occur with probability intensity Sn, and the 
row vector pn contains the transition probabilities from state n to state k.
To obtain an expression for the marginal labour cost term  in (3.20), consider 
that when the worker’s participation constrain is binding there is no surplus to 
be split from the match—or, that from A(lm,n, r]n) <  0 it follows that J u =  J n . 
Workers already employed by a firm in state n, however, can look forward to 
human-capital gains: if their employer experiences a positive productivity shock, 
the workers’ human capital jumps upwards to a fraction of the newly positive 
shadow value of employment. In other words, it must be the case that the present 
discounted value of labour earnings for a currently unemployed worker equals the 
wage paid by bad firms plus the expected capital gain from being employed by a 
hiring firm, without going through the time-consuming matching process, upon 
a positive productivity shock. In flow terms, this equilibrium requirement reads
r J “ =  «>(/"“", »j„) +  Y z r s S A A { r " , r f ) .  (3.21)
In steady state, the left-hand side of this condition is constant: by total differen­
tiation, and recalling that A(/, rp) =  a; +  b{l for i =  1 , . . . ,  n — 1, we obtain
dw(l,T}n) /? dA(l,ff) 13 -
m  =  *■ =  (3-22)
where b =  [&;] is a column vector collecting the slopes of the various hiring 
states’ marginal shadow value functions. Like (3.16), this simple relationship
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offers insights of some generality. Since wages paid by hiring firms are negatively 
related to their employment level, workers hoarded by a firing firm can look 
forward to larger capital gains when their employer’s labour force is smaller— 
hence, in equilibrium, they require a smaller wage flow, and wages paid by labour- 
hoarding firms are a positively sloped function of their employment level.2
Using (3.22) and (3.21) into (3.20) employment at not hiring firms reads
|mm   Vn hy. ~ 1~  &nPn &)
(T +  2 kn
where a(f), J) is a column vector of coefficients from (3.19) and
hn =  r J u -  Y ^ -p 5 npna(fi, 5). (3.24)
Figure 3.1 illustrates the character of the firms’ optimal policy under para­
metric assumptions, listed in Table 3.1, which are of course meant to be sugges­
tive rather than fully realistic. We choose to let most firms be small and subject 
to frequent, but not very pronounced labour demand fluctuations. Fewer and 
fewer firms feature higher and higher labour demand levels, and are increasingly 
unlikely to suffer a negative shock which, in their case, would cause a veritable 
collapse. As we highlight in the next section, this structure of productivity shocks 
appears consistent with cross-section evidence on job flows and firm size.3 The 
downward-sloping linear functions plotted in Figure 3.1 depict A(-), the marginal 
shadow value of labour, as a function of firm size for different realizations of the 
idiosyncratic shifter rji. Since vacancies are posted only when A(-) > 0, the hori­
zontal intercepts of the various marginal value schedules in the Figure correspond 
to the maximum size attainable by firms of each type. For future reference, let
2 This effect was neglected by Bertola and Caballero, who treat the wage rate offered by 
labour-hoarding firms as a constant in their derivations.
3Bertola and Caballero (1994), discuss in some detail rough calibration criteria for other 
parameters.
(3.23
Table 3.1: Baseline parameter values
Variable Notation Value
Matching Function:
matching elasticity V -0.400
constant e 1.000
Labor demand slope (all i ) a 0.325
Labor demand intercepts
m 1.627
1.452
*?3 1.297
*74 1.158
*75 1.034
*76 0.923
*7n 0.692
Transition intensities
Si 0.060
62 0.072
S3 0.086
S4 0.104
s5 0.124
Se 0.149
Sn 0.270
Distribution across hiring states of positive shocks
Pn 0.027
P72 0.047
P73 0.083
P74 0.145
P75 0.254
P76 0.444
search cost slope C 2.560
interest rate r 0.060
employees’ bargaining share 0 0.400
Unemployed income z 0.800
Firing cost F 0.000
Equilibirum values:
Market tightness e 2.321
Unemployed welfare r J u 0.864
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Figure 3.1: Labor’s marginal asset valuation
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li denote the “long-run size” employment level of firms in state i , defined by the 
condition
A{Ii,r]i) = 0 .  (3.25)
Along the horizontal axis we find the marginal shadow value when A(l , .) <  F,  
where —F = 0 under our parameterization.
Recalling that not only vacancy positing and job creation, but also equi­
librium wages are linearly related to A(-), the Figure offers a fairly complete 
characterization of individual firms’ policies for given values of $ and J u. To 
actually solve for the equilibrium value of V/U  and J u (already reported in Table 
1) we need to consider the distribution of firm size for each 77;.
3.2.3 Firm  Size D istribution  and M arket Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the firm size distribution under the simple proba­
bilistic structure of shocks considered in the previous section. In steady state, the 
probability mass of firms which flows into each productivity state must balance 
with the probability mass of firms that flows into the other states. If we indicate 
with 7r the ergodic distribution over the productive states, by virtue of our simple 
structure of productivity changes, this equilibrium requirements reads
SnPni^n = Stfi V i > n, (3.26)
and
n —1
Y2 Sini = 5nnn, (3.27)
*=i
for the lowest labour demand (not hiring) state. The expressions in (3.26) and
(3.27) form a homogeneous, rank-deficient system of n linear equations which, 
together with the summing-up condition 7T* =  1, easily yields a solution for 7r.
Since all firms in the poorest business conditions have the same employment 
level lmin, the joint distribution of employment and business conditions has a 
point mass of size 7rn at the (lm,n,rjn) point. In what follows we shall let
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be the joint density of employment and business conditions within the hiring 
subsets of the model’s state space. For a firm with productivity parameter rf 
and employment /,
li — Tji) —
c c
hence, the density must satisfy the simple Kolmogorov forward balance conditions
= - * / ( / , * ) :  (3.28)
in words, transitions into state (/, i) because of hiring (a positive /) must balance 
transitions out of it due to shocks into the firing state. The differential equation
(3.28) has solutions in the form
f(l,rji) =  A i(ai + bil)-ei, for g* =  (3.29)
v zbi
f 1'Ai /  (ai +  b{l) e'dl = 7Vi, (3.30)
J  [ m i n
and the constant of integration A{ is determined by the summing-up condition
'h
U
where n; is one of the solution to (3.26) and (3.27) and /t-, as defined in (3.25), is 
the maximum size attainable by a firm in state i.
To complete the solution we need to calculate the aggregate variables implied 
by the individual policies. For a constant c and i?, each firm’s vacancies are
linearly related to its labour’s marginal value which in turn is linear in
employment. It follows that
u(-) =  (di +  bil) - ,  (3.31)c
and aggregate vacancies are obtained by summing up across all such individual 
policies
V = - T ' f 1' \i(ai + bil)-ei+1dl. (3.32)
c Jlmtn
Similarly, aggregate employment is obtained by summing up the employment of 
all hiring and firing firms and is equal to
An aggregate consistent equilibrium is obtained when the d used to construct 
individual policies is consistent with the aggregate outcomes in (3.32) and (3.33) 
and yields a value of J n equal to the outside (unemployment) option featured in 
the dynamic labour demand problem’s solution:
r j u =  r J n = z + -  / “). (3.34)
1   Li
By virtue of (3.10) and (3.31), the capital gain term in (3.34) reads
EU[J = 1 E  / '  AiA (^ ,0(a,- +  W )-*i+1<i/. (3.35)
C U  1 -  p  1 — 7Tn  J l mtn
In (3.35) 1 — 7rn is the probability that an unemployed worker meets a firm 
of quality z, conditional on finding a vacancy posting firm. As in Bertola and 
Caballero (1994), a simple search routine may be used to compute the model’s 
fixed-point equilibrium.4
Figure 3.2 plots the density of employment across all hiring firms, “slicing” 
each portion of the density according to the business-conditions indices which 
may be consistent with each employment level; each such portion of the density 
function reaches zero at the point where firms with the corresponding rji find it 
optimal to stop hiring. Figure 3.3 plots the cumulative distribution function of 
employment, and accounts for the discrete mass of employment located at labour- 
hoarding firms. Both Figures are drawn for the same parameter values as Figure 
3.1.
Table 3.2 reports gross job flows by firm size obtained by Monte Carlo data 
drawn from the long run distribution plotted in figure 3.3. Our baseline param­
eters in Table 3.1 imply a structure of job flows consistent with the empirical 
evidence on job flows and firm size reported in OECD (1994a). Net employment
4We recall at this point that all our derivations set C,- =  0 in the key equation 3.16. Thus, 
the iterative procedure finds one economically sensible equilibrium of the model but, since 
the bilateral-bargaining structure of the model does not guarantee uniqueness and Pareto- 
optimality of market equilibria, others may exist.
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Figure 3.2: Probability densities of employment at hiring firms
Table 3.2: Job Flows by Firm Size
Firm Size Job
Creation
Job
Destruction
Job
Reallocation
Net Employment 
Change
Employment
Share
0 In — 8 In 0.262 0.071 0.333 0.192 0.335
00 1 I-* cn 0.166 0.089 0.255 0.076 0.176
1 5 / n  — 24 In 0.107 0.080 0.188 0.027 0.181
24ln -  30In 0.071 0.073 0.145 -0.002 0.064
30 In — oo 0.039 0.064 0.104 -0.025 0.245
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Figure 3.3: Cumulative distribution of employment, all firms
112
changes (the difference between job creation and destruction) are negatively re­
lated to firm size, which is of course unsurprising in a steady-state situation. The 
firm size distribution generated by our model and parameters is roughly consis­
tent with the evidence reported in the OECD study: for example, the smallest 
size category accounts for a third of employment in the Table, and the employ­
ment share of firms with less than 20 employees ranges from 27% in Canada to 
more than 40% in New Zealand in the OECD tables. More interestingly, we see in 
the Table that job reallocation (the sum of job creation and destruction) declines 
sharply as a function of size, which is also consistent with available evidence: of 
course, our model and parameters generate employment stability for large firms 
in the form of unrealistically large, if unlikely, “catastrophic” job destruction or 
perhaps plant-closure events; still, it is comforting to find that, on average, the 
model-generated job flows accord so well with qualitative evidence.
3.3 Em pirical Im plications
Figure 3.4 illustrates the model’s implications for the wage-size relationship 
by superimposing Monte Carlo data, drawn from the long-run distribution of em­
ployment and business conditions, over the theoretical wage functions of equation 
(3.16). Clusters of points appear at the (w(lmtn, rjn), /m,n) point, and along the 
downward-sloping wage loci identified by equation (3.16) for the various values of 
ti which induce hiring. Wages are clearly decreasing with employment for given 
77: hence, a regression where 77 were controlled for would yield a negative (labour- 
demand originated) relationship between wages and employment. If 77; is not 
observable, however, the model generates a positive cross-sectional relationship 
between wages and employment.
Table 3.3 reports the standardized slope coefficient of a regression (which also 
includes a constant) of wages on employer size, and thick upward-sloping line in 
Figure 3.4 plots predicted values from the same OLS regression. Since our model
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Figure 3.4: Wage functions and a Monte Carlo sample of observations
Table 3.3: Regression of wages on firm size
R 2 0.2273
Variable
Standardized
estimate t
Size 0.4768 19.48
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Table 3.4: Correlation Matrix
Labor d. Wage Empioym. Job cr. Vac. Profits
Labor d. 1.00 0.95 0.74 0.87 0.87 0.54
Wage 0.95 1.00 0.48 0.91 0.91 0.26
Employm. 0.74 0.48 1.00 0.45 0.45 0.92
Job cr. 0.87 0.91 0.45 1.00 1.00 0.23
Vac. 0.87 0.91 0.45 1.00 1.00 0.23
Profits 0.54 0.26 0.92 0.23 0.23 1.00
features homogeneous labour and uniform market power, this regression corre­
sponds to what a researcher might find in data where all worker characteristics 
are controlled for, but wage differentials are generated by dynamic heterogeneity 
across firms under diminishing returns to labour.
The model-generated data feature a sizable wage-size effect but, of course, 
the upward sloping regression line does not imply a causal relation of firm size 
to wages. Rather, it reflects the interplay of exogenous shocks to labour demand 
and the labour-supply constraints introduced by slow matching. How should 
data generated by the wage equation (3.16) be approached by an empirical re­
searcher? Among firms with similar employment levels, wages are importantly 
affected by the labour-demand heterogeneity indexed by 77 in our model. While 
77 is not directly observable, such variables as job creation and profits are also 
endogenously determined by 77. For a given /, higher 77 is associated to faster job 
creation by equation (3.31), and to a larger excess of revenue over labour-related 
costs: by virtue of (3.12) and the structure of hiring costs, each firm’s thusly 
defined “operating surplus” reads
$(*> Vi) = Vd ~  -  w(l , rji)l -  CV ^  . (3.36)
Table 3.4 reports the correlation matrix of four observable variables (wages, 
employer size, job creation and profits) with each other and the unobservable
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Table 3.5: Regression of wages on profits
R 2 0.06926
Variable
Standardized
estimate t
Profits 0.2632 8.928
Table 3.6: Regression of wages on firm size and profits
R2 0.4252
Standardized
Variable estimate t
Size 1.515 83.17
Prof. -1.130 -62.01
labour demand index rj. Other than with size, wages are also significantly corre­
lated with profits, which are significant in the wage regressions reported in Table 
3.5 and Table 3.6.
The dynamic nature of the model has further insightful implications for re­
gressions on simulated data. We see in Table 3.4 that wages are most closely 
correlated with vacancies and job creation: by (3.31) and (3.16), vacancies and 
wages are both linearly related to employment levels at hiring firms, and only the 
mass of not-hiring firms prevents their correlation from being unitary. Table 3.7 
regresses wages versus vacancies, and finds a much higher R 2 than that obtained 
in regressions with employer size and/or firm profits. The significance of job cre­
ation in a cross-section regression persist also when we control for firm size, as 
reported in Table 3.8.
Finally Table 3.9 regresses wages on all the observable variables. Each coef­
ficient is significant and, with respect to Table 3.7, R2 increases further.
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Table 3.7: Regression of wages on vacancies /  job creation
R2 0.8268
Variable
Standardized
estimate t
Vac. 0.9093 165.7
Table 3.8: Regression of wages on firm size and vacancies
R2 0.8327
Standardized
Variable estimate t
Size 0.08615 16.24
Vac. 0.8706 164.1
Table 3.9: Regression of wages on profits, size and jc.
R2 0.8359
Variable
Standardized
estimate t
Size
Prof.
Vac.
0.2573
-0.1678
0.8330
49.41
-32.22
160.0
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3.4 D iscussion
It would be misleading, of course, to give structural interpretations to the signs 
or sizes of regression coefficients in Table 3.9: all regressors are endogenous, and 
their significance spuriously reflects their role of proxies (to various degrees) for 
the unobservable labour-demand parameter rf. Here we review in more detail 
the evidence on wage/size differentials and the various theoretical approaches 
to their interpretation. We seek to evaluate the overall realism of the modeling 
approach we propose, discussing ways in which it incorporates and generalizes 
earlier theoretical models, and pointing out novel empirical implications.
3.4.1 E vidence and T heoretical Interpretations
Krueger and Summer (1988), using panel observations of individual workers, find 
that industry dummies in individual wage equations are always significant, even 
when controlling for individual effects, quality of working conditions and union 
threats. They conclude that the traditional explanation for wage differentials, 
based on the idea of compensating differentials does not find sufficient support 
in the data. Alternatively, efficiency wage theories (Akerlof, 1982) seem particu­
larly appropriate for rationalizing the existence of persistent and pervasive wage 
differentials.
In a world with homogeneous workers and decreasing marginal returns to 
labour, the wage-size effect must necessarily be connected to a firm’s ability to 
pay. Traditional efficiency wage models (Weiss, 1966 and Mellow, 1982) explicitly 
take into account this possibility.
A positive association between wage paid and employer size was noted by 
Krueger and Summers (1988), confirmed by many papers on wage differentials 
(e.g. Even and Macpherson, 1994; Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991; Morissette, 
1993), and exhaustively documented by Brown and Medoff (1989) who consider
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six possible explanations for the size-wage effect. They find support for the idea 
that large employers hire higher quality workers. Nevertheless, their fixed effect 
estimates in individual wage equations suggest strongly that the size-wage effect 
cannot be explained by a pure size-labour quality differential. Unfortunately, 
the other explanations considered by Brown and Medoff fail to account for the 
remaining effect. Possible mechanisms include the fact that large firms pay higher 
wages to compensate for inferior working conditions (Masters, 1969; Stafford, 
1980); large firms face higher risk of unionization (Podgursky, 1986) or they 
share with workers their above normal profits (Weiss, 1966; Mellow, 1982); they 
pay higher wages to offset the lower applicant-to-job vacancy ratio (Weiss and 
Landau, 1984) or they pay higher wages to reduce costly monitoring (Oi, 1983). 
The ability to pay argument, particularly relevant for the issues of this paper, 
is rejected by Brown and Medoff on the basis that large firms do not have more 
rigid product demand. This, of course does not exclude the possibility for large 
firms of being, on average, more profitable.
A second strand of literature on wage differentials refers to a persistent cor­
relation between wages and various measures of an employers’s ability to pay. 
Blanchflower et al. (1996) merge data on individual wages with industrial data 
on profits and show that in various wage equations industrial profits are persis­
tently significant.5 The major contribution of their paper is to show that a rise 
in sector’s profitability leads to a long- run increase in wages. These test, they 
conclude, produce clear evidence for the fact that pay determination appears to 
exhibit elements of rent-sharing.
5 The fact that wages are positively correlated with various measure of employer ability to 
pay is not new in the literature (Dickens and Katz 1987, Katz and Summers 1989).
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3.4.2 W age-differential Im plications o f E m ploym ent D y­
nam ics
Our modeling perspective does not deny the relevance of intuitive “ability to pay” 
mechanisms in wage determination, and is quite consistent with the empirical 
evidence supporting its real-life relevance. Rather, a dynamic approach to wage 
and firm size determination organizes intuitive insights from previous literature in 
a coherent structural approach. In fact, the model does incorporate in a fashion 
the “ability to pay” idea underlying the empirical role of profits in cross-section 
wage regressions, and a measure of profits is significant when regressions are run 
on model-generated data. Thus, the Blanchflower et al. findings are readily 
rationalized by the model.
Our structural approach, however, points out that such correlations need 
not be causal and—perhaps more importantly—that firms size, as well as firm 
profitability, is in general related to wages. The model interprets rent-sharing 
phenomena in the tradition of bilateral-bargaining approaches to wage determi­
nation. In an environment where matching is costly and time consuming, rents 
reflect scarcity of suitable labour for a growing firm. Inasmuch as wages are de­
termined by the standard surplus-sharing rule (3.10) in a matching environment, 
part of such “adjustment rents” is transferred to incumbent workers.
As firms reach their long-run desired employment levels, however, the marginal 
surplus from additional employment declines: while firms with stronger labour 
demand (and higher profits) are willing to pay more for the labour they hire, 
and do so in equilibrium, wages are a decreasing function of employment along 
the adjustment path associated to a given labour demand schedule. However, 
the “compensating differentials” idea of other empirical approaches to wage-size 
relationships is also not extraneous to our model, and it can explain more per­
sistent wage differentials. In the model, a particular (and also dynamic) sort 
of compensating differentials plays a role—namely, those deriving from the dif-
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ferent outlook offered to employees by firms at different points in the range of 
productivity states. To see this, consider (3.9): a (large) hiring firm, upon reach­
ing its statically optimal employment level such that =  0, would offer
its workers the same human capital level J u as a small (firing) firm—but not 
the same wage level: things can only get better for a small firing firm and (in 
the simple case we consider) things can only become worse for a firm which has 
stopped hiring. At small, labour-hoarding firms, r j u is obtained through a com­
bination of a low wage w(lmtn,r]n) plus an expectation of positive capital gains. 
Large firms, conversely, can offer no capital gains once they reach their long run 
position, and it must be true that
w(l,rii) > ^ ( /mm,77n) Vi > n. (3.37)
Thus, wage size differentials exist between firms which are not hiring (or are 
in their “long run” positions) i f  their outlook on future exogenous events is 
different; in general, a positive association between wages and labour-demand 
strength (hence employment) can be expected whenever a stationary process dis­
turbs individual employers’ demand schedules, and mobility is costly for workers. 
The model proposed here also features adjustment-associated rents: along firm- 
specific productivity “cycles,” because of slow adjustment in the hiring process, a 
growing firm enjoy pure economic rents A(l, rji) > 0 (and its employees are faced 
by prospects of negative capital gains if, as in the special case which we can solve 
explicitly, things can only get worse for them). Wage size differentials can be 
interpreted in terms of firm-rent effects during the adjustment process, but only 
as a compensating differential effect when looking across states.
3.5 Conclusion
The dynamic mechanism we focus on combines elements of standard theoretical 
insights, and is consistent with empirical findings put forward in the literature in
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their support. It also offers distinctive empirical implications. In the specialized 
parameterization that allows explicit solution, wage dispersion is higher among 
small firms (some of which are growing fast, while others are in the model’s “fir­
ing” or inactive state) than among large firms (which, inasmuch as the outlook for 
future developments is uniformly negative for all, offer similar wages to their em­
ployees). The next chapter considers a more complex case where transitions need 
not always occur from hiring to firing, or viceversa. When transitions between 
different hiring states are possible, of course, large firms may face heterogeneous 
expectations of further productivity developments (reintroducing wage differenti­
ation among them). Unfortunately, the model does not admit analytic solutions 
in this case (and, when more than one “bad” transition is possible, the possibility 
arises that firms will optimally choose inaction, further complicating the model’s 
algebra).
The extension of the next chapter, however, does not change the basic qual­
itative predictions of the model in an important respect. In a dynamic environ­
ment, wages should be positively related to employment levels—to the extent 
that both size and wages are correlated to the (unobservable) current position 
of various firm’s labour demand. The model does suggest a better proxy than 
employment for explaining firm level wage dispersion and “firm quality” effects: 
vacancy posting is univocally determined by the marginal value of labour for in­
dividual firms (which determines wages in rent-sharing fashion); in turn, vacancy 
posting determines the rate of employment growth at the individual-firm level. 
Hence, after controlling for employment levels, wages are predicted to be higher 
in faster-growing firms. To our knowledge, there is no evidence on whether this 
is or is not the case in the data. This is not surprisingly, since datasets with 
information both on worker characteristics and individual firms panel dynamics 
are hard if not impossible to come by. The statistical significance of employment 
growth in firm-level wage equations, however, would be a natural test of our
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theoretical perspective’s empirical relevance.
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C hapter 4
W ages and the Size o f Firms: a 
num erical approxim ation to  the  
general m odel
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 showed that the marginal value function A(.) is the solution to
rA(-) = (ru - c x l ) - ( h i + 2kil) +
+  Sijpi (max [0, A(l, ff)\ — A(*)), (4.1)
where
hi =  pr)i +  (1 -  (3)rJu, hi =
Equation (4.1) is a non-linear, non-homogeneous differential equation that can 
not be solved analytically. Nevertheless I showed that the general equation has a 
linear meaningful solution for a particular specification of transition probabilities. 
In chapter 3 I assumed that all negative rj transitions bring the firm to the 
lowest productivity state and I let the other states be reachable only from the 
latter so that, consistent with our notation, pin =  1 for i > n while pn featured 
non-zero transition probabilities to all higher productivity states. Furthermore, 
under these parametric assumptions I explicitly solved for the joint steady-state
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distribution of employer size and wages. Finally, regressions on montecarlo data 
drawn from the long-run distribution showed that the model offered a structural 
interpretation of existing evidence on firm-size wage differential.
Although analytically convenient, the parametric assumption of the previous 
chapter is not fully realistic and the reader may find himself uncomfortable with 
the asymmetry between negative and positive transitions of the productivity pa­
rameter 77. In section (4.2) I relax this simplifying assumption and I work out a 
numerical approximation to the solution of the general equation (4.1). Section
(4.3) compares the value functions under different parametric assumptions while 
section (4.4) simulates the behaviour of a firm under the general model of the 
next section and it shows that all the qualitative results of the specific case solved 
in the previous chapter continue to hold.
4.2 Solving the General M odel: A n exam ple
In what follows I assume that there are only three productivity states 77! > 
772 >  773. Transitions among these states occur with probability intensities <Jt-, for 
i =  1, 2,3, while the transition probability vector pi attaches positive weight to pij 
for i , j  =  1,2,3 with, for notational convenience, pa =  0. The lowest productivity 
states 773 is the non-hiring states and /3 is the amount of labour accumulated by 
these firms. Conversely, the highest productivity 771 represents a hiring state. In 
this general problem a firm in the intermediate state, 772, may be hiring or firing 
depending on the quantity of labour already accumulated.
Let us consider two points I and I+ dl in the region between /3 and Z2, where 
/2, by definition, solves
A(/2, 772) =  0. (4.2)
At a point I between /3 and /2, A*(Z,.) > 0 for i =  1,2 and it is optimal to hire 
at idiosyncratic productivities rji and rj2. By virtue of (4.1), the marginal value
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functions evaluated at I solves
«q2 dAHl 1
(r +  Si)A%  .) =  rji - v l -  (hi +  2h i )  +  - A \ l ,  •)— ^ L± +  ^ ^ ( Z ,  •) (4-3)
for z =  1,2 and j  =  2,1 respectively.
By definition of partial derivatives, it must be true that for dl sufficiently 
small
dAHl 1
A \ l , .) =  A \ l  +  dl, . )  J j i dl> * =  1»2. (4.4)
Using (4.4) into (4.3) yields
(r +  Si) +  =  ( m - < r l ) - ( k i +  2kil)
+ SiPij \ A j (l + d l , .) -  9A3V’ ^ d l )  . (4.5) 
Evaluating (4.3) at I Adi, subtracting the result from (4.5), and rearranging yields
-  ((’■+*)<“+ ?+ '+ *•> ) ( ^ )
-(<t +  2kt)dl+ +  ptjSi ^ dA^ ’ ' ^ dl + ^ A \ l  +  dl)dA,{l + ^  -  0(4.6)
for i= 1, 2 and j = 2 ,1.
For given values of dA and A*(l +  dl,.) for (i = 1,2), (4.6) forms a
non-linear system in dA^ , i = 1,2. If we evaluate (4.6) at I 4- dl =  I2 , by virtue 
of (4.2), the last term in (4.6) vanishes for z =  2. Furthermore, for each / > l2, 
A l(l,r) 1) solves
(r + 81) A 1(l , .) = r?i -  <7/ -  (A, + 2**/) + - A ‘(/, (4-7)
C O’/
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Equation (4.7) is a differential equation that coincides with equation (17) of the 
previous chapter and its linear solution reads
A (/,? 7 i)  =  cli 4* VZ >  I2 - (4:-8)
By virtue of (4.8) it follows that
A ^  (Z 2 ?  772)  =  f l i  +  M 2 5
and _
dA\l2,ri 1) L 
di—  =  bu
where 61 and a\ are defined in equation (19) of chapter 3. To actually solve
(4.6) at I2 we firstly need an expression for l2. By virtue of (4.2) and (4.8), (4.3) 
evaluated at l2 reads
— (7 I2 ~~ {h2 2^2/2) d~ 2^ "I" ^1^ 2) =  0* (4.9)
We thus have sufficient conditions for solving (4.6) at l+dl =  l2. Moving backward 
and proceeding recursively, making use of (4.4), it is possible to obtain values for 
the marginal value functions at a sequence of points {/*;, A 1(lk, 771), A2( 4 ,772)}- 
Finally, an approximation of lmxn =  h, ,  is obtained at a point in the sequence 
that satisfies
r)3 -  elk. -  w(.) -  +  S3Y,P3iA1(lk^Vi) -  0, (4.10)
where
0 2w(lk.,r) 3) =  r J u -  — —  S3^2p3iA%(lk^rfi), (4.11)
1 P  i = 1
and
di ~ d 3h Hi— 01— ' (4'12)
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Figure 4.1: A1 (Z, 771) between /3 and l2
4.3 A Sim ple Exam ple
To implement the methodology sets forth in the previous section I use the struc­
tural parameters listed in Table (4.1). Section (4.2) showed how to approximate 
the marginal policy function for given values of the equilibrium quantities i9 and 
J u. As I argued in more details in the previous chapter, the policy function of 
the general model is not analytically representable. Even though it is possible to 
derive a numerical approximation of the policy function for given values d and 
J u, it is impossible to calculate analytically the steady-state distribution and 
the equilibrium values of 0 and J u consistent with individual policies. With this 
limitation in mind, I consider the results of the numerical approximation.
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Figure 4.2: Marginal Value Functions
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Figure (4.1) shows the marginal value function of the best productivity in 
the market 4^1(Z,^ 7i) |Pl2>o, in the interval between the labour hoarding value /3 
and the maximum amount of labour accumulated by the intermediate firms l2. 
The same figure reports the marginal value functions for the same parameters 
of Table (4.1) when the switching probability between the highest and the in­
termediate productivity (P12) is zero. The latter parameterization is the one 
worked out in chapter 3 and the dotted line in Figure (4.1) is the linear solution 
A1(.)|pi2=o =  d\ +  bil. Conversely, the bold line of Figure (4.1) is 4^1(-)Ipi2>o7 the 
marginal value function of the best productivity rji when, conditional on chang­
ing the idiosyncratic productivity, there is a non-null probability of reaching the 
intermediate state 772. Intuitively, as accumulated labour tends to l2 the marginal 
value function A1(.)|Pl2>o converges to >11(0 Ipi2=o: as th e marginal value func­
tions of the intermediate state A 2(.) tends to zero the capital gain associated to 
reaching the intermediate state becomes smaller and, eventually, tends to zero, 
exactly as in the parameterization in which any productivity change results in a 
catastrophic switch to the lowest productivity state 773.
Figure (4.2) reports the marginal value functions A1(.) and A 2(.) between 
the labour hoarding size Z3 and the maximum firm size in the market l\. The 
figure shows once again the functions >11(.)Ipi2>o and 4^1(-)lpi2=o between /3 and 
Z2, and it adds the linear solution 4^1(-)Ipi2=o =  ^ 1(-)lpi2>o m  the interval between 
l2 and I3 . When accumulated labour is higher than Z2, following an idiosyncratic 
change 77, it makes no difference whether the new value is 773 with probability one 
or it is 772 or 773 with positive probability p i2 and pi3.
The lower part of figure (4.2) shows the marginal value functions 4^2(.)Ip2i=o 
and -A2(-)Ip2i>o- Since a change in the idiosyncratic state may result not only 
in a capital loss to the lowest 773, but also in a pure capital gain to 771, the 
slope of A 2( .) |P21>o is greater than the slope of A2(.)|P21=0. Furthermore, the 
firm maximum size /2|pi2>o is greater than 2^|pi2=o* Even though the marginal
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Figure 4.3: Wage Functions
productivity (772 — crl) is close to its marginal cost (u;() +  the prospect of a 
positive capital gain makes the firm willing to accumulate more labour.
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Table 4.1: Baseline parameter values
Variable Notation Value
Matching Function:
matching elasticity V -0.400
constant f 1.000
Labor demand slope (all i ) cr 0.325
Labor demand intercepts
m 1.895
m 1.692
r]n 1.462
Transition intensities
Si 0.150
S2 0.180
Sn 0.270
Distribution across hiring states of positive shocks
Pll 0.00
P l 2 0.36
P l 3 0.64
P21 0.22
P22 0.00
P23 0.78
P31 0.36
P32 0.64
P33 0.00
search cost slope C 2.5600
interest rate r 0.060
employees’ bargaining share 0 0.400
Unemployed income z 0.800
Firing cost F 0.000
Equilibirum values:
Market tightness (assumed) 0 2.321
Unemployed welfare (assumed) r J u 0.660
132
4.4 The W age-Size Effect in th e General M odel
Figure (4.3) reports the wage functions. As long as the marginal cost of firing is 
zero the presence of positive switching probabilities P12 and P21 do not affect the 
linear solution worked-out in the previous chapter. W ith respect to the model 
with P12 =  P21 =  0, the interesting feature of the parameterization of Table (4.1) 
is that large firms with I > I2 fire an amount of labour Al = I — I2 when their 
productivity switch to 772. As a consequence, a mass-points of non-hiring, low- 
wage firms will concentrate on I2 • In general, as it is shown in section (4.2) of 
chapter(3), even though firms in their long-run positions offer the same human 
capital J u, the wage paid by these firms will be different and it will depend on 
the capital gains faced by each firm in its long-run position. In this direction, 
and consistent with the notation of this chapter, it is necessary to study in some 
details the wages w(l3, 773), tu(/2,?72) and ttf(/i,77i). Firstly, the largest firms in the 
market, namely firms in Zi, do not face any positive capital gain and, by virtue 
of (21) of chapter 3, reads
w(li,rji) = rJu. (4.13)
Conversely, firms in I2 and /3 face some prospect of capital gains and it must be 
true that
tu(/i,?7i) >  U7(/2,772) (4 -14)
and
w(/i,»7i) >  w (h,r)Z). (4 .15)
Furthermore, the wage paid by non non-hiring firms at I3 will be in general
different, and likely smaller, than the wage paid at I2 . By virtue of (21) of
chapter 3
w { l 2 , r } 2 ) - w { h , m )  =  +  P z 2 A 2 ( l 3 , p 2 ) ) - y ^ ? > 2 P 2 \ A l ( l 2 , r i i )
(416)
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is positive unless S3p3i S2P21 so as to over-compensate the fact that in (4.16) 
A 2 (l3 , 772) >  0 and A 1 (13, 1ft) > A l (l2 ,r}i). If we assume 8 3p3i ~  82P21 it follows 
that
w(lu rfi) > w(l2 ,rf2) > w(l3 ,r]3). (4.17)
Equations (4.16) and (4.17) imply that our model prospective results in a wage- 
size effect even when the firms reach their long-run position. But if we compare 
the results in (4.16) and (4.17) with those of section (4.2) of chapter 3, a difference 
emerges. In the parameterization of chapter 3 large firms can offer no capital gains 
to their employees and the model implies a wage-differential between small and 
large firms in their long-run position, independently on the size and the intensity 
of productivity shocks. Conversely, in the general specification of this chapter, 
firms of intermediate size /2 face prospects of positive and negative capital gains 
(depending whether 772 switches to 771 or to 773 ) and, although unlikely, it is 
conceptually possible that a parameterization of the model overturns the second 
inequality in (4.17). Thus in the general specification, when looking across firms’ 
long-run positions, by virtue of (4.14) and (4.15), it will be true that the largest 
firms in the market offer the highest wage; but simultaneously, when we consider 
the set of all possible long-run position, the relationship between wage and size 
will not necessarily be monotonic.
Furthermore, it is still true that during the firm optimal adjustment path 
positive idiosyncratic shock are associated with larger employment levels and 
higher wages. This is confirmed by figure (4.4), which simulates the behaviour 
of a single firm that hires according to the parameterization of Table (4.1) and 
the policy functions of Figures (4.1) and (4.2). Given the steady-state nature of 
our market, the time-series observations of single firm between t = 1 and t = T, 
for sufficiently large T, replicate the cross-section behaviour of T  firms in the 
market. From the cluster of points in Figure (4.4) two point masses are clearly 
distinguishable, in correspondence to l3 and l2 and, overall, the cross-section ob-
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Table 4.2: Regression of wages on firm size
R2 0.1518
Variable
Standardized
estimate t
Size 0.3896 20.53
Table 4.3: Regression of wages on profits, size and jc.
R2 0.9926
Variable
Standardized
estimate t
Size
Prof.
Vac.
0.4279
0.009871
0.9117
2569.
59.25
5472.
servations imply a sizable wage-size effect. This is confirmed by the regression 
in Table (4.2), where the coefficient on firm size is positive and significant. Sim­
ilarly to the analysis of the text, it is possible to obtain regressions of wages on 
firm size, firm vacancies and profits. The results are qualitatively analogous to 
those in the text and Table (4.3) confirms that vacancies, profits and size have 
significant effect on wages. Overall, the interpretation of Tables (4.2) and (4.3) 
is the same as the one given in Chapter 3.
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Figure 4.4: The Wage-Size Effect
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C hapter 5
Job Flows and Plant Size 
D ynam ics: Traditional M easures 
and A lternative E conom etric  
Tecniques
5.1 Introduction
In the last few years, much of the discussion on the labour market focused on the 
process of job formation and destruction and great emphasis has been given to 
the relation between job flows and firm size, both in the policy debate (OECD 
1994a) and among academic scholars (Davis et al. 1995).
If we define firm size as employment in a base year, across countries, two sta­
tistical regularities hold. Job creation and destruction are substantially greater 
among small firms and net employment changes are a decreasing function of es­
tablishment size. These findings stimulated the policy emphasis on the crucial 
role of small firms in the process of job formation. Unfortunately, several statisti­
cal problems are associated with these findings. Among others, Davis et al. (1994; 
1995) point out the regression fallacy associated with the relationship between 
net employment changes and firm size and they suggest an alternative approach 
based on the notion of long run optimal size. When firm size is measured as the 
average employment across all years in the sample, Davis et al. show that in the
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U.S. manufacturing sector there is no clear relationship between net job creation 
and firm size.
In this paper I firstly assess the traditional measures and I argue that any def­
inition of firm size that arbitrary forces each unit in the sample into a pre-defined 
size category, will ignore the flows of jobs between size categories. Furthermore, 
when firm size is defined as the average employment across all years in the sam­
ple, a positive relationship between firm size and net job creation may simply 
indicate that initially smaller firms created jobs throughout the period and end 
up relatively larger.
Clearly, to estimate properly firm size convergence avoiding the regression 
fallacy and to follow accurately employers between size categories, it is necessary 
to apply an alternative econometric technique. Fortunately, methodology for this 
purpose has recently been introduced by Quah (1993a; 1993b) in the context of 
economic growth, and applied by Lamo and Koopmans (1995) in the study of 
plant distribution in the Chemical sector and by Konings (1995b) in a paper that 
studies the evolution of plant size in the British manufacturing sector. Using a 
balanced panel for the Mexican manufacturing sector, I show how conventional 
results may change when firm size dynamics is estimated non parametrically. 
Overall, I find no evidence of small firms systematically creating more jobs than 
larger firms and, thus, no evidence of convergence to the mean for the sample as 
a whole. I show how distribution dynamics varies across industries and how it is 
linked to gross and net flows in each sector. I observe convergence to the mean in 
relatively stable sectors and asymmetric dynamic behaviour between expanding 
and declining industries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section (5.2) briefly describes the data and 
measures job flows for the Mexican manufacturing industry. Section (5.3) assesses 
the traditional methodology for studying the relationship between job flows and 
establishment size. Section (5.4) describes an alternative technique based on a
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direct estimate of the dynamics of the entire firm-size distribution. Section (5.5) 
applies the methodology at the aggregate and at the industry level while section
(5.6) briefly summarizes and concludes the paper.
5.2 M easurem ent Criteria
5.2.1 T he D ata
The dataset I will use is a panel of 2021 continuing establishment over the period 
of 1984 to 1990 (7 years). The source of data are administrative records of the 
“Annual Industrial Survey” of the Mexican manufacturing industry. On average, 
it covers between 70 and 80 percent of the industry in terms of production and 
employment. The average establishment size in the sample is 220 employees 
and entry and exit of establishments are not observed. Each establishment is 
assigned to an industry at the level of the Mexican Census classification. These 
industries have been aggregated to the “Raga” level, which corresponds to the 
classification used in the Input Output table of 1985. The number of industries is 
47, which can be aggregated to 10, as I do in section 5.5. Within the sample, large 
establishments correspond to the manufacturing population while small firms are 
randomly sampled. The under-representation of small firms may apparently be a 
problem for the issue of this paper, but I do not see why the results of this paper 
should be affected by the fact that smaller establishments are randomly sampled. 
I will come back to this point later in the paper.
5.2.2 N otation  and Definitions
Let xa be the size of establishment i at time t , which, as we outline in the next 
section, can be measured as employment at time t, as employment between t and 
t +  1 or as average employment in all years in the sample. The growth rate of
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establishment i time t , ga, is then defined as
Kit  1 / r  1 \9it = -----   , (5.1)Xit
where na and nn-i  are employment for establishment i at time t and t — 1 
respectively. If X{t is measured as the average employment between t and t — 1, 
(5.1) is similar to the growth rate used by Davis- Haltiwanger (1990) and (1992), 
with deaths (births) corresponding to the left (right) endpoint. In the present 
paper the interval will be somewhat smaller since we do not observe deaths and 
births. The gross job creation and destruction rate are related to the size weighted 
frequency distribution of firm growth rates in the following way. Let job creation 
in sector j  at time t be defined as
J c jt = ' £ 9i * i r  V i :  * t > 0 ’ (5-2)
J e i
where X j t represents the size of sector J  and /  is the set of all establishment in
sector j  at time t. Job destruction rate, JD j t, is defined analogously for declining
establishments. Gross job reallocation in sector j  at time t, J R j t , is simply the 
sum of gross job creation and destruction while the difference between the two, 
NETjt  is the traditional measure of net employment changes. Since we do not 
observe jobs, vacancies and entry and exit, the measurement criteria adopted 
underestimate the true measures of job creation and destruction. For the first 
two problems there is little one can do about it. The problem with entry and 
exit is potentially more serious. However, Hamermesh (1993) and OECD (1994a) 
estimate the relative importance of the various flows of jobs and conclude that the 
contribution to net and gross employment changes of continuing firms accounts 
for roughly 70 percent of the gross flow of jobs. With this coefficient in mind, we 
proceed to the calculation of the flows.
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Table 5.1: Job Flows in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector
Year Job
Creation
JC
Job
Destruction
J D
Net Employment 
Change 
N E T
Job
Reallocation
J R
1984-85 7.49 3.6 3.89 11.09
1985-86 4.65 6.47 -1.82 11.19
1986-87 4.29 5.18 -0.89 9.48
1987-88 4.66 4.1 0.56 8.77
1988-89 7.2 4.08 3.11 11.29
1989-90 6.77 4.86 1.91 11.64
Pearson
Correlat.
p { J C, NET)
0.932
(0.006)
p{JD,  N E T ) 
-0.859 
(0.028)
p{JR,  NE T )  
0.4 
(0.421)
Marginal significance in parenthesis
5.2.3 A B rief Look at th e  A ggregate Flows
Figure (5.1) plots aggregate manufacturing employment over time. The second 
half of the eighties is a period of sustained net job creation with overall employ­
ment growth equal to 7 percent between 1984 and 1990. Table (5.1) reports the 
time series introduced in the previous section and Figure (5.2) plots the series 
against time. Values for net employment changes indicate that between 1984 and 
1990 employment fluctuates substantially, with more than 3 percent employment 
growth in 1984 and 1988 and almost 2 percent fall in 1985. Correlation values in 
Table (5.1) show that employment changes are strongly correlated with both job 
creation and destruction. Job reallocation, with the exception of 1986 and 1987 
is approximately constant, and does not show any increase during the recession, 
as in U.S. data compiled by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990).
141
Xo
CO
©
I960
V  e a r *
Figure 5.1: Manufacturing Employment 1984-1990
142
G>
O
C3C=»«I
1986 198985 1988
Year
Figure 5.2: Aggregate Job Flows: 1984-1990
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5.3 Job Flows and Firm Size. The Traditional 
Approach: A ssessm ent and M easures.
The definition of gross job flows in (5.2) depends clearly on the way establish­
ment size is defined. Different size definitions yield different results. In this 
section I show how the results are affected by each definition and I discuss the 
methodological problems associated with each measure.
When we measure establishment size by employment in the base year, across 
countries, two statistical regularities hold. Table (5.2) reports the distribution of 
gross job flows and employment by establishment size for eight OECD countries. 
Job reallocation declines sharply as a function of size. R&P (1995) argues that 
the “empirical evidence in favour of the inverse relationship between job turnover 
and firm size appears to be the only sure result that we have... It shows up in 
all countries, independently of the data sources and methodology, as well as of 
the prevailing institutions” . Table (5.2) reports also a remarkable relationship 
between net employment changes and firm size. For 7 out of 8 countries in the 
sample net job creation is positive in small firms, while the opposite seems true 
for large firms. In this section we consider in some details these findings and we 
point out why the second relationship is based on a common regression fallacy and 
thus totally uninformative on the role of small firms in the job creation process.
Table (5.3) reports gross flows by establishment size for the Mexican man­
ufacturing sector and confirms the empirical regularities found in the OECD 
economies of Table (5.2). Job reallocation is more than 23 percent for the small­
est size category and declines sharply as a function of size. Furthermore, with an 
average employment growth of 1 percent, large firms underperform the aggregate 
economy while, at the same time, small firms grow at an exceptional average rate 
of 11 percent. The 11 percent growth is entirely driven by the average creation 
rate of over 17 percent.
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Table 5.2: Net Employment Change by Establishment Size Class across the 
OECD
Country period Size Job
Reallocation
Net
Changes
Canada 1983-91 <20 39.01 7.36
20-99 26.89 2.21
100-499 26.15 0.92
>500 15.99 -0.41
Finland 1986-91 <20 29.83 2.46
20-99 19.85 -2.32
100-499 18.37 -4.27
>500 16.59 -6.86
Germnay 1986-91 <20 32.31 0.57
20-49 18.20 -2.20
50-99 13.75 -3.49
100-249 12.25 -3.89
250-499 13.98 -4.96
500-999 11.31 -4.83
1000-2499 16.77 -14.19
2500-4999 8.8 -7.32
>5000 8.47 -8.47
Italy 1984-93 <5 43.49 6.36
6-9 30.78 0.08
10-19 25.41 -0.84
20-49 20.77 -1.32
50-99 17.38 -1.30
100-199 15.15 -1.52
200-499 13.47 -1.42
500-999 12.34 -1.43
>1000 8.76 -2.28
New Zeland 1987-92 <20 37.67 0.96
20-99 32.77 -6.13
100-499 21.57 -3.55
>500 45.07 -20.56
Sweden 1985-92 <20 39.84 5.64
20-99 25.31 -1.86
100-499 21.57 -3.55
>500 21.82 -5.48
U.K. 1987-89 <5 77.50 34.1
5-9 48.6 11.2
10-19 34.40 5.20
20-49 26.90 4.10
50-99 24.00 5.80
100-499 23.4 4.2
500-999 26.40 8.60
1000-4999 16.10 1.10
5000-9999 20.8 1.60
>10000 7.3 2.1
U.S. 1973-88 jl9 41.1 10.3
20-49 26.7 0.6
50-99 23.4 -0.7
100-249 20.6 -1.7
250-499 17.3 -2.5
500-999 15.3 -2.7
1000-2499 14.1 -2.6
2500-4999 13.3 -2.5
5000-9999 11.8 -2.4
Source: R&P (1995) and reference therein; 
U.S. figure from Davis et al. (1995)
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Table 5.3: Job Flows by Establishment Size Category 
_____________ Establishment Size as Employment in Base Year
Employees
< 2 0
Employees
2 0 - 5 0
Employees
5 1 - 9 9
Employees 
100 -  500
Employees 
>  500
Average Job 
Creation 17.33 9.07 8.42 6.66 5.1
Average Job 
Destruction 5.99 4.9 5.2 4.7 4.71
Average Job 
Reallocation 23.33 14.01 13.68 11.3 9.8
Average Net 
Change 11.3 4.08 3.1 1.9 0.39
Average weighted by the number of jobs in each year
Recently, a number of scholars, notably Davis et al. (1995), have pointed 
out the statistical problems linked to the results in Table (5.3). Firstly, higher 
rates of job creation by small establishments should be treated with particular 
attention. Given our measure of job flows, it turns out that a firm of size 10 
that creates and destroys one job records a reallocation rate of 20%, while if 
the same two jobs had been created by an establishment of 100 employees, the 
same figure would be 2%. Furthermore, higher net employment changes by small 
firms do not imply by themselves that small establishments create proportionally 
more jobs. Such conclusions should also consider the share of job creation with 
respect to the employment share by each category. Table (5.4) takes explicitly 
into consideration the shares and the proportion of jobs created by each category. 
The fraction of jobs created by each category over the employment share in the 
same category is a measure independent of the relative size of the category and, 
consequently, a proper comparison across categories can be made. On average 
the ratio between the share of jobs created by small firms over their employment 
share is more than 3, against 0.86 for the establishments with more than 500 
employees. Among the two extremes, the relationship falls monotonically. It is 
necessary to stress the difference between net and gross flows before reaching any
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Table 5.4: Proportional Measure of Job Flows by Establishment Size Category
Employees 
< 20
Employees
2 0 - 5 0
Employees
5 1 - 9 9
Employees 
100 -  500
Employees 
> 500
Average Employment 
Share 0.2 1.6 4.5 36.4 58.1
Share of Job Creation 
Employment Share 
(a)
3.15 1.56 1.45 1.13 0.86
Share Job Destruction 
Employment Share
(b)
1.27 1.06 1.11 1.00 0.98
Net Proportional 
Share 1.87 0.50 0.34 0.13 -0 .12
(a) Job created by each category over 
employment share in the same category
(b) Job destroyed by each category over 
employment share in the same category
conclusion from this partial result. In Table (5.4) I calculate the same ratio for 
job destruction and it turns out that small firms also play a more active role in 
the process of job destruction. Again, the relationship between our proportional 
measure of job destruction and firm size falls monotonically. Even though small 
firms more than proportionally create and destroy jobs, the last rows of Table
(5.4) shows that the difference between rows 2 and 3 in Table (5.4) is positive 
for small firms and negative only for the very large firms. Overall, Table (5.4) 
confirms a more active role of small establishments in the process of net job 
formation.
Naturally, from the results of Table (5.4), we expect the growth rate of each 
firm to be negatively correlated to its initial size. Establishment growth rate 
regressions and studies on the evolution of the size distribution have been at
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Table 5.5: Regressions of Establishment Growth Rate on Establishment Size
Establishment Size as Employment in Base Year 
__________________ Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Establishment i at time t______
In (employment) ,-t
(1)
-0.0097
(-6 .28)
(2)
-0.0096
(-6.22)
(3)
-0.0141
(-8.199)
Time Dummies No Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No Yes
F  statistic F( l ,  12124) =  39.461 F( l ,  12118) =  22.059 F( l ,  12124) =  4.999
Number of 
Observations
12126 12126 12126
t statistics in parentheses
the core of a large literature in Industrial Organisation (Evans 1987a; 1987b). 
The simplest version of a firm growth model is one in which growth rates are 
independent of initial size, as predicted by the well-known G ibrat’s Law. We 
thus estimate
In fo , )  -  /n(x.-,,_i)
---------- — ------------=  a + bln(Xij-i) +  itit, (5.3)
where xn and xa-i  are employment in establishment i at time t and t — 1, A t  is 
the time interval between successive observations and un is a white noise. Regres­
sions in Table (5.5) estimate a negative and significant coefficient on initial size, 
even when we control for sectoral and time characteristics. Regressions in Table
(5.5) are only illustrations of well-known results in the Industrial Organization 
literature and equations in the spirit of (5.3) have been considered as evidence 
against Gibrat’s law. Results in Tables (5.3),(5.4) and (5.5) all point towards the 
same conclusion and should throw evidence on an important relationship between 
job creation and small firms.
Despite the evidence provided in Tables (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5) several dif­
ficulties remain. The major problem connected with the role of small firms in 
the job creation process is the statistical fallacy known as the Galton fallacy, or 
regression to the mean. The regression bias arises in any longitudinal data set
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and has received particular attention in the empirics of economic growth (Quah 
(1993a) and Friedman (1992). Technically, because of the Galton fallacy, when 
we regress net employment changes by firms on initial employment, a negative 
coefficient on initial size, exactly as in Table (5.5), is uninformative about the 
relationship between initial size and firm growth *. Intuitively, results in Tables
(5.3), (5.4) and (5.5) can be affected by the regression fallacy for the following 
reason. If a firm suffers from transitory deviation of employment around its long­
term optimum size, temporarily smaller firms will gain jobs during their path 
to equilibrium, and vice-versa for temporarily larger firms. If establishment size 
is measured as employment in base year, the existence of temporary deviation 
would bias upward job creation by small firms and job destruction by large firms. 
Consequently, when we regress firm growth over initial employment, a negative 
coefficient on initial size may simply capture the existence of temporary shocks, 
without telling anything about the underlying relationship between firm size and 
firm growth.
Davis et al. (1995) propose a measure of establishment size that tries to cap­
ture an establishment optimal long- run size. To avoid the regression fallacy, they 
attribute job flows to a smaller or larger size category calculating the average size 
across all observations in the sample. In their study for the U.S. manufacturing 
sector, they do not find any systematic relationship between establishment size 
and long-run firm size measure.
Table (5.6) computes job flows by firm size measuring establishment size as 
the average employment over all years in the sample. Table (5.6) is constructed 
using the same size category as Table (5.4), but assigning an establishment to 
each category according to its average employment between 1984 and 1990. The 
last row of Table (5.6) reverses the results of Table (5.3) and shows a positive
!Quah (1993b) shows why a negative coefficient in regressions in Table (5.6) is consistent 
with a stationary standard deviation in the underlying distribution.
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Table 5.6: Proportional Measure of Job Flows by Establishment Size Category
Firm Size as Average Employment between 1984 and 1990
Employees 
< 20
Employees
2 1 - 5 0
Employees
5 1 - 9 9
Employees 
100 -  500
Employees 
> 500
Average Employment 
Share 0.2 1.6 4.5 31.4 63.0
Average Job 
Creation 7.62 6.41 6.72 6.37 5.43
Average Job 
Destruction 8.52 6.79 6.3 5.2 4.18
Average Job 
Reallocation 16.1 13.2 13.07 11.6 9.6
Average Net 
Change -0.009 -0.003 0.003 1.11 1.25
Share of Job Creation 
Employment Share 
(a)
1.26 1.10 1.14 1.09 0.91
Share Job Destruction 
Employment Share
(b)
1.73 1.44 1.34 1.10 0.87
Net Proportional 
Share -0 .47 -0 .34 -0 .1 9 -0 .01 0.037
(a) Job created by each category over 
employment share in the same category
(b) Job destroyed by each category over 
employment share in the same category
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monotonic relationship between establishment size and net employment changes. 
Similar conclusions hold for the bottom row of Table (5.6), which replicates the 
calculation of Table (5.4) with the new long-run size. A casual interpretation 
of the result of Table (5.6) indicates that small firms more than proportionally 
destroy jobs.
Even though Table (5.6) may partially avoid the regression fallacy, it does not 
give us a clear answer on the relationship between firm size and job flows. Results 
in Table (5.6) may simply indicate that firms initially small ( large) created 
(destroyed) jobs throughout the period and ended up relatively large (small). 
Furthermore, to the extent that the latter interpretation is correct, it seems 
that substantial dynamics between category is taking place. In all the Tables 
so far presented, we focused exclusively on within category job creation and this 
practice, by construction, hides any intradistribution dynamics. This discussion 
should highlight the fact that the definition of small and large establishments 
is a relative concept and any such definition is somehow arbitrary. In the next 
section I consider an alternative econometric technique that allows us to measure 
job flows and firm size avoiding the Galton fallacy and explicitly considering job 
flows between size categories.
5.4 Job Flows Betw een Category and A nalysis 
of Convergence
The analysis of the previous section suggested that substantial intradistribution 
dynamics may take place and a considerable number of firms are overtaking each 
other. A first way of looking at the problem in a different way is as follows. Let 
Tin denote employment in establishment i at time t , and let us analyse the natural 
log of relative size (nt*/n*), where nt is the average employment in the sample 
at time t. Figure (5.3) plots the size distributions in the following way. Arrayed 
along the horizontal axis are more than 2000 establishments in the sample, sorted
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Advancing upward: 19S4. 1986. 1 988. 1 990
Figure 5.3: Ranking of Establishments Over Time
in order of increasing 1984 relative size nit/ n t. The horizontal line at height 0 
indicates the average establishment at time t.
The bottom chart in Figure (5.3), monotonic by construction, any estab­
lishment below (above) the dotted line in the first panel has employment lower 
(higher) than the average in 1984. Proceeding further vertically upwards in Fig­
ure (5.3), we plot additional cross-profile lines at two year intervals (1986,1988 
and 1990). In these graphs, firms overtake each other when succeeding cross- 
profiles become non-monotone. As suggested by Quah (1994), to understand 
better these graphs, let us consider two simple experiments. Suppose the cross- 
section of establishments were only adjusting towards the same steady state with­
out overtaking each other, i.e. converging towards the mean. Then the profile
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in Figure (5.3) should maintain its monotonic property and its slope flatten out. 
This is not what unambiguously happens in Figure (5.3). Suppose, conversely, 
that establishments of different size were steadily diverging from each other. This 
time the cross-profile should still maintain its monotonic property, but with an 
increasing slope over time. As before, this is not what we see in the graph. The 
only obvious conclusion from Figure (5.3) is that firms continuously overtake 
each other and the monotonicity property of the first chart is lost over time. In 
this context, what we really need are econometric methods that allow us to mea­
sure job creation between size categories. Methodology for this purpose has been 
recently introduced by Quah (1993a; 1994) in the empirics of economic growth.
In what follows, let Ft denote the size distribution across establishments at 
year t ; Quah suggests that the simplest probability model that can describe the 
dynamic behaviour of Ft is
Ft =  T*(Ft- i , u t), (5.4)
where T* is an operator that maps a probability measure and a disturbance into 
another probability measure. Note that carrying out aggregate statistics of F , 
as we did in the previous section, would not suffice since we would hide any 
intra distribution dynamics. Furthermore, if we are interested in the long-run 
behaviour of the size distribution we can proceed as follows. If we ignore the 
disturbance term ut and we iterate expression (5.4), the size distribution at time 
s > t can be described as
Ft+S = (T*)sFt. (5.5)
Finally, if we let s go to infinity, the long-run (ergodic) distribution of establish­
ment size can be characterised. In this context convergence (towards the mean) 
might manifest in Ft+S tending towards a mass point; alternatively the size dis­
tribution partitioning in small and large firms might be described by Ft+S being 
characterized by two points or a bimodal distribution.
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Note that the stochastic difference equation (5.5) is untractable. The problem 
with (5.5) is that as long as F  is a continuous variable, there are an infinite number 
of states. In this paper we focus on the simplest treatment we can have of (5.5) 
and we simplify the problem by approximating T* in the following way. We first 
assume a countable state space for firm size S  =  s l , . . . , s r  and we transform 
T* into a simple transition probability matrix Q, which makes the difference 
equation (5.5) tractable. The problem becomes simply
Ft+i = QFt, (5-6)
where Q encodes all the relevant information about mobility within the cross 
section distribution and allows us to study the long-run ergodic size distribution 
of firms. The framework set forth let us infer both intradistribution dynamics 
encoded in the matrix Q and its long-run ergodic behaviour through successive 
iteration.
5.5 R esults
To avoid the problems of arbitrariness in the size definition, we consider em­
ployment size with respect to the average establishment in each year. Category 
thresholds are determined to make the initial distribution of firms uniform. Since 
we choose five categories, the initial proportion of establishments in each cate­
gory is 0.2. Table (5.7) shows the estimate of a one year transition m atrix for 
the total manufacturing sector. In Table (5.7) the upper end of the state 0.175 
indicates that in the first category we find all establishments whose employment 
is less of 17.5 percent than the average establishment in 1984. The mean es­
tablishment falls in the fourth category. Given these categories, we estimate the 
transition probability for each year of observation. We obtain six estimates and, 
averaging out across time, we obtain the Markov chain of Table (5.7). Obviously 
most of the probability lies in the main diagonal. This is a simple indication that
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employment is highly persistent- Furthermore, entries in the main diagonal are 
higher in the first and last rows. This follows simply from the fact that firms 
in those categories can only move in one direction. One of the most important 
observations from Table (5.7) concerns elements in the third row. The establish­
ments in the third category have a higher probability of becoming smaller than 
bigger, the contrary to what we would expect in a world where establishments 
converge towards the mean. Similarly, the probability mass of an establishment 
moving from the first to the second row is smaller than the probability of falling 
from the second to the first row. Finally, plants in the fourth category have an 
higher probability of falling into the third category than moving up. The last 
row in Table (5.7) reports the ergodic distribution implied by entries in Table
(5.7) and it does not show any evidence of establishment size converging to the 
mean. If anything, there is some evidence of an increasing weight of the smaller 
category, but no evidence of convergence to the mean by initially small and large 
establishments, as results in Tables (5.3),(5.4) and (5.5) would predict. Table
(5.8) confirms the results of Table (5.7), for a one step transition matrix. What 
is happening to intradistribution dynamics is a large movement of initially larger 
establishments toward a smaller size category, with no evidence of a persistent 
growth by initially smaller firms towards the mean.
Firm size evolution depends primarily upon technological characteristics and 
market structure typical of the industry in which each establishment operates. 
After all, once we have realized that there is nothing peculiar in the behaviour 
of small firms as a whole, we can start looking at what happens within each in­
dustry. In what follows we ask the following questions. Is regression to the mean 
observed in any industrial sector, independently of its employment dynamics? Al­
ternatively, do we observe different size distribution dynamics in different sectors? 
If convergence is not observed in some sectors, is this phenomenon correlated with 
some other observable characteristics, such as average firm size, changes in the
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Table 5.7: One Year Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Total Manufacturing 
__________ Time Stationarity__________
Upper end of 
the state
0.175 0.355 0.665 1.37 oo
0.175 0.925 0.0714 0.00322 0.00 0.00
0.355 0.0847 0.823 0.0890 0.0037 0.00
0.665 0.0042 0.0883 0.824 0.0823 0.0085
1.37 0.00123 0.0045 0.0826 0.0849 0.0629
oo 0.00 0.0008 0.000161 0.0668 0.931
Ergodic 0.242 0.20 0.196 0.188 0.174
Table 5.8: 5 Years Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Total Manufacturing 
__________ Time Stationarity__________
Upper end of 
the state
0.175 0.355 0.665 1.37 oo
0.175 0.832 0.151 0.173 0.00 0.00
0.355 0.218 0.576 0.19 0.015 0.00
0.665 0.0198 0.183 0.587 0.20 0.0099
1.37 0.0495 0.00173 0.218 0.636 0.124
oo 0.00 0.0483 0.0217 0.145 0.829
Ergodic 0.287 0.198 0.203 0.175 0.13
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Table 5.9: Mobility and Convergence Across Sectors
Average 1984-1990. Total Manufacturing 
__________________________ Time Stationarity_____________
Industry Ergodic Distribution 
5 Size categories(*)
N E T
(a)
J R
(b)
Average 
Mean (c)
Mean 
Change (d)
Mobility 
Index (e)
Group 1:
Wood 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.1 7.5 181.6 0.01 0.158
Chemical 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.24 0.21 1 7.9 263 0.07 0.151
Group 2:
Textile 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.34 -1 7.9 295.1 -0.06 0.175
Car 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.31 0.30 -1.5 10.7 266.5 -0.1 0.155
Paper 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.18 0.51 -0.6 8.3 161.9 -0.037 0.184
Group 3:
Beverages 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.22 1.9 8.2 765.1 0.15 0.187
Machinery 0.38 0.12 0.21 0.18 0.09 2.7 10.0 667.6 0.209 0.176
Metal 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.8 11 284 0.06 0.227
Food 0.28 0.23 0.18 0.16 0.12 1.6 9.2 238 0.12 0.162
Group 4:
Non Metalic 0.16 0.25 0.19 0.23 0.15 0.0 9.0 323 0.003 0.162
(*) For upper limit of the initial distribution see Appendix
(a) Net employment change between 1984 and 1990
(b) Job Reallocation
(c) Average Establishment Size
(d) Proportional Change in the Mean
(e) Shorrock Mobility Index
average firm size? Is there any relationship between job flow magnitude and 
long-run behaviour of the sector?
The appendix reports the upper limit of the categories for 10 sectors for which 
I estimate the transition probability. Even though there are some differences in 
the initial size distribution, each sector has the mean in its fourth category. The 
appendix shows also the transition probability matrix for each sector and the 
ergodic distribution. The transition probability matrix shows that, as expected, 
the highest probability lies in the main diagonal, but entries in the other cells are 
non-zero. As expected, firm employment is highly persistent, but intradistribu­
tion dynamics exist.
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Table (5.9) looks in more details at the ergodic distribution in each sector 
and a series of other statistics related to job flows. The first result in Table (5.9) 
is the difference in the ergodic behaviour across industries. Wood and Chemical 
industry shows some evidence of convergence, with the highest probability clearly 
in the fourth category. The same ergodic behaviour is not observed in other 
industries. Non-Metallic sector registers a different form of convergence, with a 
bimodal concentration of firms in the second and the fourth category. Textile 
and Clothing, the Car industry and paper are characterized by a totally different 
ergodic behaviour, with the mode concentrated in the highest category. Finally 
food, metal, machinery and equipment and beverages, show no clear pattern 
of mobility. Table (5.9) also reports, for each sector, average net employment 
change, job reallocation, average establishment size, the proportional change in 
the mean over time and a measure of Shorrocks (in Geweke et al. (1986)) mobility 
index of persistence, defined as
=  (5.7) 
n — 1
where M  is the mobility index, P  is the Markov chain, n is the number of cate­
gories and t r ( P ) is the trace of P.  A value of M(P)  of 0 indicates an absolute 
persistence in the process, whereas a value of n / n —l indicates the highest possible 
mobility.
Table (5.9) shows that for the converging sectors average net employment 
change is approximately constant and the proportional change in the mean is 
slightly positive. If we take a simple average between groups of sectors, job 
reallocation for Wood and Chemical sectors and the Shorrocks index are the 
smallest between all groups. Conversely, the second group (textile, car and paper) 
has a downward shifting of the mean and a negative average net employment 
change. Both job reallocation and the mobility indices are, on average, higher 
than the corresponding values for the converging sectors. On the other hand,
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group 3 is characterized by a substantial increase in the mean, roughly 15 percent. 
Note that the mobility index for group 3, on average .19, is the highest among the 
three groups of sectors identified. Similarly for job reallocation, with an average 
value of .096.
Table (5.9) suggests that firm size distribution dynamics in each sector is 
linked to the dynamic behaviour of the sector as a whole. Relatively stable 
sectors, with small changes in both the mean and total employment (group 1) 
converge to the mean with relatively little intradistribution dynamics. On the 
other hand, declining sectors, such as those in group 2, experience a mass con­
centration into the highest size categories. Finally, expanding sectors (group 3) 
do not show any particular tendency in the size distribution, but, as a group, 
they are characterised by the highest mobility level, both in term  of job reallo­
cation and the Shorrock index. These results suggest a remarkable asymmetric 
behaviour in the size distribution between expanding and declining sectors, and 
some evidence of convergence for relatively stable sectors.
5.6 Conclusions
In the last decade, much emphasis in the policy debate has been given to the role 
of small firms in the process of job creation. From an empirical standpoint, when 
we measure firm size as employment in a base year, it is true that small firms 
more than proportionally create jobs. In this paper I discussed the problem of 
how to define establishment size and I measured the relation between job flows 
and establishment size with different plant size definitions. I argued that the 
traditional measures suffer from the Galton fallacy and they are uninformative 
on the relationship between job flows and establishment size. Applying non 
parametric techniques best suited for analysing the dynamics of a large cross- 
section, I did not find any long-run movement of initially small establishments 
toward the mean, thus no evidence of convergence. Furthermore, applying the
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analysis at the industry level, I find an interesting asymmetric behaviour in the 
dynamics of the expanding and declining sector. Konings (1995b) in a paper 
that studies the evolution of plant size in the British manufacturing industry 
finds similar results. The next step would be to apply the same methodology 
to other datasets and controll to what extent the results of this paper represent 
a more general result. If these empirical results should be further confirmed, 
important implications for industry dynamics would naturally follow.
5.A Appendix: Transition M atrices at th e  In­
dustry Level
In this section I report the one year transition matrices for the 10 industries of 
the Mexican manufacturing sector.
Table 5.A.1: Food Industry. First Order Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Food Industry 
________Time Stationarity________
Upper end of 
the state
0.225 0.390 0.670 1.38 oo
0.225 0.939 0.052 0.008 0.00 0.00
0.390 0.068 0.842 0.047 0.005 0.00
0.670 0.005 0.115 0.809 0.07 0.00
1.38 0.00 0.0103 0.074 0.862 0.0538
oo 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.929
Ergodic 0.287 0.238 0.183 0.166 0.126
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Table 5.A.2: Beverages Industry. First Order Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Beverages Industry 
__________ Time Stationarity__________
Upper end of 
the state
0.310 0.645 0.950 1.32 oo
0.310 0.929 0.066 0.011 0.00 0.00
0.645 0.062 0.823 0.115 0.00 0.00
0.950 0.005 0.128 0.763 0.11 0.00
1.32 0.00 0.0202 0.075 0.82 0.084
oo 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.0768 0.923
Ergodic 0.174 0.217 0.178 0.205 0.226
Table 5.A.3: Textile and Clothing. First Order Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Textile and Clothing 
___________Time Stationarity___________
Upper end of 
the state
0.175 0.355 0.640 1.32 oo
0.175 0.931 0.066 0.002 0.00 0.00
0.355 0.082 0.832 0.081 0.003 0.00
0.640 0.00 0.072 0.826 0.098 0.002
1.32 0.0058 0.027 0.058 0.861 0.0793
oo 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.0528 0.947
Ergodic 0.172 0.127 0.128 0.226 0.347
Table 5.A.4: Wood Industry. First Order Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Wood Industry 
________ Time Stationarity________
Upper end of 
the state
0.27 0.490 0.815 1.41 oo
0.27 0.923 0.0772 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.49 0.0917 0.795 0.108 0.00 0.00
0.815 0.00 0.0664 0.846 0.0873 0.00
1.41 0.00 0.00 0.075 0.87 0.054
oo 0.00 0.005 0.005 0.056 0.932
Ergodic 0.172 0.145 0.229 0.245 0.21
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Table 5.A.5: Paper Industry. First Order Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Paper Industry 
________ Time Stationarity________
Upper end of 
the state
0.285 0.490 0.705 1.26 oo
0.285 0.884 0.0996 0.00 0.0167 0.00
0.49 0.094 0.80 0.106 0.00 0.00
0.705 0.00 0.111 0.751 0.137 0.002
1.26 0.00 0.0139 0.0662 0.853 0.067
oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0238 0.976
Ergodic 0.09 0.11 0.096 0.183 0.519
Table 5.A.6: Chemical Industry. First Order Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Chemical Industry 
_________ Time Stationarity__________
Upper end of 
the state
0.21 0.4 0.745 1.5 oo
0.21 0.925 0.0068 0.005 0.00 0.00
0.4 0.079 0.817 0.096 0.0063 0.00
0.745 0.059 0.073 0.842 0.0785 0.00
1.50 0.0017 0.00 0.0678 0.874 0.056
oo 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.063 0.937
Ergodic 0.184 0.151 0.204 0.244 0.217
Table 5.A.7: Non-metallic Industry. First Order Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Chemical Industry 
_________ Time Stationarity__________
Upper end of 
the state
0.11 0.28 0.620 1.59 CO
0.11 0.923 0.072 0.0045 0.00 0.00
0.28 0.0479 0.836 0.112 0.0037 0.00
0.62 0.00 0.148 0.773 0.0792 0.00
1.59 0.00 0.003 0.0676 0.885 0.0436
o o 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0663 0.934
Ergodic 0.16 0.255 0.19 0.233 0.153
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Table 5.A.8: Metallic Industry. First Order Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Chemical Industry 
__________Time Stationarity__________
Upper end of 
the state
0.19 0.395 0.750 1.51 oo
0.19 0.879 0.117 0.0038 0.00 0.00
0.395 0.107 0.753 0.137 0.0035 0.00
0.750 0.0075 0.104 0.768 0.12 0.00
1.51 0.00 0.0068 0.138 0.773 0.0819
oo 0.00 0.003 0.00 0.0776 0.919
Ergodic 0.18 0.19 0.232 0.193 0.196
Table 5.A.9: Machinery and Equipment Industry. First Order Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Machinery and Equipment Industry
Time Stationarity
Upper end of 
the state
0.145 0.35 0.675 1.42 oo
0.145 0.973 0.0269 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.35 0.075 0.808 0.117 0.00 0.00
0.67 0.00 0.06 0.832 0.105 0.00
1.42 0.005 0.00 0.12 0.81 0.0652
oo 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.13 0.870
Ergodic 0.385 0.126 0.217 0.182 0.09
Table 5.A. 10: Car Industry. First Order Transition Matrix
Average 1984-1990. Car Industry 
_______ Time Stationarity_______
Upper end of 
the state
0.14 0.255 0.565 1.24 oo
0.14 0.886 0.114 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.255 0.0616 0.836 0.102 0.00 0.00
0.565 0.00 0.062 0.846 0.092 0.00
1.24 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.877 0.0637
oo 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.066 0.934
Ergodic 0.065 0.122 0.201 0.312 0.301
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C hapter 6 
C onclusions
The study of the determinants of large flows of job creation and destruction in 
labour markets is a fast growing field, both empirically and theoretically. Empir­
ically, the availability of large data-sets at the establishment level in most OECD 
countries threw new light on labour market dynamics (OECD 1994a). Theoret­
ically, the seminal works by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Bertola and 
Caballero (1994) offered structural models for thinking about labour markets 
characterised by simultaneous flows of job creation and destruction. Slow search 
from the part of workers, asymmetries in hiring and firing technologies and the 
idea of jobs (firms) as independent islands hit by idiosyncratic shocks are the key 
features of the new models. This thesis selected four particular issues and tried 
to rationalise them along the lines of the most recent development of the search 
equilibrium literature.
Chapter I, Job Flow Dynamics and Firing Restrictions, focused on the cycli­
cal properties of job creation and destruction. In each country, job creation is 
pro-cyclical while job destruction is counter cyclical but, across countries, huge 
differences exist in the relative volatility of the two flows. Chapter I introduced 
firing delays in the Mortensen Pissarides model (1994) and solved a search model 
that rationalises cross-country differences in the cyclical behaviour of job flows. 
When firing permissions are continuously available, job destruction is instanta-
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neous while job creation takes time and job reallocation moves counter cyclically, 
exactly as in North-American data. Conversely, as firing is restricted to be costly 
and time-consuming, the asymmetry between job flows disappears, exactly as in 
continental Europe data. Chapter I argued that this simple mechanism is behind 
the cross-country differences in the cyclical behaviour of job flows.
From the work of Chapter I, several directions of research should be taken. 
Firstly, following Burda and Wyplosz (1994) for Europe and Mortensen (1994) for 
the U.S., it is necessary to investigate the effect of firing restrictions on worker 
flows. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) simulate a general equilibrium model 
with simultaneous job creation and destruction and they find that a tax on job 
destruction has a sizable negative impact on total employment. W ith respect 
to the approach of Chapter I, Hopenhayn and Rogerson explicitly consider the 
effects of firing restrictions on labour supply decisions. Future researches in the 
matching literature should model in more details the labour supply decisions 
of unemployed job seekers. Finally, in order to obtain clear policy predictions, 
the welfare implications of firing delays and the optimal level of job reallocation 
should be carefully studied.
The international data on job creation and job destruction compiled by 
OECD (1994a) showed large variations across countries. Chapter II, Job Reallo­
cation and Labour Market Policy, used this variation for a sample of ten OECD 
countries to make some inferences about the connection between gross job reallo­
cation on the one hand and aggregate economic performance and labour market 
policy on the other.
The connection between job reallocation and unemployment in the inter­
national domain is rather loose but there is a strong connection between job 
reallocation and long-term unemployment. Countries with less job reallocation 
experience longer durations of unemployment. Since long-term unemployment is 
not good for the skills and the morale of those who suffer it, policy measures that
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restrict job reallocation will have negative impact on the functioning of labour 
markets in this connection. Chapter II examined also the relation between gross 
job reallocation and policy and it found one strong correlation and some other 
looser ones. The indefinite availability of unemployment compensation slows 
down the reallocation of jobs. The mechanism is probably the elimination of low 
productivity unstable jobs that the long-term availability of income support is 
likely to bring about. In Chapter II there is also some evidence that employment 
protection legislation, in the form of restrictions on the dismissal of employees, 
slows down both job creation and job destruction, and so leads to longer dura­
tions of unemployment. In contrast, the level of unemployment and active labour 
market policies are positively but weakly associated with job turnover.
W ith respect to employment protection legislation, Bertola and Rogerson 
(1996) and Boeri (1995), with a slightly different data-set and explicitly consid­
ering the role of entry and exit of firms, do not find a significant effect of firing 
costs on the level of job reallocation. Future research should include in the sam­
ple a higher number of countries and should pay as much attention as possible 
to methodological differences among data-sets.
Chapter III and IV, Wages and the Size of Firms in a Dynamic Matching 
Model, studied the role of a costly and time-consuming matching process in gen­
erating the size distribution of firms and the dynamics of firm-level turnover. The 
chapters offered a realistic extension of the work by Bertola and Caballero (1994), 
where well defined firms with downward sloping labour demand are affected by 
idiosyncratic shocks. Chapters III and IV focused on a dynamic mechanism 
that combines elements of standard theoretical insights, and is consistent with 
empirical findings put forward in the literature in their support. The various 
specifications of the model solved in Chapters III and IV offer a basic qualita­
tive prediction. In a dynamic environment, wages should be positively related 
to employment levels—to the extent that both size and wages are correlated to
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the (unobservable) current position of various firm’s labour demand. However, 
the model does suggest a better proxy than employment for explaining firm level 
wage dispersion and “firm quality” effects: vacancy posting is univocally deter­
mined by the marginal value of labour for individual firms (which determines 
wages in rent-sharing fashion); in turn, vacancy posting determines the rate of 
employment growth at the individual-firm level. Hence, after controlling for em­
ployment levels, wages are predicted to be higher in faster-growing firms. To our 
knowledge, there is no evidence on whether this is or is not the case in the data 
and future empirical researches should try to test these predictions.
Chapter V, Job Flows and Plant Size Dynamics: Traditional Measures and 
Alternative Econometric Techniques, focused on the role of small firms in the 
process of job creation and destruction. From an empirical standpoint, when 
we measure firm size as employment in a base year, small firms more than pro­
portionally create jobs. Chapter V argued that the traditional measures suffer 
from the Galton fallacy and they are uninformative on the relationship between 
job flows and establishment size. Using a sample of Mexican manufacturing 
plants, Chapter V applied non parametric techniques recently proposed by Quah 
(1993a,b) and it did not find any long-run movement of initially small establish­
ments toward the mean, thus no evidence of convergence. Furthermore, applying 
the analysis at the industry level, Chapter V found an interesting asymmetric be­
haviour in the dynamics of the expanding and declining sectors. Konings (1995a), 
in a paper that studies the evolution of plant size in the British manufacturing 
industry, finds similar results. Future researches should apply the methodology 
to other data-sets and should control to what extent the results of Chapter V 
represent an empirical regularity.
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